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Abstract 
An appreciation of the extent of one’s knowledge is known as metaknowledge and it has 
been argued that students’ ability to distinguish between what they know, and what they 
do not, is an important influence on academic success. However, previous research 
suggests a general tendency for individuals to display overconfidence in their 
knowledge, by overestimating how much they know. This study assessed the ability of 
learners studying business in higher education to appreciate the extent of their own 
knowledge and investigated the association between this capability and academic 
achievement. It therefore contributes towards answering broader questions regarding 
how well individuals are able to assess their own capabilities and what the implications 
of this are. 
Quantitative methodology was employed and multiple-choice tests used to investigate 
how accurately students were able to assess the extent of their knowledge of issues 
addressed in their study programmes. Analysis of over 12,500 judgements provided by 
508 respondents revealed a general tendency for overconfidence and indicated that this 
was greater for males, older participants and particularly, for Chinese students. 
Consequently, interventions designed to moderate overconfidence may be particularly 
valuable for these sub-groups. In terms of its potential implications for learning, the 
research indicated that better metaknowledge was positively associated with higher 
levels of academic performance, particularly for those in their first year studying at the 
university. Consequently, while metacognitive skills, such as accurate self-monitoring, 
are typically poorly addressed in business schools, the findings from this study suggest 
that initiatives to improve self monitoring accuracy may be effective in enhancing 
student learning. Additionally, such interventions have other potential benefits for 
learners, since metacognitive monitoring skills may also usefully inform lifestyle 
decisions, as well as improving the chances of success in business and may therefore be 
particularly beneficial for business students. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘To know that we know what we know and that we do not  
know what we do not know; that is true knowledge’ 
          
Confucius 
 
1.1 General Aims   
The purpose of this study is to contribute towards answering questions regarding how 
effectively individuals are able to assess their own capabilities and what the 
implications of this are. More specifically, its substantive aims are to assess the ability 
of learners studying business in higher education to appreciate the extent of their own 
knowledge and to investigate the association between this capability and academic 
achievement. The research is guided by a conceptual framework incorporating 
metacognition and investigates theory suggesting a general tendency for individuals to 
overestimate their own knowledge. The practical relevance of the findings is addressed 
by considering their implications for professional practitioners working in higher 
education. Pring (2000) argues that generalisable conclusions, however tentative, are 
more likely to influence policy makers in professional practice and the methodological 
aim of the study is to employ a quantitative approach to generate findings which may be 
generalised. A non-experimental, fixed research design is applied, using a questionnaire 
to gather data from students studying in higher education. This is analysed using 
statistical techniques to test specific hypotheses developed in the study and findings are 
discussed in the context of relevant academic literature. 
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1.2 The Significance of Metaknowledge  
Educational research has been criticised on the grounds that it does not support 
professional practice sufficiently (Pring, 2000). It is therefore important to consider the 
significance of the issues addressed in this study and their potential implications for 
educational practice. Academic performance in education can be improved by self-
regulated learning (Stone, 2000), an approach in which students take responsibility for 
their own learning (Paris and Winograd, 2003). It typically entails various activities 
which emphasise ‗autonomy and control by the individual, who monitors, directs and 
regulates actions towards goals of information acquisition, expanding expertise and, 
self-improvement‘ (Paris and Paris 2001, p.89). Since it tends to enhance performance, 
self-regulated learning is of interest to researchers investigating how students may 
become more independent and effective learners (Paris and Paris, 2001). Azevedo 
(2009), for example, emphasises the increasing importance of research which 
investigates self-regulatory processes that contribute to learning and academic 
achievement and it has been argued that the driver of self-regulated learning is 
metacognition (Paris and Paris, 2001).  
 
1.2.1 Metacognition 
Metacognition is ‗knowledge about cognition and cognitive processes‘ (Schraw, 2009 
p.34) and is concerned with the appraisal and management of learning, through 
monitoring, evaluation and planning (Everson and Tobias, 1998). Thus, it is concerned 
with thinking about thinking, a process which has been referred to as ‗metathinking‘ 
(Crittenden and Woodside, 2007 p.37). Metacognitive skills can empower students to be 
better managers of their own learning (Paris and Winograd, 1990) and recent research 
has addressed the need to assist students in developing a better understanding of their 
own cognition and thinking (Pintrich 2002). Montalvo and Torres (2004) suggest that to 
enhance learning, the education process should assist students in developing their 
awareness of their own thinking and in becoming their own teachers. However, 
Sternberg (1998) argues that, because teachers are either unaware of them or not sure 
how they should be taught, metacognitive skills are given insufficient attention in 
education. In the specific context of business education, Crittenden and Woodside 
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(2007) argue that, while students and business managers should appreciate the 
importance of metathinking, few business academic programmes incorporate it and 
academics in business schools have not done a good job in integrating it into classroom 
activities in a manner which will enhance students‘ appreciation of how metathinking 
may enhance success in business. This is despite the fact that learning programmes 
often emphasise the importance of critical thinking skills and one of the main reasons 
for its inadequate treatment, may be that it was recognised as an area for study only 
relatively recently (Crittenden and Woodside, 2007).  
 
1.2.2 Self Monitoring 
An important aspect of metacognition is monitoring, which relates to students‘ ability to 
assess their own learning and is one of the main features of self-regulated learning 
(Isaacson and Fujita, 2006). A characteristic of effective learners is having a realistic 
appreciation of their own strengths and weaknesses, since this helps to direct attention 
towards deficiencies (Boud and Falchikov, 1989). Thus, while one of the key purposes 
of education is to provide students with knowledge (Jehng, Johnson and Anderson, 
1993), metacognitive theory emphasises the importance of learners also having a good 
appreciation of the extent of their own knowledge. This concept has been referred to as 
metaknowledge (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992) and the 20
th
 century British philosopher 
Alfred North Whitehead emphasised its relevance when observing that, ‗it is not 
ignorance, but ignorance of ignorance, that is the death of knowledge‘ (Dunning et al, 
2003 p.86). A good appreciation of the extent of our knowledge is important because it 
helps us to understand whether we need more information (Renner and Renner, 2001) 
and in an educational context can therefore provide students with a basis for 
determining future learning strategies (Grimes, 2002), by directing attention to gaps in 
knowledge. Poor metaknowledge on the other hand means that a learner is not 
motivated to address these deficiencies (Sternberg, 1998). However, while good 
metaknowledge may be desirable, the most common research finding is that people tend 
to display overconfidence in their knowledge, by overestimating its accuracy (Renner 
and Renner, 2001). This tendency, has been described as ‗a fundamental feature of 
human psychology‘ (Bar-Tal, Sarid and Kishon-Rabin, 2001 p.77) and has been 
reported in findings of research conducted in many settings. In higher education, for 
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example, Smith, Shields and Washburn (2003), report the tendency for undergraduates 
in higher education to over-optimistically assess when their knowledge is satisfactory. 
Previous studies have also reported that the less knowledgeable are particularly poor at 
monitoring their own knowledge, which represents a two-fold problem for these 
individuals. Not only do they not know, but they also lack the skills to appreciate this 
and unless they are made aware of it, will be unable to remedy this inadequacy 
(Dunning et al, 2003). Consequently, professional educators have a responsibility to 
assist students in appreciating how much they do not know (Kennedy, Lawton and 
Plumlee, 2002). 
 
1.3 Implications for Professional Practice 
1.3.1 The Transfer of Research into Professional Practice 
As well as producing knowledge, the aim of educational research should be to improve 
practice (Winch, 2001) and Gersten at al (1997) argue that the researcher‘s role in 
knowledge production is irrelevant unless it has practical application. However, 
Hemsley-Brown and Sharp (2004) explain that while literature addressing the use of 
research in education has tended to suggest a need for better understanding of effective 
strategies for teaching and learning, numerous studies suggest that education 
professionals rarely use research findings to inform their practice. They argue that the 
way in which research is designed may restrict its impact on professional practice, since 
the goals of researchers and practitioners tend to differ in that the former may wish to 
develop new knowledge, while the latter require solutions to practical problems. A 
distinction can be drawn here between Mode 1 research, in which knowledge is 
produced with little consideration for its deployment in practice (Worrall, 2008) and 
Mode 2, which attempts to solve complex problems of relevance to professional 
practitioners (Van Aken, 2005). The former is typically disseminated via peer reviewed 
academic journals to an audience of fellow academics (usually those working in a 
narrow field of study) and may never be used to inform practice. Mode 2 research on 
the other hand is less exclusive and elitist and targets practitioners as well as academics, 
aiming to provide insights which may inform practice (Worrall, 2008).  
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To facilitate the transfer of research into professional practice, it is important that, as 
well as being rigorous, it also satisfies the needs of practitioners. However, educational 
research has also been criticised in recent years for addressing issues that are not their 
main concerns and which have little relevance in practice (Winch, 2001) and 
consequently, Aram and Salipante (2003) argue that research questions should relate to 
the context in which practitioners operate. Gersten et al (1997) highlight the problems 
associated with research findings indicating the value of interventions which were 
derived in settings which do not mirror the environments in which practitioners work, 
suggesting that while such studies may be informative as to the potential value of such 
initiatives for learning, they will not be implemented unless they can be adapted to 
reflect the settings and constraints under which practitioners operate. Research 
conducted by Zeuli (1994) also suggests that research is more likely to be considered by 
practitioners when it can be related to their personal experiences and addresses 
interventions with the potential for implementation in the classroom. Consequently, 
greater involvement of practitioners in conducting research may usefully assist 
researchers in appreciating the conditions in which they operate and therefore enhance 
its impact on professional practice (Huberman, 1990) and Hemsley-Brown and Sharp 
(2004) suggest involving them in the focus and design of research as well as subsequent 
follow up activities. Sparks (1988) also found that a key factor influencing professional 
educators‘ propensity to adopt new initiatives was the potential benefits for students. 
Thus research findings which suggest a particular intervention may be associated with 
higher levels of academic achievement may be more likely to impact on professional 
practice through implementation by practitioners.    
Hemsley-Brown and Sharp (2004) suggest that another issue contributing to the limited 
impact of educational research on professional practice is the manner in which 
knowledge is developed in social research, which gives rise to findings being 
challenged on the grounds of the context of research, as well as the generalisability and 
validity of findings. As Gersten et al (1997 p.466) point out, education, unlike medicine 
for example, has no ‗magic bullets‘, no chemical remedies to eliminate problems.  
Hillage et al (1998) also argue that the lack of encouragement for academics to 
disseminate research findings to practitioners contributes to the limited impact of 
research on professional practice. Worrall (2008) suggests that academics may be more 
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highly motivated by enhancing their academic reputation than generating research of 
greater value to practitioners and that in an alternative value system, practitioner 
focused research would be held in as high esteem as that published in highly rated 
academic journals. Hemsley-Brown and Sharp (2004) highlight proposals addressing 
this issue, suggesting that academics should be rewarded for dissemination of research 
findings to practitioners, who should be targeted via alternative outlets for publication.  
Gersten et al (1997) also highlight the problem of researchers underestimating the 
difficulties educational practitioners have in implementing initiatives addressed in 
research studies due to them being based on rather abstract theory. Consequently, 
research findings should be communicated in a manner which professional practitioners 
are able to interpret (Aram and Salipante, 2003). Hillage et al (1998) argue that 
professional practice is poorly informed by research, due to problems in the manner in 
which it is disseminated. These include the inaccessibility of academic journals to non-
academic practitioners and the lack of time and support for practitioners in accessing 
research. In a review of literature addressing the use of research in education, Hemsley-
Brown and Sharp (2004) therefore emphasise the value of making it more accessible to 
practitioners and reducing the use of academic jargon in encouraging the use of research 
findings in practice. However, in the context of this study it is worth noting that the 
practitioners for whom the research is relevant are professional educators working in 
higher education. For these, problems associated with the manner in which research is 
disseminated may be less important since they tend to have easier access to research 
findings and are likely to be more familiar with terminology used in academic articles. 
In conclusion, while the impact of educational research on professional practice may be 
low, researchers can enhance this by better marketing of their knowledge to 
practitioners and this may be achieved through anticipating and meeting their needs, 
considering the value of participative research and disseminating findings clearly and 
effectively (Hemsley-Brown and Sharp, 2004).   
 
1.3.2 Implications of This Study 
The findings from this study may usefully inform professional educators responsible for 
the design, management and promotion of learning activities in higher education. For 
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example, a general tendency for poor self-assessment of knowledge would suggest the 
introduction of specific remedial interventions since, if people are typically 
overconfident, they can be assisted in developing debiasing techniques (Klayman et al, 
1999). However, the potential impact of doing so will be influenced by the extent to 
which metaknowledge is associated with academic achievement and findings from this 
aspect of the research will therefore assist in assessing this. A strong association 
between knowledge monitoring accuracy and academic performance for example, while 
not necessarily implying causality, would provide evidence suggesting that initiatives to 
promote the development of metaknowledge may be effective in raising levels of 
academic achievement.  
 
1.4 Context of the Study 
The research setting for the study was Newcastle Business School, a large provider of 
business education based in the University of Northumbria, which delivers a range of 
business-related study programmes, from undergraduate up to doctoral level, to students 
from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds. The school‘s learning and teaching 
strategy emphasises the importance of independent learning and since this can be 
facilitated by accurate self-monitoring, it provides an appropriate setting for the 
investigation of metaknowledge and its association with academic performance.  
 
1.5 The Author’s Position and Interest 
Issues for social research often arise from the researchers‘ desire to understand how 
their life relates to others‘ in society (Baker, 1999)  and  most researchers, particularly 
in doctoral studies, are motivated by personal interest in the subject (James and 
Vinnicombe, 2002).  In respect of this study, a recent personal development activity in 
which the author participated provided insights in terms of personal interest in the 
concept of metaknowledge and how this may have been influenced by relationships 
with others.  During this activity, feedback received from a psychometric tool 
evaluating personal preferences indicated a preference for others to be sure of their facts 
and suggested that those communicating with the author should not ‗pretend that you 
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know more than you do‘. This highlights a preference prompting personal interest in 
how able people are to appreciate how much they know, which has been further 
provoked by professional experiences. The author is an academic member of staff at the 
institution in which the investigation took place, with responsibility for delivering 
learning activities and managing study programmes. Previous experiences in that 
environment have suggested that, on occasions, learners tend to overestimate their 
knowledge. For example, in conversations with students who were new to the 
university, some claimed that through previous learning, they already had good 
knowledge of some of the topics which were included in their study programme. 
However, subsequently, it often became clear to the author, and occasionally to the 
students in question, that they were not as knowledgeable as they initially believed and 
still had much to learn about the issues in question. Additionally, during classroom 
activities students have occasionally made strong claims for knowledge which, through 
probing and further discussion, proved to be unwarranted. 
The author‘s experiences in supervising research dissertations for students at 
undergraduate and postgraduate level have also been influential in stimulating interest 
in metaknowledge. Towards the end of their time spent working on a dissertation, some 
students have tended to display greater awareness of how much there was to know and a 
better appreciation of the extent of their own knowledge about the topic. However, this 
state was usually attained only after having spent a significant amount of time 
investigating the issue in question, which suggests that knowledge and accurate 
knowledge monitoring may be positively associated.  
 
1.6 Issues Addressed to Achieve the Aims of the Research 
Numerous issues were addressed in order to achieve the aims of the study. Initially, the 
theoretical framework in which the study is located was established and approaches 
adopted in previous research, as well as findings arising from those studies, considered. 
This assisted in developing specific research questions, to facilitate the achievement of 
the overall aim of assessing students‘ ability to appreciate the extent of their own 
knowledge and investigating the association between this capability and academic 
achievement. Research methodology and design were also addressed. Various 
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alternative approaches may be used in social research and therefore, in order to assist in 
its interpretation, it is necessary to explain the approach adopted and clarify the 
philosophical assumptions on which it is based. Since this study is quantitative, the 
advantages and potential limitations of this methodology in social research were 
addressed, as well as the manner in which it influences research design. The design 
employed to achieve the aims of the study were also established and this entailed 
considering alternative possible approaches and identifying one which was appropriate. 
Since quantitative studies entail operationalising the concept under investigation, an 
appropriate indicator of metaknowledge was established. The development of an 
appropriate method for collecting data was also considered and the specific setting in 
which this was to take place established. This included developing initiatives to enhance 
the reliability and validity of the research and, as the aim was to generate findings which 
may be generalised to the population under investigation, establishing an appropriate 
sampling strategy. Since data was to be collected from students, ethical issues were also 
addressed and procedures developed to prevent those involved in the study being 
harmed as a result of their participation. 
 
1.7 The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the study including its aims, an introduction to the 
concept of metaknowledge, including its potential implications for professional practice 
and details of the context of the research, as well as issues prompting the author‘s initial 
interest in the issues addressed in the study. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant 
literature, which is used as a basis for establishing specific research questions to be 
addressed later in the study. It initially provides theoretical context for the research by 
establishing the conceptual framework on which it is based. Alternative approaches for 
testing knowledge monitoring accuracy are also discussed in order to clarify subsequent 
discussion of findings from previous studies. To provide an insight into how findings 
which may arise from this study could be addressed in practice, potential reasons for 
those detected in previous research are considered, as well as remedial strategies which 
may be used to address their consequences. After establishing specific research 
questions and hypotheses on which the remainder of the study will focus, the chapter 
concludes by discussing how the study relates to previous research. 
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Chapter 3 addresses methodology and the research design to be used to answer the 
research questions established in the preceding chapter. It is important that the means 
used to derive findings and the assumptions under which they were produced are made 
clear (Jankowicz 1995). This assists readers in their interpretation of the research, by 
providing an indication of potential biases in how data have been collected and 
interpreted, as well as any other limitations in the work. The chapter commences by 
explaining the philosophy underpinning the research and the methodology adopted, 
before addressing the research design in detail. The latter includes an explanation of the 
nature of the research instrument and data collection procedures, as well as issues 
potentially affecting the reliability and validity of the research and initiatives 
implemented to address these. Data analysis procedures are also discussed and finally, 
ethical issues addressed.  
Chapter 4 presents the findings arising from the application of the research design 
explained in Chapter 3 to the research questions established in Chapter 2. It commences 
by analysing the participants in the sample and the extent to which they are 
representative of the population from which they were drawn. Findings arising from 
analysis of the data are then discussed, as well as their potential implications and how 
they relate to those generated by previous studies discussed in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 5 the thesis concludes with a discussion of how the findings from the study 
contribute to the central theme of the research and importantly, their potential 
implications for professional practice. This includes discussion of the challenges they 
present for business schools, as well as specific initiatives which could be implemented. 
Since it is also important to recognise that findings are affected by limitations in the 
research process, these are also specifically addressed in this chapter, as well as the 
boundaries of the study and suggestions of possible directions for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
   
2.1 Introduction 
Fixed research designs, such as that employed in this study, are theory driven and 
consequently, before embarking on the research, it is essential to have a good 
understanding of relevant theory and the phenomena under investigation, in order to 
determine the variables which are to be included in data collection procedures. This is 
accomplished by reviewing relevant literature to identify variables and relationships 
which may be investigated (Robson, 2002) and this chapter does so in respect of this 
study. Conceptual frameworks can be used to clarify and structure research by 
providing a ‗map‘ of the field of study in question (Fisher, 2004 p.122) and in this case 
a framework is developed by initially defining concepts relating to metacognition before 
considering how these relate to each other. The potential implications of metacognition 
for learning are considered, as well as the specific relevance for this study of one aspect, 
metacognitive self-monitoring. Alternative approaches which may be used to test for 
metaknowledge and the manner in which it may be operationalised, are addressed to 
clarify subsequent discussion of previous studies addressing how accurately individuals 
are able to monitor their own knowledge. This includes research into individual 
differences as well as the association between metaknowledge and academic 
achievement. Since the potential implications of findings from this study for educational 
practice are to be addressed later, reasons for previous findings are also considered, as 
well as strategies which may be used to address their consequences. The chapter 
concludes by using the preceding discussion as a basis for establishing hypotheses to be 
tested and discussing how the study relates to previous research.    
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2.2 The Meta Concept 
In discussing the development of a metacognitive model, Nelson (1996) explains that a 
conceptual analysis can produce theoretical paradoxes. For example, in respect of the 
concept of introspection, which is necessary for the self-monitoring of knowledge on 
which this study focuses, he cites the 19th century French philosopher Comte, who 
argued that one of the problems with introspection is that a thinker cannot divide 
himself in two parts, one of which reasons and the other observes, because the same 
organ cannot simultaneously take on the role of observer and observed. Nelson (1996) 
refers to an analogy used by Wilhelm Wundt, the founding father of experimental 
psychology, who likens this problem to a baron trying to remove himself from a bog by 
pulling on his own pigtail. He explains that psychologists addressing this issue have 
used a similar illustrative problem, in which two things appear to occur simultaneously, 
known as the liar‘s paradox. This relates to Epimenides, the ancient Greek philosopher 
who originated from Crete and is reputed to have stated that ‗All Cretans are liars‘. The 
problem here is that if this sentence is true then, as it was uttered by a Cretan, it must 
simultaneously be false. Nelson (1996 p.105) explains that the liar‘s paradox was not 
resolved until the middle of the 20th-century, when the philosopher Alfred Tarski 
developed the meta concept, in which meta refers to ‗whatever about whatever‘ and the 
meta level is seen as being separate from the object level to which it refers. Thus, for 
example, if we consider analysis (the object level), the meta level is meta-analysis (i.e. 
analysis of analysis). Nelson (1996 p.105) uses the following sentence to illustrate how 
the meta concept can be used to resolve self referential paradoxes, such as the liar‘s 
paradox: 
Thiss sentence contains threee errors 
 
The problem here is that as the sentence contains only two spelling errors, the statement 
may at first glance appear to be false. However, the fact that it erroneously claims that 
there are three errors when there are two can be viewed as another error, which confirms 
the accuracy of the statement asserting that there are three errors, despite the fact that 
the sentence only appears to contain two. This difficulty can be resolved using Tarski‘s 
23 
 
theory of truth, by identifying two different statement levels.  The first is the object 
level, at which sentences refer to subjects other than sentences and the second is the 
meta level, at which sentences relate to sentences. Thus, in the above sentence there are 
two errors at the object level (the misspelling of ‗this‘ and ‗three‘), and one error at the 
meta level (the fact that the sentence contains two errors and not three). Nelson (1996) 
argues that a meta approach can also be applied to Comte‘s introspection paradox in 
that, rather than a single process, two simultaneous processes occur in introspective 
activity. The first occurs at an object level and relates to cognition about external 
objects. Cognition is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‗the action or faculty 
of knowing; knowledge, consciousness; acquaintance with a subject‘ and includes 
recalling and recognising knowledge, as well as intellectual abilities (Bloom, 1956). 
The second process in introspection occurs at the meta level and relates to cognition 
about those first level cognitions. This concept is known as metacognition.  
 
2.3 Metacognition 
The term ‗metacognition‘ was first used by Flavell and Brown in the late 1970s (Paris 
and Winograd, 2003). While cognition is concerned with mental processes, such as 
thinking and learning, metacognition is ‗knowledge and cognition about cognitive 
phenomena‘ (Flavell, 1979 p.906). Thus, it is a process through which cognitive 
processes are applied to themselves and has been described as one of the most 
intriguing issues in modern psychology (Yzerbyt, Lories and Dardenne, 1998). Schraw 
(1998) cites Garner‘s (1987) view that there is general agreement among researchers in 
the field that cognition and metacognition can be distinguished in that while performing 
a task requires cognitive skills, understanding how it was achieved requires 
metacognition. It has been likened to the idea that our minds contain a type of 
‗cognitive executive‘ that monitors thought and problem solving, to monitor its progress 
and consider how it can be assisted (Smith, Shields and Washburn, 2003 p.318). 
Learning is managed through a control process in which information is exchanged 
between the lower object level, at which cognitive activities occur, and the higher meta 
level, which manages these activities (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 
2006) as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, where an individual fails to understand something 
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at the object level, self-monitoring activity can inform control processes at the meta 
level, which prompts remedial learning strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Control               Monitoring 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Metacognitive Control Cycle  
Source: Adapted from Nelson (1996) 
 
 
Metacognition is therefore concerned with the appraisal and management of learning, 
through monitoring, evaluation and planning (Everson and Tobias, 1998). It has been 
described as one of the key differences between human and animal cognition, with the 
very existence of psychology, providing evidence of our interest in mental procedures 
(Lories, Dardenne and Yzerbyt, 1998). However, the view that it is exclusively a human 
capacity is now being challenged, with recent work attributing metacognitive ability to 
more intelligent animal species, such as monkeys and dolphins (Smith, Shields and 
Washburn, 2003). 
Object Level 
Meta Level 
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While there is general agreement about the importance of metacognition, Veenman, 
Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach (2006) explain that its conceptualisation lacks 
coherence and argue that more work should be done to define it and its components 
more consistently. For example, the concept of self-regulation, which is commonly 
associated with metacognition, is considered by some to be a component of 
metacognition, while others consider that it is super-ordinate to it. Many researchers do 
not use formal definitions but, rather, prefer to use examples to illustrate metacognition 
and Paris and Winograd (1990) attribute this to the fact that as any cognition of thinking 
could be classed as metacognition, definitions would have to be relatively open-ended. 
They explain that this can give rise to disagreement about its nature with, for example, 
some regarding it as conscious activity and others arguing that it can be unconscious 
and inaccessible. Hacker (1998 p.3) explains that, while it may be considered a ‗fuzzy 
concept‘, the notion of individuals thinking about their thoughts is fundamental. This 
thinking may relate to what they know (‗metacognitive knowledge‘), what they are 
doing (‗metacognitive skill‘) or their current cognitive state (‗metacognitive 
experience‘) and these aspects have been included in various theoretical accounts of 
metacognition.  He  defines metacognition as ‗thinking about thinking‘ or ‗cognition of 
cognition‘ and distinguishes metacognitive thought from other types of thinking, based 
on its source, in that it does not arise from an individual‘s ‗immediate external reality‘ 
but rather from their ‗own internal mental representation of that reality‘.    
 
2.3.1 Flavell’s Conceptual Model 
As explained earlier, Flavell was one of the first to use the term metacognition, in the 
late 1970s. Hacker (1998 p.4) explains that his early work was influenced by the 
developmental psychology of Jean Piaget, who distinguished between first and second 
degree operations. The former, which relate to ‗thoughts about an external empirical 
reality‘ may become the subject of the latter, which are therefore of a higher order. It is 
this higher level activity with which metacognition is concerned. Flavell (1979) 
suggested that it relates to the interaction between four phenomena: 
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1) Goals and tasks 
2) Actions and strategies 
3) Metacognitive knowledge 
4) Metacognitive experiences 
 
Goals and tasks relate to the objectives of cognitive activity, whereas actions and 
strategies are the means through which these are achieved and are influenced by 
metacognitive knowledge and experiences. 
 
2.3.1.1 Metacognitive Knowledge 
Flavell (1979) divides metacognitive knowledge into further subcomponents, which he 
describes as being related to person, task and strategy. The ‗person‘ category embraces 
understanding of how one (and others) learns and can be broken down further into 
knowledge about intra-individual and inter-individual differences, as well as universal 
beliefs. Intra-individual differences could include, for example, an individual‘s belief 
that s/he learns better with active rather than passive experiences, whereas inter-
individual differences arise from a belief that individuals may react differently in 
response to a particular stimulus. Universal beliefs could include an appreciation that 
failure to fully commit to learning generally tends to hamper it. The ‗task‘ category 
entails an understanding of the requirements of different tasks and an appreciation that 
some are likely to be more demanding than others, with for example, some being better 
informed by supportive information which may be available. This suggests that person 
and task knowledge may interact to inform learning in that appreciation of task 
difficulty for example, may be informed by the extent to which an individual‘s preferred 
learning style is likely to be effective in tackling it. The ‗strategy‘ category is concerned 
with an individual's ability to discriminate between alternate approaches for achieving a 
particular goal and choose the most appropriate. The potential for combining this with 
other metacognitive knowledge is again apparent in that for example, the most 
appropriate learning strategy for an individual will be informed by not only their 
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appreciation of the alternative possibilities that exist, but also which ones are likely to 
be most effective for them.  
 
2.3.1.2 Metacognitive Experiences 
Flavell (1979) suggests that individuals have ‗metacognitive experiences‘ in which 
metacognitive knowledge enters the consciousness, before, during, or after an 
intellectual activity. These experiences are likely to be more common in cognitive 
activity which requires much careful thought, such as new learning situations, and play 
an important role in the ongoing development of metacognitive knowledge, in that 
individuals are able to modify and add to it, in response to them. Flavell (1979) explains 
how the four phenomena outlined above interact so that for example, when assigned a 
task with a particular goal, an individual may draw on current metacognitive 
knowledge, resulting in a metacognitive experience indicating that the task is likely to 
be difficult. Further metacognitive knowledge can then be applied which may, for 
example, result in obtaining further information about the task before commencing it. 
Having commenced it, a subsequent metacognitive experience may indicate how it is 
proceeding and this, combined with further metacognitive knowledge, may prompt 
modifying the approach to the task, in order to achieve the ultimate objective more 
easily. 
 
2.3.2 The Knowledge and Regulation Conceptual Framework  
While Flavell‘s model provided an early representation of metacogniton and its 
components, the most common distinction in the literature is that between 
metacognitive knowledge and skills (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 
2006).  Paris and Winograd (1990 p.16) refer to a distinction between ‗knowledge about 
cognitive states and processes‘ and ‗cognitive self-management‘. These have also been 
described as knowledge about cognition and regulation of cognition (Everson and 
Tobias, 1998), and relate to understanding and controlling cognitive processes 
respectively. Schraw (1998) offers a framework for understanding metacognition which, 
while differing from Flavell‘s (1979) earlier representation to some extent, includes 
common and similar features. It is based on the commonly used distinction between 
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knowledge about cognitive states, and the control, or self management, of cognitive 
enterprises, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Metacognition 
 
 
           Knowledge of     Regulation of 
  Cognition        Cognition 
 
 
 
Declarative Procedural Conditional         Planning     Evaluation    Monitoring               
Knowledge Knowledge  Knowledge 
 
Figure 2: A Conceptual Framework for Metacognition 
Source: Based on Schraw (1998) 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Knowledge of Cognition 
Knowledge of cognition relates to what one knows about one‘s own cognition, or about 
cognition generally. This relates to the metacognitive knowledge to which Flavell 
referred and can be used to ‗select, evaluate, revise and abandon cognitive tasks‘ 
(Flavell, 1979 p.908). It can be divided into three elements: declarative, procedural and 
conditional knowledge.  
 
Declarative Knowledge 
Hacker (1998 p.8) refers to a definition of declarative knowledge by Kluwe (1982 
p.203), as ‗stored data in long-term memory‘. In the context of metacognition, it relates 
to knowledge about approaches which may be used for cognitive tasks, such as the use 
of skim reading to develop appreciation and the use of diagrams to enhance 
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understanding (Schraw, 1998). It is also concerned with an individual‘s understanding 
of how they learn and the factors that impact on their success and in this respect, relates 
closely to Flavell's (1979) ‗person‘ category. Pintrich (2002 p.221) refers to this aspect 
as ‗self knowledge‘ and includes within this an appreciation of one‘s strengths and 
weaknesses, an important aspect of which is ‗self-awareness of the breadth and depth of 
one‘s knowledge‘. He claims that a surprisingly high number of college students lack 
accurate self-knowledge and that this can constrain their learning. As well as including 
an individual's appreciation of both how they think and what they know, Paris and 
Winograd (1990) also advocate broadening the scope of this aspect of metacognition to 
include motivational aspects of learning. Pintrich (2002) supports this view, arguing that 
self knowledge should incorporate an individual‘s self awareness about their 
motivation, which relates to how interested in a task they are and how much they value 
it, and suggesting that there are important links between these issues and learning. 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
Procedural knowledge is concerned with how to use the various approaches of which 
one may have declarative knowledge to perform different tasks and equips individuals 
with a range of methods which may be used in different contexts. Examples include an 
appreciation of how setting goals can assist in planning learning, understanding that 
asking oneself whether a mathematical calculation has been performed correctly can 
help to monitor learning and appreciating that, if necessary, taking steps to amend the 
calculation may usefully regulate learning (Schraw, 1998). Such appreciation has also 
been referred to as ‗strategic knowledge‘, which relates to generic strategies applicable 
across different tasks and domains (Pintrich, 2002 p.220). Thus, the term ‗strategic‘ is 
applied inconsistently, with Flavell (1979) using it to refer more explicitly to the ability 
to discriminate between different approaches, something which Schraw (1998) 
categorises separately from procedural knowledge and refers to as conditional 
knowledge. 
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Conditional Knowledge 
Conditional knowledge is concerned with appreciating when particular aspects of 
declarative and procedural knowledge should be used in determining the appropriate 
response to a particular task (Schraw 1998). It enables an individual to choose from a 
number of strategies available to tackle the cognitive task and therefore, as explained 
above, relates closely to Flavell's (1979) strategy category. It can be particularly 
powerful, as it helps to ensure that existing knowledge is used appropriately and 
effectively. Conditional knowledge is considered by some to be declarative knowledge 
and by others, to be an aspect of metacognitive skill rather than knowledge, which 
provides further evidence of the lack of coherence in the conceptualisation of 
metacognition and inconsistency in the definition of its components (Veenman, Van 
Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006).  
The three elements of knowledge of cognition to which Schraw (1998) refers can 
therefore be summarised as referring to awareness of various strategies (declarative 
knowledge), how they can be used (procedural knowledge) and when they should be 
used (conditional knowledge).  As discussed above, they may be used interactively and 
Flavell (1979 p.907) argued that most metacognitive knowledge is concerned with 
combining them. He illustrates this with a scenario in which an individual believes that: 
 
  they    (unlike one of their peers),  -    Declarative knowledge 
 
should use strategy A  (rather than strategy B), -    Procedural knowledge 
 
in task X   (but not in task Y)  -    Conditional knowledge 
 
 
Schraw (1998) advocates the use of strategic evaluation matrices (SEM) to assist 
learners in developing their knowledge of cognition (See example in Appendix 1). 
These can help them to develop their declarative, procedural and conditional 
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understanding of various strategies, which helps them to appreciate how and when they 
may be used, and for what purpose. This understanding can then be applied in 
regulatory activities to enhance learning. 
 
2.3.2.2 Regulation of Cognition 
Regulation of cognition, which has also been referred to as ‗cognitive self-
management‘, relates to activities used by individuals to control their learning and 
includes planning and implementing appropriate strategies for learning, as well as 
monitoring and adapting learning as it proceeds (Paris and Winograd, 1990 p.18). 
Sternberg (1998) argues that metacognitive processes for learning and using 
information are as important as knowledge itself  and while other skills have been 
identified in the literature, the most commonly discussed are planning, evaluation and 
monitoring (Schraw, 1998).   
 
Planning 
Planning entails scheduling sufficient time for various learning tasks, in order to attain 
learning outcomes. This regulatory activity can be informed by knowledge of cognition 
to promote effective learning. For example, as illustrated in Figure 3, learners can plan 
to carry out learning using strategies of which they are aware and have procedural 
knowledge and which their conditional knowledge indicates are appropriate for the task 
in hand. 
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Figure 3: The Role of Metacognitive Knowledge in Planning Learning 
 
Evaluation 
Evaluation refers to the self-assessment of learning outcomes and includes critically 
assessing learning outputs to judge their value. Klenowski 1995 (p. 146) defines such 
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self-assessment as ‗the evaluation or judgment of ―the worth‖ of one‘s performance and 
the identification of one‘s strengths and weaknesses with a view to improving one‘s 
learning outcomes‘. Falchikov and Boud (1989) stress the educational benefit of this 
type of activity, the value of which lies in its propensity to encourage a greater degree of 
reflection on learning (Mowl & Pain, 1995) and Ward, Gruppen and Regehr (2002, 
p.76) argue that its importance in education ‗stands undisputed‘. A common approach in 
studying this aspect of metacognitive self-management is to investigate learners‘ ability 
to provide an accurate self-assessment of their academic output, by forecasting their 
assessment grades (Boud and Falchikov, 1995).  
 
Monitoring 
Monitoring has been defined as ‗one‘s online awareness of comprehension and task 
performance‘, of which self-testing during learning is an example (Schraw, 1998, 
p.115). This definition suggests that it can be distinguished from evaluation, in that it 
refers to awareness of how one is performing while carrying out a task (i.e. online) as 
opposed to self-evaluation of the outputs or products of learning. However, as discussed 
earlier, components of metacognition tend to be defined inconsistently. Paris and 
Winograd (1990) for example, classify reflection on one‘s knowledge state, which could 
be included in Schraw‘s (1998) definition of monitoring, as cognitive self-appraisal, 
which they distinguish from self-management of cognition, in which they include 
monitoring ongoing performance. Nelson (1996) meanwhile, when identifying different 
strands of monitoring research, includes prospective activity, such as predicting how 
easy future learning will be, and this does not comply with the online aspect of 
Schraw‘s (1998) definition. Consequently, while metacognition clearly embraces the 
notion of self-assessment of both ongoing learning and the manner in which it is used to 
produce outputs, there are differences in how these are classified. As Veenman, Van 
Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach (2006) argue, there is clearly a need for more precise 
taxonomies of metacognitive knowledge and skills. 
In terms of how regulation of cognition can enhance learning, research indicates that 
better appreciation of gaps in understanding is important (Schraw, 1998). Learning 
requires that, as well as working independently, students are able to assess their own 
progress (Falchikov & Boud, 1989) and therefore accurate self-monitoring is essential 
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for effective learning (Pieschl, 2009). Consequently, monitoring of knowledge is 
considered to be a particularly important component of metacognition, as without 
accurate monitoring, learning cannot be effectively controlled, particularly in 
environments which require large amounts of information to be learned (Clarebout, Elen 
& Onghena, 2006). This implies that it may be particularly valuable in a higher 
education learning environment.  
To illustrate how self monitoring may impact on behaviour, Dunning et al (2003) report 
a study in which students answered a series of questions based on scientific reasoning. 
While females provided less favourable self-assessment of their performance, there was 
no significant difference in actual test performance. However on being invited to 
participate in a further quiz, for which prizes were offered, females were less inclined to 
accept than males and Dunning et al (2003) therefore suggested that it is perception 
rather than reality which influences behaviour. This conclusion can be challenged on the 
grounds that, rather than perception of performance, other gender-related factors, which 
were not addressed in the study, may have influenced the behaviour of the participants. 
For example, their greater reluctance to participate further may have been attributable to 
the prizes on offer for doing so being less appealing to the female participants. 
However, if perception does influence behaviour as suggested, then misconceptions 
may produce inappropriate responses and poor self-monitoring may, for example, result 
in those who over-estimate their current knowledge state, failing to address this 
unappreciated deficiency in future learning activities. Flavell (1979) argues that those 
with better metacognitive monitoring skills are likely to learn more effectively, both 
inside and outside the classroom environment, and suggests that they may be better 
equipped when taking lifestyle decisions, as well as learning more effectively in formal 
educational situations.  
In terms of the relationship between components of metacognition, as illustrated in 
Figure 4, declarative self knowledge relating to appreciation of one‘s own knowledge 
can be used to inform monitoring activity, through which gaps in knowledge may be 
identified. This may in turn prompt regulatory planning activity, which can also draw on 
other metacognitive knowledge, and initiate learning strategies aimed at addressing the 
knowledge deficit and enhancing academic achievement. 
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Figure 4: Interaction between Monitoring, Metacognitive Knowledge and Planning 
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However, Nelson (1996, p.106) explains that, while philosophers have traditionally 
assumed infallibility in introspection, metacognitive theory does not and assumes that 
‗cognitive illusions‘ occur, through individuals‘ imperfect monitoring of their own 
cognitive activity. He describes how these can be investigated by eliciting meta-level 
statements about object level cognitive activities, operationalising what actually occurs 
at the objective level and testing for self-monitoring accuracy, by assessing the 
relationship between the two. This approach has been commonly adopted in research 
studies using responses to a series of multiple choice knowledge questions at the object 
level, accompanied by respondents‘ meta-level judgements as to their perception of the 
accuracy of their responses as illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Assessing Self-Monitoring Accuracy   
Source: Adapted from Nelson (1996) 
 
Schraw (1998) argues that, while the strategy evaluation matrices discussed earlier may 
improve knowledge of cognition, they may not necessarily improve regulatory skills. To 
do so, he advocates the use of a regulatory checklist (see example in Appendix 2), 
which provides useful prompts to encourage students to be more strategic and 
systematic and has proved to be effective in learning.  
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2.3.3 Metacognition and Learning 
The raised consciousness of thinking associated with metacognition promotes self 
regulated learning as it transfers responsibility for monitoring of learning from teacher 
to learner and also promotes positive self-perception in the learner while increasing 
motivation to learn (Paris and Winograd, 1990). Thus, learning becomes more 
independent as learners participate more actively in their own learning, rather than over-
relying on pre-determined activities, in which they are instructed and tend to play a 
more passive role. Since it emphasises personal knowledge and self-management, it also 
embraces individual differences in learning styles and cognition and has therefore been 
linked to successful development of expertise through learning (Sternberg, 1998). While 
it has been found to be only moderately correlated with intelligence, there is much 
evidence indicating that metacognition complements intellectual ability in enhancing 
learning and that metacognitive skill can therefore compensate for poor cognitive ability 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006). Consequently it has the potential 
to enhance academic performance (Schraw, 1998) and Everson and Tobias (1998) 
explain that studies have shown that those with better metacognitive skills are generally 
better equipped to monitor their learning accurately, assess the extent of their 
knowledge, plan for new learning and enhance their knowledge. However, they argue 
that, while this is particularly important for effective learning in dynamic environments, 
in which available information is continually updated, many learners have ineffective 
metacognitive strategies. Consequently, an important message arising from research in 
the early 1990s on competent thinking was that students should be made aware of 
different strategies and given the chance to develop metacognition about them (Pressley 
and Gaskins, 2006). Paris and Winograd (1990) advocate creating opportunities in the 
curriculum for students and tutors to discuss beliefs and judgements in respect of 
academic activities, since this will enable learners to reflect on their current approaches 
to learning and how metacognition may assist them in enhancing them. 
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2.3.3.1 Metacognitive Knowledge and Bloom’s Taxonomy for Learning 
In 1949 Benjamin Bloom initiated the compilation of a taxonomy of educational 
objectives, primarily as a means of providing a consistent framework for the production 
and exchange of test questions between American universities (Krathwohl, 2002). This 
resulted in collaboration over the next few years which culminated in the publication of 
the taxonomy and an accompanying handbook in 1956 (Bloom, 1956 – see Appendix 
3). This gained widespread acceptance and was translated into 22 languages and while 
initially primarily conceived as a tool to assist in measuring educational attainment, 
Bloom believed it could also be used to help clarify the meaning of educational goals 
(Krathwohl 2002). Since its inception, it has been used to help ensure that learning 
objectives include more complex elements of the taxonomy, such as synthesis and 
evaluation, as well as the acquisition of knowledge. 
However Klenowski (1995), in advocating initiatives to help develop learners‘ self-
evaluation skills, argued that they should be encouraged to develop the ability to make 
judgements earlier than Bloom‘s taxonomy suggested and a revised version was later 
produced (Anderson et al, 2001). It was devised by a team comprising cognitive 
psychologists, instructional researchers and assessment specialists, including one of the 
authors of the original taxonomy, David Krathwohl. The revised version included 
numerous refinements, such as changing the category names from nouns to verbs, to 
reflect the manner in which learning objectives are more typically framed. Thus, for 
example, application became apply and evaluation became evaluate. However, one of 
the most significant changes was to convert the original one dimensional framework to 
a two dimensional model which acknowledged the importance of metacognitive 
knowledge. This two dimensional approach arose from the typical framing of learning 
outcomes in terms of both subject content and a cognitive process, relating to what the 
learner is expected to do with that subject matter. Hence, they usually entail the use of a 
noun, or noun phrase, representing the subject matter and a verb, representing the 
cognitive process. For example, a research methods course may include the following 
learning outcome: 
The learner will be able to apply…. (verb – cognitive process)  
data collection methods  (noun phrase – subject content) 
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Krathwohl (2002) explains that, in the original taxonomy, the knowledge category 
differed from the others in that it had two dimensions, as it included both noun and verb 
elements. The verb aspect was included in the definition of knowledge in the handbook 
accompanying the taxonomy, which referred to behaviours emphasising ‗recognition or 
recall, of ideas, materials or phenomena‘ (Bloom, 1956 p.62, italics added for 
emphasis), while the noun aspect was incorporated in the various sub-categories of 
knowledge to which these behaviours could be applied (terminology, facts, conventions 
etc.).  Krathwohl‘s (2002) suggestion that this two-dimensional aspect related only to 
the knowledge category, can be challenged in that this was in fact also the case for the 
analysis category which referred to analysis (verb aspect) of elements, relationships and 
principles (nouns).     
This two-dimensional approach was specifically incorporated in the revision to the 
taxonomy, in which the verb aspect forms one dimension, based on cognitive processes, 
and the noun aspect another, based on knowledge (see Appendix 4). The cognitive 
process dimension comprises six progressive, but overlapping, major categories 
(remember, understand, apply, analyse, evaluate and create), which are broken down 
into a further 19 sub-categories as shown in Appendix 5. The knowledge dimension was 
structured with four categories, as compared to the three used in the original taxonomy 
(see Appendix 6). The first three, – factual knowledge, conceptual knowledge and 
procedural knowledge – consolidated sub-categories used in the original framework. 
However, the fourth – metacognitive knowledge – added an aspect which was not 
recognized at that time, but which has become increasingly significant due to research 
which has demonstrated how important it is to make learners aware of how knowledge 
of their metacognitive activities can be used to adapt their thinking and learning 
effectively (Krathwohl, 2002). It includes three sub-types – strategic knowledge, 
knowledge about tasks and self-knowledge – which relate to Flavell‘s (1979) strategy, 
task and person sub categories of metacognitive knowledge. The importance of 
metaknowledge is specifically acknowledged in the revised taxonomy in illustrative 
examples of self-knowledge provided, which include ‗awareness of one‘s own 
knowledge level‘ and the need for educators to assist students in making accurate 
assessments of their knowledge is also emphasised (Anderson et al, 2001 p.29). 
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2.3.4 Metacognitive Monitoring Research 
Hacker (1998) explains that three strands of research consistently appear in 
metacognition research. The first is concerned with cognitive monitoring and studies in 
this field have investigated how accurately individuals are able to monitor their 
knowledge and thought processes. The second is cognitive regulation, where studies 
have typically addressed the ability to transfer learning strategies between different 
tasks. Note here further evidence of inconsistency in the definition of various aspects of 
metacognition in that, while Schraw (1998) classifies monitoring as a regulatory 
process, Hacker (1998) distinguishes between regulation and monitoring. The third 
research strand addresses both monitoring and regulation and includes studies which 
investigate people‘s ability to monitor their own thinking and use this information in 
subsequent activities (Hacker, 1998). This study focuses on the first of these, 
monitoring, and Figure 6 shows types of research which have been carried out in this 
strand, during the acquisition and retrieval of knowledge. A distinction can be made 
here between prospective activities, which entail predicting future performance, and 
retrospective activities, which entail postdiction (Nelson, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Metacognitive Monitoring Research Framework 
Source: Nelson (1996 p.109) 
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2.3.4.1 Prospective Activity 
Prospective activities at the acquisition level include predicting how easy learning is 
expected to be (ease of learning judgements) and how easily the learner expects to be 
able to subsequently recall ongoing learning (judgements of learning).  Straddling both 
the acquisition and retrieval stages are ‗feeling of knowing‘ judgements, which relate to 
an individual‘s ability to subsequently recognise knowledge items which they cannot 
currently recall. Research in this aspect has investigated the extent to which individuals, 
who are currently unable to recall an item of knowledge, are subsequently able to do so 
on being presented with alternative possible correct answers. 
 
2.3.4.2 Retrospective Activity 
Retrospective activity relates to the post-learning retrieval stage and studies here have 
investigated the accuracy of meta-level judgements, in which individuals express levels 
of confidence in their current knowledge. Thus, metaknowledge can be assessed by 
investigating how accurately individuals are able to monitor their own knowledge. The 
importance of this aspect is emphasised by Hacker (1998 p.11), who argues that while 
there may be a lack of clarity in classifying some aspects of metacognition, there 
appears to be consensus that any definition should incorporate the concept of 
‗knowledge of one's knowledge‘. 
  
2.4 Metaknowledge 
Russo and Schoemaker (1992 p.8) explain that while knowledge relates to ‗the facts, 
concepts, relationships, theories and so on that we have accumulated over time‘, 
metaknowledge is ‗an appreciation of what we do know and what we do not know‘.  
Thus, those with well developed metaknowledge have a good appreciation of what they 
know and the gaps in their knowledge, whereas those with poor metaknowledge are less 
able to appreciate the state of their knowledge.  This capability has also been referred to 
as ‗knowledge monitoring ability‘ (KMA) (Everson and Tobias, 1998 p.66) and it is 
important to distinguish it from metacognitive knowledge which, as discussed above, 
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relates to ‗knowledge about cognition in general‘ (Pintrich, 2002 p.219), a wider 
perspective than the ‗knowledge about knowledge‘ to which metaknowledge relates.   
The former US Secretary for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld (2002), referred to the capacity 
for appreciating gaps in knowledge, in his explanation that: 
 
As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We 
also know there are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't 
know we don't know. 
 
He was much derided for this observation and indeed won The British Plain English 
Campaign‘s annual prize for the most nonsensical remark made by a public figure, 
narrowly beating a quote from European Commissioner Chris Patten, who in 2003, 
claimed that ‗the British Conservative Party had committed political suicide and was 
now living to regret it‘ (BBC, 2003). However, Rumsfeld‘s quote contains a perfectly 
logical statement and our capacity to learn is dependent on the ability to reflect on, and 
develop awareness of, what we know and what we do not (McGregor, 2004). He was 
perhaps displaying the wisdom referred to in the following Arabic proverb cited by 
Davidoff (1995): 
 
He who knows and knows that he knows is conceited; avoid him. 
He who knows not and knows not that he knows not is a fool; instruct him. 
He who knows and knows not that he knows is asleep; awaken him. 
But he who knows not and knows that he knows not is a wise man; follow him. 
 
Similar views have also been attributed to Confucius who reportedly explained that, 
‗real knowledge is to know the extent of one‘s ignorance‘ (Dunning et al, 2003 p.83) 
and Thomas Jefferson, who suggested that, ‗he who knows best, best knows how little 
he knows‘ (Kruger and Dunning, 1999 p.1130). Metaknowledge has been described as 
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‗higher-order knowledge‘ (Sternberg, 1998 p.129), which is associated with a ‗higher 
level of expertise: understanding the nature, scope and limits of our basic, or primary, 
knowledge‘ Russo and Schoemaker (1992 p.8). Gredler (2004) argues that it is essential 
when collecting data for solving problems and consequently, if well developed, it can 
assist in making more informed choices and decisions. However, since it requires a 
greater level of expertise than primary knowledge (Ramnarayan, Strohschneider and 
Schaub, 1997) and because it tends not to be formally recognised or rewarded, nor 
developed during formal education, metaknowledge can be poorly developed and this 
may remain a hidden problem (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992).  
 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
Having considered metacognition and its various sub-components, as well as how they 
may relate to each other, the conceptual framework which will be used to guide this 
study is shown in Figure 7. This illustrates how metaknowledge, a form of declarative 
self-knowledge, informs regulatory monitoring activity, which can in turn prompt the 
planning of learning strategies to enhance academic achievement. Given its role in 
prompting planning of learning, accuracy of knowledge monitoring is an important 
factor and various methods may be used to test for this. 
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Figure 7: The Conceptual Framework Developed for This Study 
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2.6 Testing for Knowledge Monitoring Accuracy 
Investigating the extent to which individuals are able to assess their own knowledge, 
requires asking them to make judgements about the accuracy of responses they provide 
to questioning designed to investigate it. To facilitate unbiased interpretations of these 
responses, objective questions, for which there is a definitive correct answer, can be 
used (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). When doing so, a distinction can be made between 
approaches in which probability assessments are made over continuous variables, such 
as unknown numerical values, and calibration studies that seek judgements on particular 
propositions Keren (1991). 
 
2.6.1 Continuous Variables (Range Questions) 
When using confidence range estimates, participants are provided with a series of 
questions, each of which requires a numerical response. They are asked to provide a 
lower and upper estimate for each question, such that they believe the correct answer 
has a given percentage chance of falling within this range (see example in Appendix 7 
using 90% confidence ranges). The resulting data is analysed to reveal a ‗surprise 
index‘, which reflects the percentage of judgements for which the correct answer lies 
outside of this range. These are compared with the anticipated error rate to provide a 
metaknowledge rating as follows: 
 
Metaknowledge score  = S.I.  -   T.E.R. 
  
Where: 
S.I.  =  the surprise index (i.e. the rate of incorrect responses) 
 
  T.E.R. = the targeted error rate (i.e. in this case 10 %
*
) 
     
* In the example in Appendix 7, respondents were asked       
   to make judgements at a 90% confidence level. 
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A score of zero indicates a well calibrated respondent who, having being asked to 
provide answers with a 90% confidence level, did actually experience a 90% success 
rate. Thus, the surprise index in this case would coincide with the targeted error rate as 
follows: 
 
Metaknowledge score  = S.I.     -   T.E.R.  
     = (100% - 90%)   -   10% 
     = 10%  -   10%  
= 0% 
 
A score of greater than zero indicates that the respondent was less capable of identifying 
the correct range than they believed and was therefore overconfident about how much 
they knew about the subject matter in question. To better reflect their lack of 
knowledge, the ranges they provided should have been increased. Conversely, a 
metaknowledge score of less than zero indicates underconfidence. In such cases the 
respondent‘s knowledge was actually better than they believed and consequently, the 
ranges provided could have been narrower to reflect this.  
 
2.7 Calibration Studies 
When using judgements on propositions, Schraw (2009) distinguishes between two 
approaches. In the first, respondents make a dichotomous judgement on an outcome, 
indicating whether they believe they will be successful or not. Their accuracy can be 
subsequently verified by comparing their actual and estimated success rates.  In the 
second, more common, approach respondents express their confidence in the accuracy 
of their judgements using an appropriate continuous rating scale. This type of 
investigation is known as a calibration study. Calibration is a measure of the 
relationship between individuals‘ metacognitive judgements and their own performance 
and has been referred to in the literature by a number of terms including accuracy, 
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illusion of knowing and judgement bias (Pieschl, 2009). The most popular approach in 
calibration studies is one in which respondents are required to select from a number of n 
alternatives and give the subjective probability that their choice is correct (Keren, 1991). 
Using this method, a respondent without the knowledge to enable them to discriminate 
between the correct and incorrect alternatives available to them, may still do so by 
chance and therefore the confidence rating scale should be designed accordingly.  If for 
example, there are two alternatives, a scale of 50-100% confidence should be used, 
since the respondent should not be less than 50% confident on chance grounds alone. 
Respondents are said to be well calibrated where ‗for all propositions assigned a given 
probability, the proportion that is true is equal to the probability assigned‘ (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982 p.307) as estimations which closely resemble the actual 
outcomes associated with those judgements demonstrate a good appreciation of the 
extent of their knowledge.  
A visual representation of calibration can be provided using calibration curves, which 
show the relationship between metacognitive judgements and actual performance. They 
are drawn by grouping responses in particular confidence ranges and plotting assessors‘ 
mean response rate in each of these against the mean percentage correct judgement rate 
(Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977). The resulting curve is then plotted along on a graph 
as shown in Figure 8. The 45 degree curve shown here represents perfect calibration, 
depicting individuals who have a very good appreciation of the extent of their 
knowledge. Judgements made with 50% confidence were correct 50% of the time, those 
assigned 70% confidence were correct 70% of the time and so on.  
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Thus, calibration is concerned with metacognitive monitoring in that it reflects 
individuals‘ awareness of their internal processes by indicating the accuracy of their 
own perception of their performance (Pieschl, 2009). Figure 9, shows how the use of 
calibration studies to investigate knowledge monitoring accuracy empirically, relates to 
the conceptual framework developed earlier.  
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Figure 9: Calibration Studies in the Context of the Conceptual Framework 
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Different approaches may be adopted when assessing calibration and these can be 
distinguished in terms of the granularity and timing of judgements made by participants 
(Pieschl, 2009) as summarised in Table 1. 
 
      Table 1 - Timing and Granularity Aspects of Calibration Studies 
 Timing 
Prospective Retrospective 
 
 
Granularity 
 
Local 
Judgements 
 
Prediction of   
single items 
 
Postdiction of 
single items 
 
Global 
Judgements 
 
Prediction 
across multiple 
items 
 
Postdiction 
across multiple 
items 
 
    
2.7.1 Granularity of Judgements 
With respect to granularity, one approach is to provide respondents with a series of 
questions and request a performance judgement in which they are required to provide a 
single (global) rating (Schraw, 2009) representing their expectation of the percentage of 
questions correctly answered. However, Westley (2008) argues that this method does 
not require participants to separately consider the extent of their knowledge of different 
topics and to remedy this, asked students to predict performance separately for 
numerous specific subject areas addressed in a test. An alternative approach, which 
addresses subject matter in a finer level of detail, is one in which local confidence 
judgements are provided in respect of each individual question.  For example, as 
discussed above, a common approach is to provide a series of forced choice objective 
test questions and ask respondents to choose the option they believe to be correct and 
indicate their confidence level in each of those responses.  
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2.7.1.1 Eliciting Expressions of Confidence  
Bjorkman (1994) explains that early studies of confidence judgements used verbal, 
rather than numerical, expressions of confidence employing categorical scales, relating 
to uncertainty and certainty and provoked much debate about how many categories 
should be used. However, things changed around 1960, when psychologists began to 
associate confidence with probability, which permitted the comparison of numerically 
expressed confidence ratings with the frequency of outcomes to investigate how 
realistic (Adams and Adams, 1961), or appropriate (Oskamp, 1962), confidence 
judgements are. As explained earlier, when using numerical expressions of confidence 
with multiple-choice questions, the confidence rating ranges from 100%, for answers 
which the respondent believes with certainty that they have answered correctly, down to 
a rating reflecting an answer they have only been able to guess. For example, if 
choosing from two alternatives, this lower level confidence rating would be 50%, 
reflecting the one in two probability of providing the correct answer by chance. Thus, 
the lower end of the confidence scale is determined by the formula 100/k, with k 
representing the number of alternative responses (Flannelly, 2001). These numerical 
confidence ratings therefore represent the observable outcomes arising from internal 
processing of uncertainty, in which internal cues are used to initially guide the selection 
of an answer and subsequently, to provide the basis for the confidence assessment 
(Bjorkman, 1994).  
Investigating respondents‘ preferences between verbal and numerical expressions of 
confidence, Erev and Cohen (1990) found a preference for contemplating confidence in 
verbal terms, rather than numerically. Keren (1991) speculates that this may be due to 
the fact that responding quantitatively may require more effort and signify a greater 
commitment, as compared to a verbal response.  However, using numerical expressions 
clarifies the interpretation of the confidence scale and improves consistency between 
those providing judgements, as compared with the use of verbal expressions of 
confidence (Adams and Adams, 1961). A study of undergraduate students by Sinkavich 
(1995 p.80) provides an example of the potential problems that may arise when using 
verbal responses. In a multiple-choice test, a five point Likert scale was used to express 
confidence, which ranged from +2 (‗correct‘), to -2 (‗not correct‘), with the midpoint 
reflecting, ‗maybe it is correct; maybe it is not correct‘. The first point of contention 
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here is the need for a response of ‗not correct‘ in multiple choice questions. If the 
respondent believed that a particular option available to them was incorrect, then 
presumably they would have chosen an alternative answer. This issue also arose in an 
earlier study (Shaughnessy, 1979), in which a four point confidence scale was used, 
which included the response ‗definitely incorrect‘. It was reported that this was rarely 
used and one wonders why it was used at all, given the nature of the judgements 
participants were asked to make. Additionally, as Sinkavich (1995) himself 
acknowledged, the nature of this type of verbal scale may have resulted in inconsistent 
interpretation across participants and a revised version, which permitted a more stable 
interpretation of different confidence judgements, may have been more appropriate. 
Consequently, while there may be some difficulties in the use of numerical responses to 
assess and evaluate confidence, they may be less problematical than using verbal 
responses, which are subject to different, and perhaps vaguer, interpretations by 
respondents (Keren, 1991). 
Gigerenzer (1991) argues that a problem with a numerical approach is that it requires 
the assignment of a confidence relating to a single event, which is then interpreted by 
comparing the mean of such judgements with frequencies, i.e. the percentage of 
questions answered correctly.  He suggests that, if instead, subjects provide a global 
judgement of accuracy, by estimating the percentage of questions they believe they have 
answered correctly, poor calibration, which is suggestive of overconfidence detected in 
many studies using the local approach, disappears. However, Kruger and Dunning 
(1999) dispute this explanation and demonstrated in three different studies that 
overconfidence persists even where the global approach is adopted.  
As illustrated earlier, using a numerical confidence scale also permits comparison of 
actual with expected performance at different confidence levels, which can be illustrated 
on calibration graphs. Where for example, a series of judgements on propositions are 
made with 50% confidence, an appropriate (or ‗realistic‘) outcome would be one with a 
50% correct response rate. Similarly, judgements made with 70% confidence should 
produce a 70% accuracy rate and 100% confidence should be accompanied by correct 
responses every time. Thus, the extent to which confidence can be regarded as 
appropriate is reflected in the degree to which it is matched by actual outcomes and 
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perfect calibration, representing the ideal outcome, is represented by the 45 degree line 
shown previously in Figure 7. 
 
Graduation of the Confidence Scale 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) explain that many studies using a numerical 
approach have employed confidence responses with 5% intervals, offering respondents 
options of 100%, 95%, 90% etc. to express their judgements. In other cases a broader 
scale has been employed, with Koku and Qureshi (2004) for example, using 20% 
intervals and providing respondents with only five choices, (20, 40, 60, 80 and 100%). 
Using fewer and pre-determined ratings may be easier to administer in that, for 
example, respondents could be asked to tick their chosen response to permit subsequent 
data analysis using optical reading equipment. However, limiting the rating scale in this 
manner will restrict participants‘ responses and Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1977) suggest that using a more graduated scale will allow them to better express 
varying degrees of uncertainty. It is also important that a consistent approach is adopted 
for all respondents, to avoid a confounding effect from the manner in which confidence 
judgements are requested. Yates et al (1989) for example, in a study comparing 
respondents from China, Japan and the USA, using two-choice items, asked the 
Japanese and USA groups to use prescribed 10% intervals, whereas the Chinese were 
requested to use a graduated scale in which they could indicate any confidence level 
between 50-100%. While they subsequently rounded Chinese judgements to the nearest 
10%, this inconsistency in approach can be criticised in that it may have affected the 
manner in which confidence levels were provided by participants and therefore, biased 
the study‘s finding that Chinese respondents were more overconfident than those from 
the USA or Japan.      
 
2.7.2 Timing of Judgements 
In terms of their timing, metacognitive judgements may be elicited either pre-test or 
post-test  (Grimes, 2002) and thus, may be either prospective or retrospective. The 
former requires a prediction of the outcome of a future task, whereas the latter entails 
postdiction, in which the self assessment of performance is provided after having 
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completed the task in question. Pieschl (2009) explains that studies have shown that 
predictions are generally less accurate than postdictions and that this has been attributed 
to problems related to the frame of reference of the task question. As prediction entails 
making judgements in advance of the task, it requires that subjects estimate the nature 
of the task, as well as their performance. However, with postdiction, they are already 
aware of the nature of the task when they make their performance judgements and as 
this element of uncertainty is removed, their frame of reference is clearer and 
judgements tend to be more accurate. 
Examples of predictive and postdictive approaches on both local and global bases can 
be found in a study by Dunlosky and Hertzog (2000), investigating subjects‘ ability to 
recall the second word of a pair they had viewed earlier, when later prompted with the 
first word.  Their approach is summarised in Table 2 and discussed below: 
 
Table 2 – Examples of Granularity and Timing Differences in  
     Metacognitive Monitoring Judgements 
 Timing 
Prospective Retrospective 
 
 
Granularity 
Local 
Judgements 
How confident are you that in 
about ten minutes from now 
you will be able to recall the 
second word of the pair when 
prompted with the first? 
How confident are 
you that the answer 
you just gave is 
correct? 
Global 
Judgements 
Type any number between 0 
and 100 (inclusive) that 
corresponds to the percentage 
of pairs......that you think you 
will correctly recall. 
What percentage of 
items did you 
correctly recall? 
 
   
To prompt prospective judgements, participants were initially provided with numerous 
word pairs (e.g. dog-spoon) and asked to provide local predictions, indicating for each 
pair, their confidence that they would later be able to provide the second word, having 
been prompted with the first.  They were then each asked to make a global prediction by 
indicating the overall percentage of word pairs they believed they would be able to 
55 
 
recall. Subsequently, they were asked to make retrospective judgements by firstly 
providing local postdictions, indicating their confidence in the response they provided 
each time they were prompted with the first word of a pair. Having done so, they were 
each requested to make a global postdiction, by indicating the percentage of word pairs 
they believed they had correctly provided.  
These four dimensions of calibration can be reflected in the conceptual framework 
developed earlier, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Metacognition 
  
 
                    Knowledge of   Regulation of 
   Cognition       Cognition 
 
 
         Declarative       
    Knowledge      
    
        
Self knowledge               
       Metaknowledge 
 
  
           Knowledge 
          Monitoring 
       
      
         Accuracy Assessment 
                Calibration Studies 
               Timing of judgements 
 
              Granularity of judgements         
            Prospective           Retrospective 
 
                              Local          Global        Local      Global                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                      Predictions   Predictions      Postdictions   Postdictions 
 
Figure 10: Dimensions of Calibration in the Context of the Conceptual Framework 
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A distinction can also be made between offline and online methods for investigating 
metacognition, where offline entails obtaining information either prior to or after the 
cognitive task, whereas online entails doing so while the task is being performed 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006). In Schraw‘s (1998) classification 
of components of metacognition, online assessment was referred to as monitoring while 
offline was classified as evaluation. In calibration studies, global judgements, whether 
prospective or retrospective, would lend themselves to an offline approach while for 
local judgements, due to their requirement to perform a number of tasks, an online 
approach would be more appropriate.  
 
2.7.3 The Nature of Test Items 
A fundamental issue which must be addressed in calibration studies, is the nature of the 
stimulus for the self-monitoring activity through which participants make meta-level 
judgements. As explained earlier, a common approach is to provide a series of forced 
choice objective questions and numerous issues must be considered when designing 
these. 
 
2.7.3.1  Knowledge Domain 
A commonly used method in studies of confidence is to use test items based on general 
knowledge. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) defend this approach by arguing that we 
have a responsibility to appreciate the limits of our own understanding, regardless of the 
subject matter. However, it has been challenged on the basis that it lacks ecological 
validity, which is concerned with the extent to which individuals‘ natural behaviour is 
reflected in experimental scenarios (Bem and Lord, 1979) and whether findings from 
social research are applicable in natural settings (Bryman, 2008). It has therefore been 
suggested that researchers should investigate judgements made in domains with which 
subjects are familiar (Dunning et al, 1990) and in natural settings (Ehrlinger et al, 2008). 
The ecological validity of many educationally based studies can be challenged on these 
grounds, in that they have been based on general knowledge or experimentally learned 
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knowledge, rather than richer knowledge gained over a longer period of time in a more 
motivational setting, such as their natural learning environment (Hacker et al, 2000). 
Consequently, investigation of confidence in knowledge would benefit from more 
studies in natural settings, based on knowledge that learners develop during the course 
of their studies.   
  
2.7.3.2 Number of Distracters 
A common means of studying confidence is to use two-choice questions, each 
comprising one correct answer and a ‗distracter‘, in which respondents choose the 
answer they believe is most likely to be correct and assign a confidence level using a 
scale of 50-100% (Klayman et al, 1999). Thus, the two options act as a filter through 
which respondents communicate their responses (Shuford and Brown, 1975). Klayman 
et al (1999) point out that this approach has relevance to real world judgements, in that 
there is often a need to choose between two alternatives. However, if a respondent‘s 
knowledge state and level of uncertainty is such that they could assume more than the 
number of alternative responses offered, then each of these options may represent more 
than one knowledge state. Keren (1991) suggests that this problem can only be resolved 
by increasing the number of responses available. Ehrlinger et al (2008) for example, in 
two studies of 57 and 42 undergraduates respectively, employed a 20 item multiple 
choice test using five options and therefore, a confidence response scale in the range 20-
100%, as did Koku and Qureshi (2004) in a study of 91 business undergraduates, using 
a 50 item test. However, as Keren (1991) points out, the problem with increasing the 
number of options is that, as respondents have different states of knowledge, and as 
these are unknown, it is impossible to offer an exhaustive list of options. He also argues 
that too many options can make it impossible for respondents to make comparisons 
between alternatives and assess probabilities, due to limited cognitive processing 
capacity. Therefore, an approach which takes these issues into account would be one in 
which the options were extended to some extent without over-burdening respondents 
with too much choice.  
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2.7.3.3 Number of Items 
Another issue which must be addressed is the number of test items to use and previous 
studies have used between 20 and 300 questions (Klayman et al, 1999). Increasing the 
number will enhance the reliability of tests and Schraw (2009) suggests that at least six 
items should be used. However, a balance must be struck between this consideration 
and using tests which are so time consuming to complete that participants either fail to 
do so, or provide poorly considered responses due to boredom or a lack of 
concentration. 
   
2.7.4 Operationalising Metaknowledge 
When assessing metaknowledge using subjective probability, it is not possible to 
confirm individual judgements, except in situations where the respondent indicates 
100% confidence. Hence, it is more appropriate to aggregate responses over a range of 
judgements and investigate the extent to which the respondent is able to assess their 
level of knowledge (Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982). This requires a comparison of the 
aggregate probability judgements with knowledge, as demonstrated by the proportion of 
correct answers provided. Calibration is therefore concerned with the ‗absolute fit 
between metacognitive judgements and performance‘ in a test and the two most 
commonly used measures are accuracy and bias, which is also known as 
over/underconfidence (Pieschl, 2009 p.21). Calibration accuracy is ‗the mean unsigned 
difference between predicted and observed performances‘ (Pieschl, 2009 p.22) and 
while this definition refers to prediction, it is also suitable for the assessment of 
postdictive accuracy. It is a measure of the difference between confidence judgements 
and actual performance and while it indicates the magnitude of judgemental error, it 
does not provide information as to its direction, as it is unsigned. To determine this 
additional dimension an alternative, directional, indicator must be used, which specifies 
whether poorly calibrated subjects are over or under confident in their judgements. This 
can be determined by taking ‗the difference between the mean of the probability 
responses and the overall proportion correct‘ (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977 p.161). 
The resulting indicator, which assesses the extent to which an individual providing 
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confidence judgements is over or under confident, has been referred to as the bias index 
and can be expressed as follows (Schraw, 2009 p.37): 
 
                            
N 
Bias index  = 1    ∑   (ci  -  pi) 
     N   
i=1
 
 
Where: 
N = the total number of responses 
ci = a confidence rating 
pi = a performance score (rated as either 100% (correct) or 0% (incorrect)). 
 
It is also known as the bias score and this term will be used in this thesis. Since it is 
signed, it takes into account the direction of the discrepancy between confidence 
judgements and actual performance (Nietfield, Cao and Osborne, 2006), with a positive 
score indicating overconfidence and a negative result reflecting underconfidence. Thus, 
it gives information in respect of both the direction and extent of the discrepancy 
between confidence expressed and actual performance, with its direction signifying 
either over or under confidence and size indicating how severe the judgemental error is 
(Schraw, 2009). It is the most commonly used method for operationalising 
overconfidence (Ehrlinger et al, 2008; Hacker et al, 2000) and has been adopted in 
many studies (e.g. Koku and Qureshi, 2004; Pallier, 2003; Renner and Renner, 2001; 
Flannelly and Flannelly, 2000; Klayman et al, 1999). 
In terms of evaluating self-monitoring accuracy, it has been suggested that a bias score 
of less than 5% should be deemed indicative of good self-assessment (Pallier, 2003). 
However, while it may be applicable to overconfident individuals, using this standard 
more universally is problematical. It would for example, include someone with a score 
of say -20%, who therefore demonstrates poor self-assessment in the direction of 
underconfidence. Consequently, a more appropriate expression of this standard for good 
self-assessment would include those with a bias score of less than 5% and greater than -
5%. 
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The calibration graphs discussed earlier can be used to supplement arithmetic indicators 
and have relative advantages, including providing more detail (Weingardt, Leonesio and 
Loftus, 1994). For example, as well as providing a visual representation of calibration, 
they can reflect accuracy and over/under confidence for different levels of confidence.  
Calibration curves are also useful when studying groups, as they provide a useful visual 
representation of differences between them (Pieschl, 2009). For example, in Figure 11, 
the fact that the calibration curve for Group One deviates from the perfect calibration 
line, indicates that as a group, the judges in question were poorly calibrated and its 
location beneath that line indicates that their poor self-assessment was in the direction 
of overconfidence. It also reveals that  judgements made with 100% confidence 
produced a correct response rate of only 70% and therefore that, even when they felt 
they were absolutely sure about their judgements, respondents were overconfident. 
Group Two, since their curve falls predominantly below the prefect calibration line, also 
demonstrated a general tendency for overconfidence. However, since it lies above the 
perfect calibration line for judgements made with relatively low levels of confidence 
(i.e. less than 30% confidence), underconfidence is indicated for those judgements. 
Conversely, judgements made with confidence levels in excess of 30% resulted in 
overconfidence, since the curve for those falls beneath the perfect calibration line. The 
graph also indicates that for judgements in which they expressed 100% confidence, their 
accuracy was 90%, which, while also indicating overconfidence, exceeded that of 
Group One. 
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Figure 11: Calibration Curves Illustrating Group Differences 
 
2.8 Overconfidence  
Psychological research has indicated that most people are overconfident about their own 
ability (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). This has been described as ‗a fundamental feature 
of human psychology‘ (Bar-Tal, Sarid and Kishon-Rabin, 2001 p.77) and one of the 
most powerful of human tendencies, which has been linked to survival (Gilfoyle, 2000). 
Acker and Duck (2008) distinguish between ‗referential‘ and ‗stand-alone‘ 
overconfidence. The former relates to overconfidence about one‘s ability relative to 
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others, in which the most common view is the ‗better than average‘ effect. This 
indicates that most people tend to believe they are better than average in many social, as 
well as intellectual, abilities (Burson, Larrick and Klayman, 2006), which as Ehrlinger 
et al (2008) point out, is statistically impossible. In a study of 714 engineers, for 
example, 42% believed that their performance was within the top 5% of the group and 
only one person thought s/he was below average (Zenger, 1992). Stand-alone 
overconfidence on the other hand, is a type of self-appraisal in which one does not relate 
oneself to others and miscalibration, in which judgements about knowledge are 
inaccurate, is an example of this.    
 
2.8.1 Stand-Alone Overconfidence 
Stand-alone overconfidence is the unjustifiable belief that one‘s judgements are accurate 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982) and in studies testing self-assessment of 
knowledge, overconfidence is by far the most commonly reported result, with people 
tending to overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge (Renner and Renner, 2001). 
Taleb (2004) suggests that the difference between performance and self-assessment has 
been known since studies conducted by Meehl in 1954. However, Darwin recognised 
the potential problems associated with a lack of self-awareness of personal limitations 
as far back as the 19
th
 century, when claiming that ‗ignorance more frequently begets 
confidence than does knowledge‘ (Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee, 2002 p.243) and thus 
suggesting that the less knowledge we have, the less capable we tend be in appreciating 
this. Bjorkman (1994 p.386) meanwhile, explains that empirical studies investigating 
the confidence people have in their judgements ‗are as old as experimental psychology 
itself‘. Baranski and Petrusic (1999 p.1369) trace such findings to around the turn of the 
20
th
 century. They explain that the tendency for overconfidence was highlighted over 
100 years ago by Titchener, who, in a students‘ manual on experimental psychology 
published in 1905, explained that ‗We feel sure, our expectation becomes conviction, 
long before we have the objective right to be anything more than moderately expectant‘. 
They argue that this assertion, while prophetic, is curious, since at that time there 
appeared to be very little data to support it. They point out that the evidence which did 
exist in respect of differences between degree of certainty and accuracy suggested that it 
was mainly due to individual differences. Griffing (1895), for example reported that ‗the 
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degree of confidence in the perception of intensive differences varies greatly for 
individuals, the proportion of wrong judgements of which observers were confident 
ranging from 
1
/3 to 
1
/50‘ and Fullerton and Cattell (1892) suggested that ‗some observers 
are not confident, unless they are, in fact, right; while others are often confident when 
they are wrong‘. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) later played an important role in 
reviving interest in this phenomenon, when investigating whether those who have better 
knowledge, also know more about how much they know (Pallier et al, 2002).  
Overconfidence has been reported in many domains and while Pintrich (2002) suggests 
that a characteristic of experts is that they are aware of gaps in their knowledge, 
previous research, studying professionals in many fields, suggests that this is not 
necessarily so. Allwood and Granhag (1999) point out that overconfidence has been 
detected in studies of many professional groups, including bankers predicting stock 
exchange movements (Stael von Holstein, 1972), economists predicting economic 
downturns (Braun and Yaniv, 1992), lawyers predicting outcomes of legal cases (Loftus 
and Wagenaar, 1988) and FBI/CIA agents detecting lies (Ekman and O‘Sullivan, 1991). 
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) meanwhile, investigated over 2,000 business managers, 
using range questions typically based on either their company, or the industry in which 
it operated, and reported that over 99% displayed overconfidence. For example, they 
found that when asked to provide 95% confidence ranges (i.e. the correct answer had a 
95% chance of lying within the range provided) for questions related to their industry, 
computer mangers‘ responses fell way short of this, with only 20% of responses 
containing the correct answer. Similarly, advertising mangers asked to provide 50% 
ranges were able to provide ranges containing the correct answer for only 22% of 
responses. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) examined various other similar 
studies, in which a 98% confidence level was used, and found that in each case, the 
surprise index exceeded the 2% targeted error rate (T.E.R.), with a mean for 
approximately 15,000 tests, of 32% (i.e. overconfidence of 30%). Plous (1993) also 
highlights overconfidence detected in previous research, but suggests a lower mean 
level of 10-20% in most studies, while Russo and Schoemaker (1992) report levels of 
between 30-60% in their studies of business managers. Calibration studies of surgeons 
have also reported overconfidence (Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981); while 
conversely, particularly good calibration has been reported for weather forecasters 
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(Charba and Klein, 1980). The graph in Figure 12 shows calibration curves for these 
studies, in which weather forecasters provided predictions of precipitation and surgeons 
diagnosed whether or not patients had pneumonia. The proximity of the weather 
forecasters‘ curve to the perfect calibration line is in contrast to that of the surgeons, 
which falls well below it, indicating unjustifiable confidence in their diagnoses.  
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Figure 12: Calibration Curves for Weather Forecasters and Surgeons 
Source: Adapted From Plous (1993) 
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2.8.1.1 Global vs. Local Judgements 
In a calibration study using two alternative forced choice questions, which asked 
respondents to use both local and global judgements, Keren (1991) found that greater 
overconfidence resulted from the use of local judgements, evidence which seemed to 
support Gigerenzer‘s (1991) view that using global judgements reduces overconfidence. 
However, whereas when using local judgements subjects followed an instruction not to 
provide judgements below chance level, they were not given this instruction when using 
the global approach and more than 14% of respondents did so, by estimating a success 
rate of less than 50%. Eliminating these from the sample would logically increase both 
mean confidence, and consequently, overconfidence, for global judgements. On doing 
so, Keren (1991) found that overconfidence rose to a level at which it was not 
significantly different from that detected when using local judgements. As he points out, 
providing judgements below chance level suggests that such respondents either did not 
understand the concept, or were unable to appreciate it in the context in which they were 
asked to apply it and that this problem was also likely to apply to others who did not 
answer at below chance level. Ronis and Yates (1987) also detected respondents‘ use of 
probabilities below chance level when making local judgements, by assigning 
confidence levels of less than 50% for test items with two alternatives. In this case, the 
researchers re-interpreted such judgements by changing the choice recorded to the 
alternative answer and altering the confidence level to one minus that recorded by the 
respondent. This was based on the logic that if, for example, a respondent chose option 
(a) and assigned a confidence level of 30%, this suggested that their confidence in 
option (b) was 70% and that consequently, they actually believed that this was more 
likely to be the correct answer. However, as the responses provided by those 
participants indicate that they may not understand the probability scale, this would 
appear to compromise the findings from the study and Keren (1991) suggests that to 
address this, a screening procedure should be developed to exclude such respondents 
from the sample.  
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2.8.2 The Relationship between Confidence and Overconfidence 
Klayman et al (1999) explain that the greater confidence respondents have in their 
judgements, the greater their overconfidence tends to be. For example, in a study of 
lawyers, Loftus and Wagenaar (1988) reported a positive relationship between 
confidence expressed and overconfidence, with highly confident predictions resulting in 
particularly high levels of overconfidence. However, as Dunning et al (1990) point out, 
if mean confidence exceeds mean accuracy and correlation between accuracy and 
confidence is weak, it is inevitable that highly confident judgements would also be 
highly overconfident. However, they argue that these results are not forced by the nature 
of the task or the measurement system and, where subjects had insufficient information 
to support high levels of confidence, they could have given lower levels.    
 
2.8.2.1 Extreme Confidence 
While it has been argued that, to some extent, poor calibration may result from subjects‘ 
poor interpretation of the confidence scale, expressions of 100% confidence present no 
such problem, since 100% certainty about a judgement tends to be understood by most 
people (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977). Overconfidence has been found to 
persist in these circumstances and in a series of studies Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1977) detected a rate of ‗false certainties‘ (in which 100% confidence 
judgements were subsequently proved to be inaccurate) of between 17% and 30% of 
such judgements. Dunning et al (1990) reported that this occurred for 20% of certainty 
responses and highlight the potential consequences of acting on judgements made with 
absolute certainty, which prove to be inaccurate one time in every five. They may be 
particularly damaging since decision makers are more likely to rely on high confidence 
judgements and less likely to accept disconfirmatory evidence, or take out appropriate 
insurance strategies in such situations. It is therefore in these circumstances, in which 
decisions are taken in conditions of ‗inappropriate certainty‘, that the consequences can 
be most extreme (Plous, 1993 p.230). Consequently, decision makers would be well 
advised to think twice about things they believe they know with certainty, especially if 
this information is to be used to support important decisions. This view is supported by 
Bertrand Russell‘s (1951), rather blunt, observation, cited by Ehrlinger et al (2008 
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p.98), that ‗one of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are 
stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and 
indecision‘. Supportive evidence was reported in respect of a study investigating the use 
of absolute certainty (Fischhoff and McGregor, 1982), which found that a substantial 
minority of subjects tested did not give 100% confidence ratings for any of their 
judgements and that this group were better assessors of the extent of their knowledge.  
 
2.8.3 The Hard-Easy Effect 
Studies of bias in confidence judgements have tended to support the general tendency 
for gross overconfidence, with the exception of the easiest of judgements and while 
difficult tasks tend to result in overconfidence, easy tasks tend to produce 
underconfidence (Klayman et al, 1999). Thus, studies have revealed a greater tendency 
for overconfidence when using difficult sets of questions, where the rate of correct 
responses is lower, and the tendency can be reversed for easy sets of questions; a 
phenomenon known as ‗the hard-easy effect‘ (Harvey, 1997 p.78). Positive correlation 
between the difficulty of judgements respondents are required to make and 
overconfidence has been widely reported (e.g. Koku and Qureshi, 2004; Flannelly and 
Flannelly, 2000; Klayman et al, 1999; Pulford and Colman, 1997; Keren, 1991; 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980). It has 
been suggested that the hard-easy effect in fact provides supportive evidence of the 
difficulty people tend to have in assessing their own knowledge, since mean confidence 
levels are relatively insensitive to changes in the difficulty of the tasks in question 
(Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982) and thus for example, when tasks becomes more 
difficult, confidence levels are not reduced accordingly. 
However, the psychological significance of these findings has been questioned by 
Keren (1991), who uses the example of a two option test, in which respondents are 
asked to use a confidence range between 50 and 100%, to illustrate this. First of all 
consider at one extreme, a hypothetical situation in which questions were so difficult 
that respondents cannot achieve a correct response rate in excess of 50%, other than by 
chance. In these conditions, the mean correct response rate for a group of judges will, on 
chance grounds, equal 50%. Since 50% is the lowest permissible confidence response, 
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the mean for all such judgements cannot be lower than this figure and would therefore 
be equal to, or exceed, the mean correct response rate of 50%. Consequently, for 
extremely difficult questions, respondents could only be either overconfident or 
perfectly calibrated. This line of argument can also be applied, though to a lesser extent, 
in less extreme situations and where questions are a little less difficult, but still very 
challenging, where overconfidence is still more likely to occur. At the other extreme, if, 
hypothetically, questions were so easy that they are all correctly answered, then 
respondents can only be underconfident or perfectly calibrated, since their mean 
confidence rating across all questions cannot exceed 100%.  Once again this principle 
can be applied to a lesser extent for judgements where accuracy is high but less than 
100%.  Thus, Keren (1991) argues that calibration studies incorporate a mechanism 
which results in underconfidence for easier test items and overconfidence for difficult 
judgements. 
In view of this, Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka (1996) highlight the importance of using 
questions of equal difficulty when investigating groups using different sets of test items 
and explain that this is not always clearly addressed in studies. Klayman et al (1999) 
suggest that one method, which can be used to help prevent using questions of differing 
degrees of difficulty, is to focus on a very narrow knowledge domain and design 
questions using random sampling to determine alternative answers available to 
respondents. For example, a series of questions could be devised, each of which 
requires choosing from four different countries, the one with the highest population. In 
each case the available options could be determined by choosing a random sample of 
four from all countries in the world.  However, this approach is problematical in terms 
of ecological validity, in that a series of judgements in such a narrow knowledge 
domain may not reflect the type of judgements required of individuals in more natural 
settings. Therefore an alternative, and more ecologically valid, approach when using 
different sets of questions for participant sub-groups, would be to attempt to ensure 
equal difficulty in their design and subsequently verify this statistically (Yates, Lee and 
Shinotsuka, 1996).  
 
69 
 
2.8.4 Individual Differences 
Individual differences have been under-explored in respect of metacognition generally 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006) and specifically relating to self-
assessment of knowledge (Ackerman, Beier and Bowen, 2002; Grimes, 2002). Previous 
studies which have investigated individual differences in overconfidence have focused 
on factors such as age, gender and nationality and Pallier et al (2002) emphasise the 
importance of such studies. 
 
2.8.4.1 Age 
While there is some debate as to whether metacognitive skills are transferrable to 
different domains, Schraw (1998) explains that many researchers believe that, while 
they are initially domain specific, as they develop, individuals begin to build general 
metacognitive skills. He suggests that this may imply that, as these skills become 
transferable, older and more advanced students are able to use them for a variety of 
tasks and thus apply them in new learning situations. Pintrich (2002) supports the view 
that age may be influential, arguing that some students develop metacognitive 
knowledge with age and experience. Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach 
(2006) report on investigations which indicated that while metacognitive skills may 
generally tend to emerge at an early age and develop in future years, certain skills, such 
as monitoring, appear to develop later than others. Paris and Paris (2001) also explain 
that previous research has indicated that self-appraisal of learning improves with age 
and studies conducted by Fischhoff (1992) and Grimes (2002) for example, provide 
supportive evidence, in that each found that overconfidence tends to reduce with age. 
Sternberg (1998) on the other hand, argues that while Schraw‘s view on the 
transferability of metacognitive skills may be true to some extent, it may be 
overoptimistic and metacognitive skills in one domain may not necessarily translate to 
another. He cites an example of how an individual with a good understanding of how to 
develop a strategy to address an issue in the physical sciences may not necessarily be 
able to use this competence to compose a literary piece of work. Pallier (2003) found 
evidence which contradicts the view that metacognitive skill is better for older people, 
when reporting a reduction in monitoring accuracy with age. Fitzgerald, White and 
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Gruppen (2003) meanwhile, suggest that while age may be influential to some extent, 
development of self-assessment ability may not be progressive throughout life span, 
explaining that one school of thought suggests that it is largely learned in childhood, 
and by adulthood is fixed. They suggest that the lack of evidence of development of 
self-assessment skills in a study of medical students may either support this view or 
alternatively, may result from the lack of emphasis on the development of self-
assessment skills in education.  
 
2.8.4.2 Gender 
Although the tendency has been demonstrated in both males and females, it has been 
reported that overconfidence tends to be more evident in males (Acker and Duck, 2008; 
Pallier, 2003; Barber and Odean, 2001; Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar, 1994). Beyer 
(1990 p.960), who suggests that research on the accuracy of self-monitoring should 
devote more attention to gender differences, explains that females have been associated 
with lower expectations of success in many domains. She argues that this may be 
attributable to a tendency for ‗self-derogatory‘ bias, through which ability is 
underestimated. This is in contrast to males, for whom the tendency for ‗self-enhancing‘ 
bias is more prevalent. This tendency for a lack of confidence in females has been 
suggested as a factor which may reduce their persistence in higher education and even 
when outperforming males, they have a tendency to underestimate their capability 
(Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar, 1994). However, it has been suggested that gender 
differences in some cases arise not because females lack confidence, but rather that 
males display too much, a tendency which has been referred to as ‗male answer 
syndrome‘ (Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar 1994, p.120). Pallier (2003) for example, in 
a study of 303 subjects drawn from the general population in Sydney Australia, found 
that males displayed significantly higher levels of confidence, which were not 
accompanied by better test performance, and consequently, resulted in significantly 
more overconfidence than for females. Dunning et al (2003) similarly reported on a 
study using a series of scientific reasoning questions in respect of which, despite there 
being no significant difference in actual results, males provided higher estimations of 
their performance. It has been argued that this may result from the greater influence on 
males of self serving attribution bias, in which too much personal credit is assumed for 
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one‘s successes (Beyer, 1990; Meehan and Overton, 1986; Deaux and Farris, 1977). 
Overconfidence has also been associated with risky behaviour and risk taking generally 
tends to be more common in males than females (Nicholson and Willman, 2001). In 
terms of how gender and age may interact, Pallier (2003) found that males were more 
overconfident regardless of their age. Pressley et al (1987) meanwhile also found that at 
a young age, girls are better able to monitor their knowledge than boys. They also 
reported that older girls outperformed boys of the same age to an even greater extent, as 
their monitoring ability increased with age, whereas the boys‘ did not.  
However, greater overconfidence in males is not a universal conclusion and Bromily 
and Curley (1992) suggest that in certain contexts, the reverse may true. Pallier (2003) 
for example, highlights the potential importance of the knowledge domain, explaining 
that gender stereotypes suggest that females tend to have more confidence in humanities 
subject areas and males in science based subjects.  Addressing ecological validity in the 
context of gender studies of confidence ratings, Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar (1994) 
argue that, while there have been consistent findings indicating the tendency for females 
to display lower levels of confidence than males in studies of general knowledge, there 
is less known about such differences in the context of more natural settings, such as 
answering tests or examination questions, as few researchers have addressed this. More 
recently, Pallier (2003) also argues that gender differences in findings related to 
overconfidence appear to be under-investigated and this is therefore an issue which 
merits further study.  
 
2.8.4.3 Nationality 
Previous studies have detected particularly high levels of overconfidence for Asians, 
with Yates, Lee and Bush (1997), for example, finding that they were more 
overconfident than Westerners. In another study, based on undergraduate students‘ 
confidence in self-estimates of their end of year examination marks, Acker and Duck 
(2008 p.1817) investigated the difference between British and East Asian students 
(classified as originating from, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia or Taiwan) and found that 
Asians displayed greater overconfidence than their British counterparts. They suggest 
that this may be due to over-optimism, or the fact that according to the Risk Avoidance 
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Index, which measures ‗the level of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within a 
society‘, China and Hong Kong are among the less risk averse cultures, which may 
indicate a greater tendency to use high levels of confidence in judgements, rather than 
expressing greater uncertainty. Extreme overconfidence has been reported more for 
subjects from a Chinese cultural background than any other (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 
1996). Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery (2002) explain that, while there is a general 
tendency for overconfidence regardless of nationality, various studies have indicated 
that for Chinese subjects this is relatively extreme. They suggest that extreme 
overconfidence for Chinese subjects may be attributable to a tendency for less debate 
between opposing views in Chinese culture and that this may account for a tendency to 
use extreme responses. However, they also highlight an opposing view, suggesting that 
Chinese respondents may be more likely to display modesty than overconfidence, since 
this, rather than assertiveness and strong opinions, is more valued in China, because 
Asian cultures tend to be more collectivist than individualist and this self-effacement 
serves to promote harmony between individuals (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996). 
These arguments suggest that there may be two opposing influences on Chinese 
subjects when asked to express confidence in judgements and Culpepper, Zhao and 
Lowery (2002) explain that there is empirical evidence supporting each of these. They 
help to reconcile these findings by explaining that they may differ according to the 
nature of the task under investigation. Idiographic tasks, which emphasise the 
individual, may be more likely to produce a modest response around the mid-range. 
Chen, Lee and Stevenson (1995) found evidence of this in a study investigating cross 
cultural differences in the use of response ranges in surveys, by comparing Asian and 
North American students. Their questions included many of an idiographic nature and 
they reported that responses from Chinese participants were more biased towards the 
mid-point than North Americans. However, for more nomothetic enquiries and tests 
based on general knowledge or knowledge of specific facts, the tendency for Chinese to 
consider less contrary evidence may be more likely to result in extreme responses and 
increase the potential for overconfidence.  
In terms of the influence of other individual characteristics, Acker and Duck (2008) also 
investigated interaction between nationality and gender and found no significant 
difference between Asian males and females in terms overconfidence. However, as their 
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sample included only 18 Asians and 68 British students, this limits the generalisability 
of their findings and this issue would benefit from further investigation with larger 
samples. 
 
2.8.5 Overconfidence in Educational Environments 
Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994), explain that appreciating what is known and 
what is not, has important implications for study behaviour. When assigned a learning 
task, students must accurately assess the difficulty of the material they must learn, their 
own understanding and the task requirement (Isaacson and Fujita, 2006). The second of 
these requires that they are able to assess their own knowledge accurately as this will 
guide them in devoting more time to areas in which knowledge is judged to be poor, or 
curtailing study when it is perceived to be satisfactory (Smith, Shields and Washburn, 
2003). However, as Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee (2002) point out, the tendency for 
students to display overconfidence in their knowledge has been reported in numerous 
studies (e.gs. Koku and Qureshi, 2004; Dunning et al, 2003; Pallier, 2003; Grimes, 
2002; Pallier et al, 2002; Renner and Renner, 2001; Ramnarayan, Strohschneider and 
Schaub, 1997; Yates, Lee and Bush, 1997; Alicke et al, 1995; Brown and Gallagher, 
1992; Oskamp, 1962).   
Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani (2008) refer to findings suggesting that calibration is 
relatively stable over time and across tasks, suggesting that this may imply that it is not 
controllable but a permanent personal trait. However, in a study of business and 
sociology students at two universities in the USA, Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee 
(2002) reported that overconfidence declined with the length of time students had spent 
on their courses. They suggest that this indicates that the phenomenon was not due to 
personality traits alone and that the educational experience had indicated the limitations 
in their own understanding and highlighted how much more they had to learn. This 
explanation contradicts Russo and Schoemaker‘s (1992) suggestion that metaknowledge 
tends not to be developed during formal education.  
It has been suggested that epistemological beliefs are an important influence on 
cognitive monitoring (Tynjala, Helle and Murtonen, 2001) and in this respect Jehng, 
Johnson and Anderson (1993) found that those studying at postgraduate level are more 
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likely than undergraduates to recognise that knowledge is uncertain. Differences 
between disciplines in education and the tendency for them to attract different 
personality types may also mean students in one discipline having different beliefs, or 
behaving differently, from those in another (Koku and Qureshi, 2004). Consequently, 
Jehng, Johnson and Anderson (1993) also investigated differences between students 
from four academic fields of study: engineering, arts and humanities, social science and 
business, in terms of their recognition of the uncertainty of knowledge. For comparative 
purposes they classified engineering and business as ‗hard‘ fields and arts and 
humanities and social sciences as ‗soft‘ and found that those in ‗hard‘ fields had less 
tendency to believe that knowledge is uncertain. However, their classification of 
business alongside engineering as a ‗hard‘ field can be challenged in that it was based 
on an assumption that, ‗typical problems presented in engineering, natural science, and 
business courses contain enough information to reach a particular solution‘ (Jehng, 
Johnson and Anderson, 1993 p.33). In the case of business, this is often not the case, 
since information supporting many business decisions is insufficient to reach clear and 
definitive conclusions.  
When investigating subject specialism differences in a meta-analysis of previous self-
evaluation studies in higher education, Falchikov and Boud (1989) found that students 
from the natural sciences provided more accurate assessments of test performance than 
those studying in the social sciences. Ackerman, Beier and Bowen (2002) meanwhile 
found that those who had specialised in business at university displayed lower self-
assessment accuracy than those studying the physical sciences, social sciences and 
humanities. Koku and Qureshi (2004) however, highlighted a lack of studies exploring 
the relationship between overconfidence and examination performance for business 
students and investigated 91 undergraduates specialising in business. Using a research 
instrument based on a multiple choice examination, they found that the group as a 
whole displayed overconfidence. They also reported evidence of the hard-easy effect in 
that difficult questions produced extreme overconfidence, with a bias score of +36% 
(i.e. a mean confidence score of 73% vs. an accuracy rate of 37%), intermediate 
questions lower overconfidence of +7% (77% vs. 70%) and easy questions slight 
underconfidence, with a bias score of -2% (84% vs. 86%). Interestingly, they express 
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surprise at the underconfidence detected for easy questions, despite evidence of the 
hard-easy effect reported in previous studies.  
 
2.8.6 Overconfidence and Competence 
Dunning et al (2003) explain that there is much evidence that less competent performers 
tend to have greater difficulty in making metacognitive judgements than the more 
competent. The inability of the incompetent to appreciate their shortcomings has been 
reported in numerous domains, such as social competence, physical reaction times and 
comprehension of written text (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). In respect of 
metaknowledge, Pintrich (2002) argues that experts tend to have a good idea of what 
they do not know. However, contradictory evidence is provided by the numerous 
studies that have detected overconfidence in professionals in many domains and which 
therefore suggest that either most of those tested lack expertise, or that well developed 
metaknowledge is not necessarily associated with competence.  
In terms of its association with academic achievement, while most empirical evidence 
shows low to medium levels of calibration accuracy, it indicates that this is particularly 
so for poor learners (Pieschl, 2009) and previous studies have shown a positive 
relationship between accurate self-appraisal and academic achievement (Paris and Paris, 
2001). Tobias and Everson (2002 p.21), meanwhile, when discussing a programme of 
research investigating knowledge monitoring ability conducted over more than 10 years, 
conclude that their findings suggest that the ability to distinguish between what is 
known and what is not known ‗is an important ingredient for success in all academic 
settings‘.   
 
2.8.7 The Association between Knowledge and Overconfidence 
Since multiple choice tests used in calibration studies can be used to derive indicators of 
both knowledge (i.e. the proportion of correct answers) and metaknowledge (i.e. the 
bias score), they provide researchers with the means of investigating whether those who 
know more, also know more about how much they know. For example, in an important 
early study addressing this issue Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) investigated 120 
university students, who responded to a call for paid volunteers, using a test based on 
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general knowledge. They split these into three sub-groups according to their knowledge 
scores on the test and results indicated that the higher performers had a mean bias score 
of 5% (76% mean confidence vs. 71% accuracy), the middle group 7% (71% vs. 64%) 
and the worst performers 15% (71% vs. 56%). Thus while each group tended to display 
overconfidence, the more they knew the better calibrated they were. Each respondent 
answered 75 test items drawn from a pool of 150 general knowledge questions and 
while this meant that they completed different sets of questions, task difficulty did not 
represent a potential confounding effect, since individual differences were not 
investigated. However, since the test was conducted in a two hour session, in which 
participants also took part in a number of other judgemental activities, it may have been 
compromised by them providing ill-considered responses due to poor concentration or 
boredom.  This may have been compounded by a lack of motivation when completing 
the tests due to their participation being prompted by the inducement of a cash payment. 
Additionally, since general knowledge questions were used, the ecological validity of 
the study can be challenged on the grounds that the results may not have been replicated 
in a more natural setting. 
However, similar findings have been detected by others in more natural settings. 
Sinkavich (1995) for example, found that those performing poorly in university 
educational psychology examinations were less able to appreciate which question they 
answered correctly and which incorrectly, when compared with those who performed 
well. However, in this case, verbal, rather than numerical, expressions of confidence 
were used and these may be more likely to be inconsistently interpreted by participants.  
Flannelly and Flannelly (2000) on the other hand, used numerical expressions of 
confidence in a study of undergraduate nursing students‘ performance in tests based on 
their study programme. They also reported a negative relationship between test 
performance and overconfidence bias and suggested that overconfidence poses a 
problem for learning. Renner and Renner (2001) also found a negative association 
between knowledge and overconfidence in an experiment involving psychology 
students, in which participants completed a series of weekly subject-related tests over a 
ten week period. These were four-option multiple choice tests in which respondents 
provided confidence estimates between 25% and 100% for each of 10 questions and 
were given feedback on their performance. Changes over time were assessed by 
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comparing the means for the first two tests with those for the last two. This indicated 
that at the start of the experiment, participants were generally overconfident in their 
knowledge, with a mean bias score of +6%, but by the end, were underconfident, with a 
bias score of -14%. The study also revealed that this group‘s performance on the tests 
was significantly better at the end of the experiment than at the start, while for a control 
group, which had not provided confidence estimates, performance had declined. Thus, 
the researchers argued that the reduction in the bias score was accompanied by better 
performance in the tests. In this case while overconfidence was reduced, participants 
were not better calibrated, since at the end of the experiment they were underconfident 
to a greater extent than their initial overconfidence (-14% vs. 6%). However, Renner 
and Renner (2001 p.31) argue that underconfidence may be the preferable error, since it 
is less likely than overconfidence to result in inadequate learning in preparation for tests 
and support this view with a quote from one participant who remarked, ‗I like being 
underconfident, it makes me study more‘. 
Everson and Tobias (1998) also reported that less competent participants were less able 
to appreciate their own level of knowledge in a study of university students at the start 
of their programme, in which vocabulary knowledge was assessed. However, the study 
did not address subject knowledge specific to their programme of study, nor did it 
consider a wide range of competence, since participants were from a group identified as 
at risk of performing poorly in their studies. In another study, based on an examination 
taken by students with a wider ability range, Ehrlinger et al (2008) grouped their 124 
participants by competence displayed in the test and found that the bottom quartile and 
middle 50% displayed significant overconfidence, while the upper quartile estimated 
their performance much more accurately and displayed underconfidence to a small 
extent. Meanwhile in the study of business students discussed earlier, Koku and Qureshi 
(2004) also reported a significant negative relationship between overconfidence and 
knowledge for business undergraduates. They classified participants as high, average or 
low performers based on their test score in the multiple choice examination on which 
the research instrument was based, in the same manner as Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 
(1977), with the top third classed as high performing the middle third as average and the 
remainder as low performing. They found greater differences between these groups than 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), with high performers only slightly overconfident 
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with a bias score of 3% (83% mean confidence vs. 80% accuracy), average performers 
moderately overconfident with a bias score of 10% (78% vs. 68%) and low performers 
extremely overconfident, with a bias score of 22% (73% vs. 51%). While these studies 
detected relatively low levels of overconfidence for higher performers, studies of 
university students‘ global postdictions of multiple-choice examination performance on 
introductory educational psychology courses (Hacker et al, 2000; Hacker, Bol and 
Bahbahani, 2008), reported underconfidence for the more knowledgeable. They also 
indicated that those who performed best were better calibrated and it was argued that 
these findings suggest that a high degree of accuracy in calibration may only occur 
where an individual has very good knowledge in the domain being tested. However, 
while Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani (2008) explained that their results should be viewed 
cautiously due to the relatively small number of participants, they did not discuss the 
implications of the gender split in the sample. Participants were predominantly female 
(80%) and consequently, it may be that their findings were gender biased. Kruger and 
Dunning (1999 p.1121), who also detected that those who displayed least competence 
were most likely to overestimate it, argue that the skills necessary for competence are 
often the same as those required to evaluate it. They conclude that this lack of 
metacognitive skills for accurate self-assessment represents a ‗dual burden‘ for some in 
that they not only make incorrect choices but ‗their incompetence robs them of the 
ability to realize it‘.  
However, while many studies have indicated a negative association between 
overconfidence and knowledge, it has been argued that the method used in such studies 
has biased findings. This argument suggests that those with differing levels of 
competence may not differ in their self-assessment ability, but that people of different 
skill levels find it equally difficult and this, combined with problems in methods 
adopted in research studies, produces findings suggesting the less competent are poorer 
at self-assessment (Ehrlinger et al, 2008). As Klayman et al (1999) point out, the bias 
score is determined by comparing confidence and accuracy and therefore 
overconfidence and accuracy will be negatively correlated when using the same set of 
questions to measure each. Therefore, those displaying poor knowledge in the type of 
test commonly used in calibration studies are more likely to show overconfidence than 
those showing good knowledge, because it is more difficult for them to underestimate 
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their performance, since it is so poor (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Similarly those 
displaying high knowledge levels are more likely to display underconfidence, since is 
more difficult to overestimate such high performance. To take an extreme example, it 
would be impossible for someone answering 100% of test items correctly to display 
overconfidence, since they would be unable to express a mean confidence level in 
excess of 100% for those judgements. However, when investigating this issue, Kruger 
and Dunning (1999) found that with training, the self-assessment ability of less 
knowledgeable participants was enhanced and they were able to provide better self-
assessment, even where test scores were low. They argue that this suggests that, while it 
may play some part, overconfidence in the less knowledgeable does not arise solely due 
to the lower likelihood of underestimating low scores. However, since the problem 
identified occurs through the use of the same instrument to operationalise both 
competence and calibration, it could be addressed in an educational context by using a 
separate instrument to independently assess academic competence. For example, 
assessment marks during participants‘ study programme could be used for this purpose. 
Since performance indicators used when investigating the association between 
calibration and performance have tended to be restricted to objective, multiple choice 
tests, little is known about how it relates to broader indicators of academic performance 
(Nietfield, Cao and Osborne, 2006). The approach suggested here would address this by 
permitting the investigation of the association between overconfidence and indicators of 
student performance which impact on the overall grade awarded in their study 
programme.   
 
2.9 Reasons for Overconfidence 
The potential adverse consequences of overconfidence raise questions about its possible 
causes and whether interventions can be initiated to assist in moderating it. Reasons for 
overconfidence detected in research studies can be categorised as cognitive 
explanations, motivational explanations or flaws in testing. 
 
2.9.1 Cognitive Reasons 
Overconfidence may arise through the use of heuristics when making judgements. 
These are mental shortcuts which individuals take when making judgements, in order to 
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simplify the task. However, while they may be advantageous in reducing the cognitive 
effort required when making judgements, they can also cause problems. The following 
heuristics have been identified as potential causes of overconfidence (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1992).  
 
2.9.1.1 Availability Bias 
Availability bias arises due to the difficulty people have in picturing all the ways in 
which events could possibly unfold (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). This results in a 
tendency to over-rely on evidence which is most available or more easily accessed, 
perhaps based on recent experiences for example, and to give insufficient consideration 
to other sources. Thus, unwarranted confidence in judgements may arise through 
consideration of over-restricted sources of relevant information. For example, when 
mentally searching for sources of information to inform a response in an educational 
test, students may over-rely on recently learned material, or issues which have received 
more prominence in previous teaching sessions. 
 
2.9.1.2 Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias arises due to the tendency to seek support for expectations rather than 
looking for disconfirmatory evidence (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). Selectively 
adopting or ignoring information, depending on whether it fits expectations, can result 
in failure to consider alternative possibilities and thus place too much confidence in the 
initial perception. For example, a student may feel that s/he knows an answer and fail to 
subject this belief to sufficient critical examination by considering alternatives (Koku 
and Qureshi, 2004). This bias can work in conjunction with availability bias in that the 
availability of information may influence initial expectations, which the student 
subsequently fails to assess critically enough when evaluating evidence to inform 
his/her judgement.   
 
2.9.1.3 Anchoring Bias 
Anchoring bias results from a reluctance to shift sufficiently our belief from one 
particular notion on which we have become ‗anchored‘. In a seminal paper on 
judgement under uncertainty and the use of heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
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Two-Choice Questions 
 
Chance        Mid-point anchor   Certainty 
   50%        75%       100% 
 
 
Four-Choice Questions 
 
Chance        Mid-point anchor   Certainty 
   25%      62.5%      100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
explain that when making judgements, individuals often use a start point (anchor) and 
adjust from that in making their judgement. Problems tend to occur through either 
choosing an inappropriate anchor or failing to adjust sufficiently from that starting point 
to take other relevant information into account and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
suggest that this can account for overconfidence.  
Keren (1991) argues that anchoring may help to explain the hard-easy effect in 
calibration studies. He suggests that when uncertain about the answer to a test item, 
rather than indicating a confidence judgement near chance level, respondents may use 
an anchor of probability based on moderate difficulty in the middle of the confidence 
rating range available to them. For example, as illustrated in Figure 13,  for two-choice 
questions this would be around 75% % [50 + (100-50)/2] and for four-option questions, 
somewhere around 60-65% [25 + (100-25)/2].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure13: Location of the Mid-Point Anchor in Multiple-Choice Questions 
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        Underconfidence 
           Confidence 
 Stimulus                Response 
   
Easy questions     100% 
  
Mid-point        75% 
  Anchor   
 
Hard questions      50% 
 
Overconfidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While respondents make adjustments from this initial anchor, to account for questions 
which are perceived as being either particularly easy or difficult, these are often 
insufficient. This can result in confidence estimates from those who are uncertain in 
their judgements being biased towards this central reference point, causing ‗response 
contraction bias‘ (Poulton, 1994 p.13).  Figure 14 illustrates this effect using two-choice 
questions for illustrative purposes. It shows how it would tend to result in a stimulus 
which is higher than the central reference point (i.e. from easy questions) being 
underestimated, resulting in underconfidence, while stimuli below the reference point 
(i.e. difficult questions) would be overestimated, and produce overconfidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
    Figure 14: Response Contraction Bias 
    Source: Adapted from Poulton (1994) 
 
Respondents behaving in this manner thus tend to play safe, by contracting their 
confidence judgements to the mid-point (Poulton, 1994). Consequently, to assist in 
preventing this tendency, they should be encouraged to use the full confidence range to 
reflect different states of uncertainty more appropriately.  
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2.9.2 Motivational Explanations 
2.9.2.1 Social Utility 
It has been suggested that motivational factors may be a contributory factor to the 
overconfidence detected in research studies, in that respondents may feel they should 
appear knowledgeable and confident, since in many situations competence can be 
difficult to assess and confidence may therefore be rewarded instead (Klayman et al, 
1999 p.243). This suggests that respondents may feel motivated to express greater 
confidence than is warranted if they feel it is to their advantage to do so (Wright and 
Wishuda, 1982). Fischhoff and MacGregor (1982) argue that this implies that findings 
from studies investigating confidence of those who are consulted, and paid, on the basis 
the confidence they project (e.g. stock market advisors and management consultants) 
may be ambiguous, since they may feel motivated to express confidence in their 
judgements, whether warranted or not. People like to see themselves as knowledgeable 
(Klayman et al, 1999) and the less competent, in particular, may display 
overconfidence, not because they are unable to accurately self-assess, but rather they are 
unwilling to do so and admit to their incompetence, whereas those performing well have 
less incentive to do so and indeed may even display false modesty (Ehrlinger et al, 
2008). 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) analysed 74 previous studies and concluded that monetary 
rewards for good calibration can act as an effective means of addressing this issue, as 
respondents offered this competing motivation tend to shift responses, from favourable 
self-presentation to a more reasonable response. However, Ehrlinger et al (2008) found 
evidence to the contrary in a study in which they investigated the impact of motivation 
on the less competent, by offering monetary rewards to one group for accurate self-
assessment and comparing their responses with a control group, for whom there was no 
such incentive. They found that with a monetary incentive, less competent respondents 
actually displayed more overconfidence, rather than less as would have been predicted 
by a motivational explanation. They also investigated the impact of social incentives, by 
requiring respondents to explain their responses to the researcher, on the grounds that 
people tend to make more considered judgements when they are accountable for them. 
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Here they found similar results to those obtained with financial incentives and therefore 
concluded that for the group in question, overconfidence in the less competent was not 
attributable to motivational explanations.    
 
2.9.2.2 Wishful Thinking 
Another influence on overconfidence may be the extent to which a respondent is 
involved in the outcomes of the judgement and the wishful thinking that may 
consequently result (Keren, 1991). Babad (1987) detected this in a study of predictions 
of football results, where respondents were more likely to predict a win for a team to 
which they had some affiliation. In a study of psychology students, Hacker, Bol and 
Bahbahani (2008) also found some evidence of this, albeit from a very small percentage 
of their sample, with participants assigning confidence levels based on their desire for 
high scores. 
 
2.9.3 Flaws in Testing 
2.9.3.1 Question Difficulty 
While there was general agreement from the 1970s until the early 1990s that individuals 
were overconfident about the state of their own knowledge, a view emerged in the 
1990s which suggested that this finding may have been influenced by the nature of the 
questions used in testing (Klayman et al, 1999). It has been claimed for example, that 
overconfidence detected in some studies may not be generalisable, since it may have 
arisen due to flaws in the way in which test questions were selected, with researchers 
using particularly difficult questions (Juslin, 1994). Contrary questions are those for 
which the correct answer contradicts the information subjects tend to use to guide them 
in making a judgement (Klayman et al, 1999) and it has been argued that the use of such 
misleading test items introduces an experimental bias, which tends to produce 
overconfidence (Klayman et al, 1999; Keren, 1991).  However, it can be difficult to take 
this into account when designing tests since question difficulty depends on the 
respondents and may differ for different sub-groups (Keren 1997) and for certain 
individuals. Klayman et al (1999) also argue that in natural settings, people are required 
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to make some judgements which may be more difficult than others and an 
understanding of how they respond to such difficult questions is therefore important.  
 
2.9.3.2 Difficulty in Expressing Confidence Levels 
Koku and Qureshi (2004) suggest that respondents‘ difficulty in translating subjective 
judgements into quantitative measures may have contributed to overconfidence detected 
in research studies. They argue however, that it cannot be solely due to this on the 
grounds that one would expect to find underconfident as well as overconfident 
individuals and previous studies have generally reported overconfidence. However, this 
argument can be challenged, in that it does not take into account the fact that some 
studies have found evidence of underconfidence. For example, it has been detected for 
easy questions (i.e. the ‗hard-easy‘ effect) and, as discussed above, response contraction 
bias, in which respondents misuse the confidence scale, has been suggested as a 
possible cause. Consequently, while numerical expressions of confidence may be less 
subjective than verbal responses, it is important that studies adopting this approach take 
steps to clarify for respondents the nature of the confidence scale being employed.  
 
2.9.3.3 Ecological Validity 
As discussed earlier, concerns have been raised about the ecological validity of findings 
from calibration studies. Very few have been undertaken in a classroom environment, 
with most being laboratory-based, in what could be argued as artificial situations 
(Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani, 2008; Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee, 2002). Christensen-
Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) caution against generalising from experimental 
laboratory based findings to real life judgement scenarios, arguing that subjects in real 
life settings may not display the same cognitive limitations as those in a laboratory, as 
they may be more motivated to produce appropriate judgements in a real life setting. 
Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani (2008) therefore argue that, while experimental laboratory 
studies may be useful, more research should be undertaken in natural environments such 
as classrooms. 
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2.10 Reducing Overconfidence   
In an analysis of a wide range of studies attempting to explain or reduce 
overconfidence, Fischhoff and MacGregor (1982) concluded that only three approaches 
appear to be effective: assigning easier tasks, challenging one‘s own judgements and 
extensive training supported by effective personal feedback. However subsequently, 
rewarding self-assessment accuracy (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992; Hacker, Bol and 
Bahbahani, 2008) and developing awareness of overconfidence (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1992) have also been suggested. 
 
2.10.1 Assign Easier Tasks 
Since task difficulty has been associated with calibration accuracy, with difficult tasks 
tending to result in overconfidence and easy tasks underconfidence, asking subjects to 
perform less challenging tasks is likely to reduce overconfidence. However, this 
approach is of limited value since, while in experimental situations task difficulty could 
be manipulated, this is more difficult, as well as inappropriate in more natural settings 
in which individuals are faced with tasks of varying degrees of difficulty. In higher 
education for example, individuals may often be confronted with learning objectives 
which are designed to challenge them. 
 
2.10.2 Challenge Judgements 
Overconfidence can be reduced by considering evidence which contradicts initial beliefs 
(Zakay and Glicksohn, 1992; Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa, 1998) and actively 
considering reasons why judgements may be incorrect (Koku and Qureshi, 2004; Arkes 
et al, 1987; Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980), especially those made with 100% 
confidence (Dunning et al, 1990). This approach can be enhanced by the involvement of 
others (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992), since this provides another perspective on the 
judgement being made. The expectation that judgements may be scrutinised by others 
may also be influential. This can have a moderating motivational effect on those who 
may otherwise provide inappropriately high confidence levels for presentation purposes, 
due to their perception of the social utility associated with such displays. Evidence of 
87 
 
this was provided in a study by Arkes et al (1987), in which a group expecting a group 
discussion of answers they gave in a test displayed less overconfidence than a control 
group.  
 
2.10.3 Develop Awareness 
Fischhoff (1982) highlights the potential value of developing an awareness of 
overconfidence bias when suggesting the following progressive steps for correcting 
overconfidence bias.  
 
1) Warn about the potential for the bias 
2) Explain the direction and extent of bias which is typically found 
3) Provide feedback on the subjects own bias to personalise the implications 
4) Extensive training, coaching, feedback 
 
He suggests moving through each of these in turn until the bias is corrected and Russo 
and Schoemaker (1992) explain that in some cases, awareness alone may be sufficient. 
For some this may result from general awareness of the tendency, prompted by Steps 1 
and 2 above. However, for others this may be insufficient and Step 3, in which they are 
provided with information to make them aware of their own bias, may be more 
productive, while for others, the more extensive interventions in Step 4 may be 
necessary.  
 
2.10.4 Feedback 
Metaknowledge can be developed through the provision of relevant, timely and accurate 
feedback (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980). Stone 
(2000) suggests that, although it may help to increase accuracy, the main value of 
feedback lies in its potential to induce individuals to adopt more appropriate confidence 
levels and it is this which enhances self-assessment accuracy. For example, it has been 
argued that evidence indicating that weather forecasters are particularly well calibrated, 
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with confidence levels matching very closely with accuracy (Charba and Klein, 1980), 
may be attributable to the rapid and highly relevant feedback they receive on their 
judgements (Murphy and Winkler, 1984). In separate studies of undergraduates on 
psychology courses, Nietfield, Cao and Osborne (2006) and Renner and Renner (2001) 
also found that providing feedback on performance in calibration tests reduced 
overconfidence and improved academic performance in classroom tests. However the 
type of feedback which may assist in moderating individuals‘ unrealistic evaluations of 
their own knowledge may not always be available to them. Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
argue that they may not receive any feedback and even if they do, it is more likely to be 
positive than negative, as those in a position to judge may prefer to provide none at all, 
rather than negative feedback. Therefore it is important that, rather than unduly positive 
feedback designed to enhance students‘ self-esteem, professional educators provide 
honest, constructive evaluations (Pintrich, 2002), which can assist learners in 
appreciating what they know and what they do not.  
The effectiveness of feedback also depends on the extent to which recipients are able to 
use it effectively to inform future performance. Hacker et al (2000) for example, found 
that, while feedback improved the self-assessment accuracy of more competent 
students, this was not the case for the less competent, despite repeated information 
highlighting their limitations. Participants completed three tests of knowledge and both 
predictive and postdictive self-assessment accuracy over a 15 week period, in which 
they were informed of the potential benefits of accurate self-assessment and given 
feedback on test scores, as well as self–assessment accuracy. While for the group as a 
whole, predictive accuracy increased over time, postdictive did not. To investigate 
further they grouped participants, based on their competence in the knowledge based 
aspect of the test, with those achieving in excess of the median classified as high 
performers and those below as low performers. Their findings indicated that, while the 
higher performers improved over time in their predictive and especially, postdictive 
ability, the self-assessment accuracy of the less competent did not. 
Keren (1987) argued that the value of feedback is influenced by the extent to which 
activities undertaken are related tasks, in which knowledge from one can be transferred 
to another. Weather forecasters‘ judgements of the likelihood of precipitation are 
examples of such tasks, since experience gained from making one judgement has 
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specific relevance for, and can be related to, subsequent judgements. Keren (1987) 
suggests that the process through which confidence ratings are generated in typical 
calibration studies consists of two sub-processes. In the first, the subject builds a mental 
model to generate feelings of certainty about, for example, the plausibility of one 
possible answer, versus the other options and these judgements are based on previous 
experience. In the second sub-process these feelings are quantified, by translating them 
into probabilities. He argues that where related tasks are performed repeatedly, their 
performance calls for similar cognitive processes. Consequently, subjects can learn from 
their previous experiences to become better calibrated. It is this which therefore 
contributes to very good calibration detected in studies of weather forecasters, who 
perform related tasks repeatedly. However, he suggests that the impact of feedback on 
the development of metaknowledge is likely to be more limited in respect of non-related 
tasks, because in their case, previous experiences are less informative. This argument 
calls into question the extent to which feedback may improve metaknowledge in a 
higher education context, as it would depend upon the degree to which the cognitive 
process associated with self-assessment of subject-related knowledge is transferrable 
between individual items of learning. It may, for example, be more easily achieved in 
environments in which learners focus on a particular narrow knowledge domain in one 
specialised subject area in which tasks are similar, than those which entail more diverse 
demands. 
 
2.10.5 Training 
The high quality of probability judgements provided by weather forecasters has been 
attributed, in part at least, to the fact that it is an important aspect of their role and great 
effort has been devoted to improving their judgements (Murphy and Winkler, 1984). 
However, while training can enhance metaknowledge (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 
1980, Kruger and Dunning 1999), as discussed above, good calibration in one domain 
may not necessarily transfer to another. Keren (1987) for example, reported a study in 
which weather forecasters showed excellent calibration in their field of expertise, but 
performed no better than a group of students when participating in a general knowledge 
task. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) also reported little transferability of good 
calibration between general knowledge tests and other self-assessment tasks. Paris and 
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Winograd (1990) advocate the use of cognitive coaching in educational environments as 
a means of improving metacognitive skills generally and suggest that this could include 
self-assessment of learning as well as mutual discussion, instruction and encouragement 
to motivate the learners.  
 
2.10.6 Reward Good Metaknowledge 
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) argue that the lack of formal recognition or reward for 
metaknowledge, and failure to develop it during formal education, contributes to the 
general tendency for overconfidence. The fact that weather forecasters are rewarded for 
good calibration has been suggested as a factor contributing to findings indicating their 
highly developed metaknowledge (Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982) and incentivising 
learners in educational environments, who display good metaknowledge, may assist in 
its development in that context also. In a study investigating this Hacker, Bol and 
Bahbahani (2008) awarded students sitting examinations on a course in educational 
psychology extra marks according to how accurate their predictions and postdictions of 
accuracy were. They found that, while accuracy improved for these students, this was 
also the case for a control group for whom there was no such incentive. Since there was 
no significant difference between the improvements in each group, the results indicated 
that the incentive had not been influential in enhancing calibration. They explored this 
in more depth, analysing the participants by competence by splitting them into two 
groups, based on whether their examination marks exceeded the median score. They 
found that for the higher performers, there was no difference between those offered the 
incentive of extra marks and those in the control group. However, for the lower 
performance group, the incentive did improve calibration accuracy, suggesting that 
explicit rewards may be more influential for such students.    
 
2.11 Advantages of Overconfidence 
While there is much emphasis in the literature on the possible negative consequences of 
excessive confidence, it is worth noting that potential advantages have also been 
highlighted. For example, as noted earlier, since confidence can be associated with 
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competence, especially in circumstances where competence is difficult to assess 
(Klayman et al, 1999), unwarranted displays of confidence can attract favourable 
attention and possibly rewards (Fischhoff, 1994). Overconfidence has also been linked 
to health benefits, with studies having found that self-enhancing biases such as 
overconfidence are more likely to improve psychological health than accurate self-
perception (Beyer, 1990). This suggests that feedback to those with unjustifiably high 
perceptions of their own knowledge should be provided in a constructive and supportive 
manner. Confidence also has motivational value and encourages individuals to take on 
challenges, through which they may realise their potential. The German philosopher 
Goethe recognised this when declaring that, ‗for a man to achieve all that is demanded 
of him he must regard himself as greater than he is‘ (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992 
p.16). In an educational context, optimistic views of self competence can motivate 
individuals to apply themselves to learning and encourage them to undertake 
challenging learning activities (Paris and Winograd, 1990). This motivational impact 
can assist in improving performance and, as this further enhances positive self-
perception, a positive cycle may be established in which self-evaluation, motivation and 
performance feed each other (Shen and Pedulla, 2000). Overly negative views of self-
competence may lead to over-cautiousness and Davidoff (1995) for example, argues 
that in a medical context, an unwarranted lack of confidence contributes to excessive 
testing and at extreme levels, could result in the inability to take decisions. In education, 
it may diminish ambition and dissuade students from accepting challenges which may 
have increased their learning. Thus, since self-efficacy can engender the confidence 
necessary to take difficult decisions and rise to challenges which provide learning 
opportunities, it is important that it is not eroded in initiatives designed to heighten the 
awareness of learners who may be overconfident.  
 
2.12 Conclusion 
Summarising the issues discussed in this chapter, self-regulated learning highlights the 
importance of students taking responsibility for, and control of, their own learning and 
generally enhances performance. Metacognition is a concept which relates to 
‗knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena‘ (Flavell, 1979 p.906) and has 
been identified as the driving force behind self-regulated learning. While its components 
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are often inconsistently described, the most common distinction in the literature is that 
between metacognitive knowledge and skills, which have been described as knowledge 
about cognition and regulation of cognition respectively. One of the fundamental aims 
of education is to endow students with knowledge (Jehng, Johnson and Anderson, 1993) 
and an important aspect of metacognitive regulatory activity is knowledge monitoring, 
since accurate self-monitoring can enhance learning, particularly in environments such 
as higher education, which entail learning large amounts of information. However, 
learners are not necessarily well equipped to do this, a shortcoming which indicates 
poor knowledge of their own state of knowledge (‗metaknowledge‘) and can impede 
their learning.  
Calibration studies can be used to test for metaknowledge and the most popular 
approach is to use multiple-choice questions, in which respondents select, from a 
number of options, what they believe is the correct answer and provide a subjective 
probability representing their confidence in that choice. While many studies have been 
based on general knowledge questions, the ecological validity of this approach is 
questionable and the investigation of knowledge monitoring accuracy in more natural 
settings has been encouraged. This concept can be operationalised using the bias score, 
which provides information on both the extent and direction of the discrepancy between 
confidence and actual performance and is the most commonly used indicator of over or 
under confidence in knowledge. Previous studies have tended to support the view that 
metaknowledge is typically poorly developed, with a general tendency for 
overconfidence when individuals assess the extent of their knowledge. These findings 
have been attributed to the lack of formal recognition or reward for metaknowledge and 
failure to develop it during formal education (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). However, 
exceptions have been reported with for example, good calibration being detected for 
meteorologists‘ weather forecasts, a finding which has been linked with training they 
undertake, the quality of feedback they receive on their judgements and the rewards 
available for accurate self-assessment. Task difficulty has also been found to be 
influential and high positive correlation between the difficulty of judgements and 
overconfidence has been widely detected. 
Individual differences have also been reported, with previous studies indicating a 
greater tendency for overconfidence in males and younger people. A cultural bias has 
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also been detected, with Asian, and in particular Chinese, subjects displaying greater 
overconfidence than Westerners. In an educational context, the relationship between 
self-assessment accuracy and knowledge has also been explored, with many studies 
reporting that those who know more tend to have a better appreciation of their own 
knowledge than their less knowledgeable peers. However, this finding has been 
influenced by the fact that it has commonly been investigated by measuring both 
competence and bias using the same test instrument, which will tend to bias results 
towards a greater tendency for overconfidence in poor performers.  
Given its possible adverse consequences, initiatives aiming to moderate overconfidence 
in knowledge may be useful and an understanding of its causes would be helpful when 
considering these. Reasons proposed include cognitive explanations and motivational 
factors, and suggested remedial strategies include raising awareness of the general 
tendency for overconfidence, challenging one‘s judgements, rewarding good 
metaknowledge and providing training and effective feedback. 
 
2.12.1 The Current Study  
The purpose of this study is to contribute towards answering central questions of how 
effectively individuals are able to self-assess their capabilities and what the implications 
of this are. It specifically focuses on their ability to appreciate the extent of their own 
knowledge. The preceding review of the literature has provided indications of what is 
known about this through previous studies, as well as highlighting issues which could 
be addressed through further research. This will now be used as a basis for the 
development of specific research questions and hypotheses for this study. 
It has been suggested that an important issue, worthy of further investigation, is whether 
metacognition is a general concept, or specific to particular tasks and domains and that 
future research should therefore involve a variety of tasks and domains, as well as 
exploring individual differences (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006). 
This study addresses these issues by investigating a particular aspect of metacognition, 
knowledge monitoring, in a higher education setting. 
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2.12.1.1 The Tendency for Overconfidence 
The most common finding in previous studies investigating the ability of individuals to 
assess their own knowledge accurately is the tendency for overconfidence. This is 
important in the context of learning, as the ability to appreciate what has already been 
learned and where gaps in knowledge exist may be advantageous in the development of 
learning strategies (Everson and Tobias, 1998). If students appreciate that their 
knowledge is deficient, they can undertake remedial action through further study, 
whereas ignorance of this is unlikely to induce such a response (Pintrich, 2002). While 
the literature review has indicated a general tendency for overconfidence in knowledge, 
its investigation in different settings has been suggested. In an educational context, the 
need for further research in a variety of institutions and academic disciplines has been 
highlighted (Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee, 2002) and the lack of studies investigating 
overconfidence in business students specifically noted (Koku and Qureshi, 2004). The 
ecological validity of previous findings has also been challenged and it has been 
suggested that studies should focus more on natural settings, by investigating 
judgements made in domains with which subjects are familiar, such as knowledge 
acquired by students over a period of time in their natural learning environment. Grimes 
(2002) for example, calls for more research investigating students‘ ability to assess 
performance on tests in a classroom environment accurately.  
This study addresses these issues by investigating knowledge monitoring accuracy of 
students studying in a higher education learning environment at a large business school, 
located in a post-1993 UK university.  The investigation will focus on knowledge 
related to the study programmes on which participants are enrolled and specifically aims 
to answer the following question, by testing the associated hypothesis: 
 
Research Question 1  
Are students overconfident in their knowledge?  
 
H1 = Students are overconfident in their knowledge 
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2.12.1.2 Individual Differences 
The literature review suggests that individual differences have been under-explored, in 
respect of metacognition generally and specifically relating to self-assessment of 
knowledge. Previous research on the tendency for inflated self-assessment has generally 
tended to focus on means, while not providing enough information on individual 
differences (Ackerman, Beier and Bowen, 2002) and Klayman et al (1999) suggest that 
individual differences in confidence judgements warrant further investigation. Grimes 
(2002) meanwhile, specifically advocates that this should address personal 
characteristics, such as age and gender and this study responds by investigating each of 
these. Additionally, since the research setting is a large business school educating 
students from diverse cultural backgrounds, differences by country of origin will also be 
explored. 
 
Age 
Views on how metacognitive skills develop over time are mixed. One theory suggests 
that they may emerge at an early age and increase steadily. Evidence for this has been 
found in studies indicating that self-appraisal of learning is enhanced and 
overconfidence in knowledge reduced, with age. However, evidence has also been 
reported, in which knowledge monitoring accuracy has reduced with age. The timing of 
the development of monitoring ability has also been considered, with one view arguing 
that it may develop later than other metacognitive skills, and another suggesting that it 
may be largely developed as a child and remain fixed during adulthood. Consequently 
this study aims to answer the following question: 
 
Research Question 2 
Is there an age difference in overconfidence bias? 
 
H2      = Overconfidence differs between older and younger students 
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Gender 
There are consistent findings indicating greater overconfidence in knowledge for males. 
However, many studies have been based on general knowledge and it has been 
suggested that more research should focus on how monitoring accuracy may differ by 
gender in more natural settings, such as when answering learning tests (Lundeberg, Fox, 
and Punccohar, 1994). It has also been suggested that gender differences in educational 
settings may be influenced by the nature of the academic discipline under investigation.  
Consequently, the literature highlights the need to investigate these differences further 
and this study aims to do so by answering the following question: 
 
 Research Question 3 
Are males more overconfident in their knowledge than females? 
 
H3     = Overconfidence is greater for male students 
 
Country of Origin 
Previous studies investigating differences by country of origin have detected 
particularly high levels of overconfidence for Asians, as compared with westerners 
(Acker and Duck, 2008; Yates, Lee and Bush, 1997). This has been particularly evident 
in Chinese subjects (Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery, 2002; Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 
1996). This study aims to explore this issue by answering the following question: 
 
Research Question 4 
Are Chinese students more overconfident in their knowledge than UK students? 
 
H4     = Overconfidence is greater for Chinese than UK  
students 
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2.12.1.3 Overconfidence and Academic Performance 
Grimes (2002) suggests that, since inaccurate self-assessment of knowledge may result 
in inappropriate learning strategies, and consequently, poor performance in assignments 
and examinations, the relationship between overconfidence and learning outcomes 
should be investigated. Nietfield, Cao and Osborne (2006) explain that previous studies 
investigating the association between calibration and performance have typically been 
restricted to performance in multiple choice objective tests. Koku and Qureshi‘s (2004) 
study of business students is an example of this, as they investigated the relationship 
between overconfidence and performance in multiple-choice examinations. However 
they used the same instrument to determine competence and overconfidence and as 
discussed previously, this approach is problematical. When determined in this manner, 
incompetence is more likely to be associated with overconfidence on the grounds that 
underconfidence is unlikely when the test accuracy score is particularly poor. This study 
aims to address this issue by using different datasets to determine indicators of self-
monitoring accuracy and academic competence. While overconfidence bias is 
determined using multiple-choice tests, academic performance indicators are 
determined independently, using summative assessment marks achieved by students 
during their study programme. Consequently, the study aims to respond to the concern 
that previous studies investigating the association between calibration and performance 
have typically been restricted to multiple-choice examinations and little is known about 
how it relates to wider indicators of academic performance (Nietfield, Cao and Osborne, 
2006). This will be achieved by answering the following question:  
 
Research Question 5 
Is there a negative association between overconfidence and academic performance? 
 
H5     = There is a negative association between overconfidence  
and academic performance 
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While their investigation focused only on a multiple choice examination, Koku and 
Qureshi (2004 p.223) claimed that their results ‗could be generalized to all type of 
examinations‘. However, they offer no evidence in support of this and make no 
reference to other modes of assessment. This study will address this by considering, not 
only participants‘ overall academic performance on their study programme, but also 
investigating the association between overconfidence and performance in different 
modes of assessment, such as assignments and examinations, as prompted by Grimes 
(2002). Since it includes higher education students at different levels of study, ranging 
from first year undergraduate to postgraduate, it also responds to Isaacson and Fujita‘s 
(2006) suggestion of exploring the relationship between metacognitive awareness and 
higher level learning.  
Having reviewed relevant academic literature and developed specific research questions 
and hypotheses to guide the study, the next chapter will address the methodology and 
research design employed to provide answers to these questions. 
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3. Methodology and Research Design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Research is concerned with asking and attempting to answer, questions in order to seek 
knowledge and develop an understanding of the world (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Social 
research investigates human activity and interactivity and includes educational research, 
which develops understanding of learning and teaching activities (Black, 1993). Various 
alternative approaches can be adopted in social research, each with relative strengths 
and weaknesses in terms of their assumptions, attitudes and underlying philosophies 
(Eilon, 1974). Consequently, it is important that researchers have an appreciation of the 
philosophical assumptions that influence how research is understood (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994). The manner in which it is conducted should also be clearly 
explained when reporting research and this chapter addresses these issues. 
It commences by considering the role of theory in research before explaining the 
philosophy underpinning this study and the methodology adopted. This includes 
discussion of criticisms and support for the use of this methodological approach in 
social research, in order that the findings from the study may be interpreted accordingly. 
The research design is then explained in detail and mapped to the conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter 2. The nature of the research instrument used to collect data is 
explained, as well as piloting and data collection procedures. Issues potentially affecting 
the reliability and validity of the research are also considered, as well as initiatives 
implemented to address these, including the sampling strategy employed. Data analysis 
procedures are also described to clarify how data collected using the research design is 
to be interpreted and finally, ethical issues are addressed, to explain measures adopted 
to ensure that those involved in the study were not harmed as a result of their 
participation.  
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3.2 The Role of Theory in Research 
Science is the means of understanding the natural and social world through observations 
and the process of science is usually classified as either inductive or deductive (Baker, 
1999). An inductive process is one in which theory is constructed through the collection 
of data by repeatedly observing reality and developing explanations of what occurs 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). Thus, as illustrated in Figure 15, the process 
starts with observations, through which theory is generated using empirical 
generalisations. A deductive process, on the other hand, is conducted with the aim of 
testing theory. It therefore requires that a theory is identified, which is subsequently 
tested through empirical observation (Gill and Johnson, 1991). As shown in Figure 15, 
theories are used to generate hypotheses, which are tested through new observations 
(Baker, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Components of the Scientific Process 
Source: Adapted from Baker (1999) 
 
    Theories 
  
  
Empirical 
Generalisations 
Observations 
Hypotheses 
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This study involves a deductive process, as it tests theory related to self-monitoring of 
knowledge, which suggests a general tendency for overconfidence. As illustrated in 
Figure 16, this requires operationalising the concept of overconfidence by constructing 
an indicator to represent it (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007), which can be used to test 
theory by observing students studying business in a higher education environment. The 
methodology underpinning the study and research design used to carry out these 
procedures are addressed this chapter.  
 
 
Theory/hypothesis formulation 
 
 
 
Operationalisation 
(Translating abstract concepts into indicators or measures,  
which enable observations to be made) 
 
 
 
 Testing of theory through observation of the empirical world 
 
 
 
 
     
  Falsification and         Creation of, as yet unfalsified,                                                        
                     discarding of theory              covering laws that explain past and                
                                                                            predict future, observations 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The Deductive Process  
Source: Adapted from Gill and Johnson (1991)  
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3.3 Research Foundations 
As researchers engage with and describe the world, philosophical issues underpin 
decisions made about methodological approaches (Scott, 2005).  Consequently, when 
conducting research, it is important that the means used to derive findings are explicit 
and the assumptions under which they were produced made clear (Jankowicz, 1995). 
This should assist others in their interpretation, by providing an indication of potential 
biases in how data has been collected and interpreted as well as any other limitations in 
the work. However, while there are different approaches to research, the way in which 
these relate to theoretical issues is not always clear and often the literature uses terms in 
different, and occasionally contradictory, ways (Crotty, 1998). Sarantakos (2005) uses 
five elements to address how different approaches to research reflect a range of guiding 
philosophies and Figure 17 illustrates how the approach adopted in this study relates to 
these. 
 
 
     Ontology 
             (Realism) 
 
Epistemology 
(Empiricism) 
 
Methodology 
(Quantitative) 
 
Research Design 
(Deductive/ 
non-experimental, cross-sectional, fixed design, survey) 
 
Data Collection Method 
(Questionnaire and documentary secondary data) 
 
Figure 17: The Research Approach Adopted in the Study 
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3.3.1 Realist Ontology 
The term ontology is derived from the Greek words ‗ontos‘, which means being, and 
‗logos‘, which means theory or knowledge and thus, to consider the ontological status 
of something, is to question whether it is real or an illusion (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). It is therefore concerned with the nature of reality and addresses whether it is 
objective, or subjective and constructed. Realist ontology assumes that a reality exists, 
independent of human perception of it, whereas a subjectivist view sees reality as 
existing only through our conscious perception of it. Realism views reality as being 
governed by natural laws, knowledge of which would assist in predicting human 
behaviour (Sarantakos, 2005). This study is therefore informed by realist ontology in 
that it explores individuals‘ metaknowledge, which exists regardless of whether those 
individuals, or others, are aware of it. Indeed by its very nature, inaccurate self-
monitoring of knowledge, since it results from differences between perceived and actual 
knowledge, reflects a reality of which individuals are unaware.  
 
3.3.2 Empiricist Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with the criteria used to determine what constitutes 
warranted knowledge (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). Consequently, its contribution in 
activities in which knowledge claims are made is through ‗clarifying the conditions and 
limits of what is construed as justified knowledge‘ (Johnson and Duberley, 2000 p.8). 
An empiricist epistemology deems knowledge to be created through facts, emanating 
from observed experiences, whereas interpretivism sees knowledge arising from 
subjective interpretations of the world (Sarantakos, 2005). Empiricism takes the view 
that knowledge arises through the senses, rather than other sources such as reason 
(Halfpenny, 1982), and is therefore created by gathering facts, through observation and 
experience (Sarantakos, 2005). Copleston (1963) highlights the relationship between 
realist ontology and an empiricist epistemology, when acknowledging the influence of 
experience in understanding the world by suggesting that, while truth precedes 
experience, it may be that we perceive it through experience. This study is informed by 
an empiricist epistemology in that the reality of overconfidence in knowledge and its 
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association with academic achievement are investigated in a sensory manner, rather than 
purely by reason, by observing evidence of each of these concepts. 
 
3.3.3 Quantitative Methodology 
Methodology holds a central position in research, since it is the strategy which 
translates ontology and epistemology into appropriate guidelines for its conduct 
(Sarantakos, 2005). In this respect, research is often classified as being either qualitative 
or quantitative. As illustrated in Table 3, a qualitative approach tends to accompany a 
constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, which aims to interpret the 
different ways in which people make sense of their world. A quantitative approach, on 
the other hand, is typically guided by a realist, objectivist ontology, and an empiricist 
epistemology. It entails attempting to measure observations in empirical investigations 
and is typically underpinned by the positivist paradigm (Sarantakos, 2005).  
 
        Table 3 - Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies 
 Methodology 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontology Realism/objectivism Constructionism 
Epistemology Empiricism Interpretivism 
Research design Fixed design Fixed/flexible design 
          Source: Adapted from Sarantakos (2005) 
 
3.3.3.1 Positivism 
The term positivism is derived from the notion of a positive (i.e. progressive) approach 
and is originally attributed to the 19
th
 century French philosopher August Comte. It was 
an influential intellectual trend from the mid 19
th
 century and until relatively recently 
represented the commonly accepted view of science (Robson, 2002). Positivistic work 
incorporates statistical analysis and seeks causal relationships, or uses objectively 
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determined empirical information to test hypotheses (Halfpenny, 1982).   However, as 
explained earlier, terms explaining approaches to research are used in different ways 
and while Sarantakos (2005) refers to it as a paradigm embracing realist, objectivist 
ontology and empiricist epistemology, Johnson and Duberley (2000) class positivism as 
an epistemological approach in itself and Hughes and Sharrock (2007) refer to it as 
ontology.  
Positivism takes the view that it is possible to acquire accurate, value-free knowledge 
(Fisher 2004). It entails objectively studying and quantifying an ‗observable reality‘, 
with a view to undertaking statistical analysis, to produce generalisable laws in the 
manner of natural scientists (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003 p.83). It takes the 
view that knowledge is based on sensory experience and can be developed only by 
observation and experiments, using measurements to answer pre-determined questions 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). Thus, it reflects a structured, objective approach, 
typically using large samples and operationalises concepts for the purpose of 
measurement. Johnson and Duberley (2000 p.78) explain that this represents a 
nomothetic approach, applying procedures used in the natural sciences. They argue that, 
while positivism is the dominant approach in research in the management disciplines, 
this is often not apparent, since researchers rarely describe their work as positivistic. 
They explain that this does not imply that its assumptions are absent, but rather, that 
researchers may not explain their positivist rationale, because it is so dominant that they 
do not feel compelled to do so. Since methodology is closer to the practice of research, 
reference is more commonly made to this than the research paradigm, ontology or 
epistemology and therefore one may more commonly hear, for example, that a research 
study is quantitative, rather than positivistic (Sarantakos, 2005).  
 
3.3.3.2 Criticisms of Quantitative Methodology 
The use of a quantitative approach in the social sciences has been challenged and 
criticisms tend to reflect concerns with positivism (Sarantakos, 2005). A positivistic 
approach has been criticised in social research because it entails searching for constant 
relationships between variables and while this may be possible in the natural world, 
through the use of controlled experiments, Robson (2002) argues that the study of 
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people in the social sciences has yet to produce scientific laws despite attempts over 
more than one hundred years. Consequently, we cannot be sure that the results are truly 
representative in all instances and therefore represent certain knowledge. For example, 
the literature reviewed in the previous chapter identified a general tendency for 
overconfidence when individuals assess their own knowledge. However, there are 
exceptions, which indicate that this is not a consistent and universal finding.  
Scott (2005 p.644) suggests that, as they operate with open systems, educational 
researchers have a more difficult task than those working in natural sciences, since 
individual behaviour and conditions in which it occurs, do not remain constant. He 
therefore argues that a quantitative approach to investigation of the social world is 
limited, since the need to express variables quantitatively results in descriptions that 
‗rarely reflect the richness and depth of human interaction‘. Findings may be 
compromised by the manner in which research is designed. A quantitative approach is 
typically associated with fixed designs, in which the conduct of the research is pre-
determined, and Sarantakos (2005) argues that this may over-restrictive which, along 
with a reliance on quantitative measures, can bias the findings of researchers. It can also 
present problems in terms of ecological validity, in that it may entail separating research 
participants from their natural context in order to study the issue in question, which may 
result in an oversimplification of the real world (Sarantakos, 2005). 
 
3.3.3.3 Support for Quantitative Methodology 
Some have argued that critics of positivist approaches have gone too far in abandoning 
scientific approaches and giving up hope of determining useful generalisations using 
quantitative approaches. Nash (2005 p.201) suggests that critics of a quantitative 
approach, risk ‗throwing out the scientific baby with the positivist bath water‘ and cites 
Byrne‘s (1998) argument that a rejection of statistical methods is incompatible with the 
chaos and complexity which characterise the social world. Kemp and Holmwood (2003) 
support this view, arguing that events occurring in the social world are suitable for 
quantification, alongside non-positivist explanations. Cohen, Manion and Morrison 
(2000 p.27) also support the use of positivistic approaches, arguing that, while they ‗can 
be criticised for their macro-sociological persuasion, so interpretive and qualitative 
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[approaches] can be criticised for their narrowly micro-sociological persuasion‘. 
Denscombe (2003) meanwhile highlights the relative limitations of qualitative 
approaches when compared with quantitative methodology, pointing out that they tend 
to be less rigorous, over-descriptive, lack sufficient explanation and provide results that 
can be unrepresentative, due to the use of small sample sizes.  
Johnson and Duberley (2000) explain that, despite its critics, many argue that the 
assumptions associated with positivism underpin most social science research and this 
view is supported by Sarantakos (2005), who argues that most social scientists still 
employ a quantitative methodology. However, Robson (2002 p.26) highlights the 
contribution of critics of positivism in recognising a ‗looser connection between data 
and theory confirmation‘ than is assumed in positivism. A post-positivist view 
acknowledges their criticisms and accepts that, while positivism assumes that 
researchers are independent and objective, in practice their values and knowledge can 
affect research observations. It therefore seeks objectivity in research, while accepting 
that bias may impact on observations and interpretation and while believing a single 
reality exists, accepts that it can be known only probabilistically rather than perfectly, 
due to limitations of the research process (Robson, 2002). Fisher (2004) refers to this as 
realist research, which, while often deemed to be the same as positivism, can be usefully 
distinguished from it. While it retains many of the aims of positivism and aspires to a 
scientific approach, it accepts the subjectivity of research and therefore makes less 
strong claims for knowledge which perfectly reflects the objects being investigated. 
This post-positivist view therefore accepts that, while researchers may not be able to 
observe the world in completely objective manner, they should represent reality as best 
they can, acknowledging that findings will be influenced by subjectivity in conducting 
the research (Muijs, 2004). Thus while qualitative research may be informative in terms 
of why people behave as they do, quantitative studies can also play their part in 
understanding the social world. Nash (2005) challenges objections to the use of 
mathematical approaches in social research on the basis of intensionality, which suggest 
that a quantitative approach is inappropriate for uncovering meaning. He argues that 
social research should investigate events, regardless of whether the meaning of actors is 
known, and that objections to this would unnecessarily limit the scope of social science. 
Cohen et al (2000) support this view, arguing that, while understanding human 
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behaviour will be enhanced by an appreciation of intentions, this cannot be the sole 
purpose of social research. They suggest that, while patterns of social interactions may 
represent the accounts of actors, their consciousness may be false and cite Rex‘s (1974) 
argument that researchers have an obligation to discover an objective perspective, which 
may not accord with that of the actors. The very focus of this study addresses a theory 
that humans may overestimate their knowledge, one which, in itself, suggests the 
limited consciousness to which Cohen et al (2000) refer. Consequently, here, it is 
investigated using quantitative methodology, and while the study attempts to achieve 
the objective perspective to which Rex (1974) refers, the difficulty in doing so, due to 
the limitations of the research process, is acknowledged. 
Pring (2000 p.259) argues that both quantitative and qualitative research have a part to 
play in educational research. A quantitative approach can be used to suggest differences, 
which can be explored in a more interpretive manner, to refine general claims and 
determine the particular meanings behind actions and the beliefs which underpin the 
‗quantifiable claims which research should constantly be seeking‘. While 
acknowledging the role of qualitative methodologies, he concludes that only by 
employing quantitative approaches, using statistical methods, will educational 
practitioners have access to (perhaps sometimes tentative) conclusions, to assist them in 
understanding which interventions are likely to be useful. His view is therefore 
supportive of the approach taken in this study, which aims to inform professional 
practice, by investigating the extent of overconfidence in knowledge in a higher 
education setting and its association with academic performance. Testing existing 
overconfidence theory in this manner responds to Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee‘s  
(2002) call for further research investigating it in different institutions and disciplines, 
and will help to assess the generalisability of previous findings and inform practitioners, 
who have professional responsibility for enhancing the learning of business students. 
However, while adopting a quantitative methodology, it is acknowledged that the study 
may not comply with the more strict assumptions associated with positivism concerning 
complete objectivity, researcher independence and the ability to operationalise concepts 
unambiguously. Consequently, to assist in the interpretation of the research findings, it 
is important that the manner in which the research has been conducted is clarified and 
this is explained below.  
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3.4 Research Design 
Research design is a process through which research is structured to answer research 
questions (Davis, 2005) and different types of research lend themselves to different 
means of data gathering (Jankowicz, 1995). Research designs may be fixed or flexible 
and quantitative studies typically use fixed designs, in which the approach to the 
research is largely determined in advance. These are theory driven and tend to rely on 
statistical interpretation of quantitative data. They usually consider aggregates, 
tendencies and group properties and their advantage is in their ability to identify 
patterns and processes, which can be associated with social structures and features of 
groups (Robson, 2002). In support of the research philosophy adopted in this study, a 
fixed design was employed to provide indicators of metaknowledge and enable the 
investigation of patterns, by exploring individual differences and relating 
overconfidence bias to indicators of academic performance.  
When using fixed designs, a distinction can be made between experimental and non-
experimental (or ‗correlational‘) strategies. These are similar in that they are empirical, 
with evidence gathered by observation and measurement, and attempt to answer 
research questions objectively (Field and Hole, 2003). However, they differ in that non-
experimental methods attempt to gather data from the real world without attempting to 
interfere with it directly, whereas an experimental approach involves manipulating the 
environment in some way (Field and Hole, 2003). An experimental approach entails a 
systematic approach to research, in which subjects are allocated to experimental and 
control groups, and the researcher manipulates independent variables and observes 
changes in dependent variables (Gill and Johnson, 1991). However, in social research, 
such experiments can be difficult to conduct outside of the laboratory. The use of an 
experimental approach in social science also presents potential ethical issues, where for 
example, groups are treated differently for control purposes. Koku and Qureshi (2004) 
for instance, randomly assigned students taking an examination into one of two 
experimental groups or a third control group. The two experimental groups were 
respectively requested to provide possible reasons contradicting, or supporting, the 
answers they gave in order to test hypotheses that the former would reduce 
overconfidence and the latter increase it. The results from the study demonstrated that 
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for the ‗contradicting reasons‘ experimental group the intervention did indeed result in 
lower overconfidence than each of the other two groups. That group also achieved a 
mean test score of 72%, which exceeded that of both the ‗supporting reasons‘ 
experimental group (62%) and the control group (65%). If these differences in test 
scores were attributable to the experimental interventions, then it could be argued that 
the ‗supporting reasons‘ group were harmed by the research, since they achieved a 
lower mean mark than each of the other two groups. This study does not entail 
manipulation of variables or assigning participants to experimental and control groups 
and therefore, since it uses a non-experimental design, avoids such ethical issues.  
Robson (2002) distinguishes between three different types of non-experimental, fixed 
designs. In comparative designs, participants are grouped and the emphasis of the study 
is on making comparisons between those groups. Longitudinal designs, on the other 
hand, study the same subjects and measures are repeatedly taken over a period of time 
in order to analyse changes and trends. The third type is relational designs, also known 
as correlational studies, which entail taking measurements on a range of variables and 
examining the relationship between them. A common method for doing so, which is 
often used in conjunction with a survey, is a cross-sectional design, in which measures 
are taken across a relatively short period of time. This approach, which studies the 
relationships between and among variables in a group of subjects, is probably the most 
commonly used design in social research (Robson, 2002) and was adopted in this study. 
Due to the problems associated with determining causality in relational designs, the 
terms, independent and dependent variables are often replaced by terms ‗explanatory‘ 
and ‗outcome‘ variables and while the detection of causal links is difficult, the 
relationship between variables may in itself be of interest (Robson, 2002). 
In this study, a fixed design was used to investigate associations between an outcome 
variable indicating overconfidence bias and those indicating academic performance. 
While this entails relational analysis, the aims of the study also included investigation of 
explanatory variables representing individual differences in overconfidence in respect of 
age, gender and country of origin. It therefore employs a cross sectional design which is 
essentially a combination of a relational and comparative study within the same 
framework. 
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3.4.1 Evaluating Overconfidence 
A deductive process entails operationalising concepts and testing theory through 
empirical observation. Concepts are labels attached to ‗elements of the social world that 
seem to have common features and strike us as significant....and represent the points 
around which social research is conducted‘ (Bryman, 2008 p.143). Measuring them 
provides a basis for making distinctions and allows investigation of differences between 
people, in terms of the concept being studied and relationships between it and other 
concepts (Bryman, 2008). This study investigates the concept of metaknowledge, 
through observations of self-monitoring accuracy in a calibration study. It is therefore 
necessary to operationalise metaknowledge to determine its extent in students and 
permit the investigation of differences between various sub-groups, as well as the 
association between this concept and academic performance. When doing so, it is 
important to distinguish between measures and indicators. The former relate to things 
which can be clearly quantified, such as age, or number of years worked in an 
organisation, whereas indicators are used where concepts are less directly quantifiable. 
They allow more abstract concepts to be quantified and subsequently analysed as if they 
were direct measures (Bryman, 2008). Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to the 
variable used to operationalise metaknowledge as an indicator, rather than a measure, as 
it is often referred to in the literature (e.g. Pieschl, 2009; Ehrlinger et al, 2008). 
As discussed earlier, there are two types of calibration study, each of which establishes 
a different indicator for metaknowledge.  The first uses range questions in response to 
which subjects provide upper and lower estimates of numerical values, which 
correspond to their belief that the correct answer has an x% chance of lying between 
those values. Since this approach entails using questions requiring a numerical response, 
using it in this study would restrict the breadth of knowledge that could be addressed. 
However, the second approach overcomes this problem since it requires subjects to 
make judgements about discrete propositions and provide confidence estimates in 
respect of each judgement. This is less constraining in terms of the nature of the 
knowledge which can be addressed and since the aim of the study is to investigate 
metaknowledge in the context of issues addressed in the participants‘ study programme, 
this approach was adopted. 
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Schraw (2009) recommends that the outcome indicator used when assessing 
metacognition should be that which relates most closely to the aims of the research. 
Consequently, as the research questions in this study relate to levels of 
over/underconfidence, the bias score was employed as expressed below:   
 
                            
N 
Bias score  = 1    ∑   (ci  -  pi) 
                N   
i=1
 
 
Where: 
N = the total number of responses 
ci = a confidence rating 
pi = a performance score (rated as either 100% (correct) or 0% (incorrect)). 
 
As discussed earlier, this is the most commonly used indicator when assessing 
overconfidence (Ehrlinger et al, 2008; Hacker et al, 2000). It represents ‗the difference 
between the mean of the probability responses and the overall proportion correct‘ 
(Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977, p.161) and thus, entails a comparison of the mean 
confidence expressed across all judgements and the success rate. The latter is referred to 
as the performance score in the formula above and for the purposes of this study, to 
avoid confusion with aspects of academic performance, will be referred to as the 
‗knowledge score‘. Thus the derivation of the bias score can be simplified as follows: 
 
Bias score  = MC   - KS    
 
 Where: 
MC = Mean confidence across all judgements  
KS = Overall proportion correct 
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The bias score indicates both the direction and size of judgemental error.  A positive 
score indicates overconfidence and a negative result indicates underconfidence and its 
size indicates the severity of the judgemental error (Schraw, 2009).  It is also worth 
noting that when providing self-assessment feedback, Farrell and Leung (2004) stress 
the importance of engaging the users by adopting an approach which is not cognitively 
over-demanding and adopts a relatively straightforward scoring system. The bias score 
complies with this and while this in itself does not impact on the conduct of this study, 
it does have potential implications for its use in initiatives in professional practice, 
which may be suggested by findings generated by the research. Dissemination of 
feedback using a relatively simple indicator is likely to more acceptable not only to 
students but also to professional practitioners in higher education. 
 
3.4.2 The Research Instrument 
Research instruments are the means used to collect data for the purpose of analysis 
(Sarantakos, 2005) and in this study a questionnaire was used (see Appendix 8). While 
these provide a quick, inexpensive means of collecting meaningful data (Bell 1993), 
response rates are often low (Wisker, 2001) and many produce response rates below 
50%, with virtually none achieving 100% (Muijs, 2004).  To help overcome this, 
questionnaires should be attractively designed (Bell, 1993) and concise, while allowing 
the collection of sufficient relevant data to meet the objectives of the research (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991). The questionnaire used in this study was therefore clearly set out and 
contained a set of instructions to guide the participants, as well as a clear indication of 
where responses should be recorded,  which would also simplify the data recording 
process. To facilitate subsequent statistical analysis, closed questions were used, as 
recommended by Jankowicz (1995). The questionnaire comprised two sections in order 
to collect data which could be used to determine overconfidence, as well as 
demographic data to permit the investigation of individual differences. The design of 
each of these two sections is discussed below. 
 
3.4.2.1 Demographic Data 
As suggested by Gill and Johnson (1991), the demographic factual data was requested 
first. Respondents were asked to indicate their age group, gender and country of origin, 
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to allow investigation differences according to these characteristics. This information 
would also permit subsequent checking of the representativeness of the sample in these 
respects (Fisher, 2004).  They were also asked to provide their unique student reference 
number and indicate their study programme. The student number permitted access to the 
secondary data required to determine their academic performance on their study 
programme. Using their reference numbers, rather than names, for this purpose helped 
to protect their anonymity and as well as complying with ethical standards for research, 
this was designed to improve the response rate of those willing to allow their data to be 
used for the study. The reference number also enabled the determination of the number 
of years they had spent studying at the university, since the first two characters are 
significant in this respect. Participants were also asked to record the name of their study 
programme, as this could be used to assist in determining the relevant student 
registration number should a participant not indicate this clearly enough to correctly 
interpret.  
 
3.4.2.2 Testing for Overconfidence 
The second part of the questionnaire comprised the instrument used to determine the 
bias score and contained 30 multiple-choice objective test questions. As is typically the 
case for such questions, each comprised a stem, indicating the problem and a number of 
alternative responses, including one which was correct and a number of distracters 
(Hansen and Dexter, 1997). The position in which the correct answer appeared across 
the 30 questions was randomised using a random number generator. Using questions for 
which there is a definitive correct answer in this way overcomes the difficulty of the 
lack of an objective benchmark when investigating self-assessment (Kruger and 
Dunning, 1999). Respondents were requested to select the correct answer for each 
question and indicate their confidence in that choice.  
The written instructions provided them with guidance in terms of how the confidence 
scale was to be used, with 100% indicative of their certainty that the answer provided 
was correct and 25% to be used in cases where they felt they were only able to guess 
and therefore had a one in four chance of being correct. These instructions also provided 
an explanation of how 50% confidence should be used in situations where the 
respondent was certain that two options were incorrect and believed that the other two 
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had an equal chance of being correct. An additional illustrative example showed a 
confidence level of 60% and it was explained in verbal instructions provided to 
participants by the researcher prior to completing the test that this could for example, be 
used in circumstances in which they believed that the correct answer was one of two 
possible options of which they judged that one was more likely than the other. 
Consequently, while the written instructions provided illustrative examples to guide 
respondents on the use of the scale, the verbal explanation by the researcher permitted 
other scenarios to be addressed. These included for example how 90% confidence could 
be used where respondents had a strong belief that they had chosen the correct answer, 
but acknowledged that there was a possibility (i.e. one in ten in this case) that this was 
not the case. 
The approach adopted is mapped onto the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 
2 in Figure 18. In terms of granularity and timing, as participants were required to 
provide confidence estimates for a series of test items after having completed each 
question in turn, this study employs the most popular approach used in calibration 
studies (Keren, 1991), by investigating local retrospective judgements, using an online 
testing approach. As well as a bias score indicating the extent of overconfidence for 
each respondent, this approach also permitted the production of calibration curves to 
illustrate monitoring accuracy for the whole sample and various sub-groupings at 
different levels of confidence. 
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Figure 18: Mapping of the Empirical Investigation onto the Conceptual Framework 
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3.4.2.3 Knowledge Domain of the Test 
As explained earlier, the ecological validity of previous studies has been challenged on 
the basis of their emphasis on general, or experimentally learned, knowledge rather than 
richer knowledge gained in a more natural learning environment (Hacker et al, 2000). 
Consequently, the knowledge base used to test for metaknowledge in this study was 
specific to the study programme on which participants were enrolled and therefore, as 
suggested by Dunning et al (1990), enabled the investigation of judgements in domains 
with which the participants were familiar. To permit the investigation of students 
studying at different levels, eight separate tests were designed covering four levels of 
study, ranging from first year undergraduate up to postgraduate level. Since the students 
in question study various business related disciplines and subjects (marketing, finance, 
human resource management etc.), in order to control for a possible subject-related 
confounding effect, each test focused on a study module which addressed financial and 
quantitative aspects of their study programme.  
 
3.4.2.4 Question Difficulty 
Since the use of deliberately misleading test items can create an experimental bias, 
which tends to produce overconfidence (Keren, 1991), questions were designed to 
provide a test of knowledge which participants could have reasonably been expected to 
have attained. To facilitate this, they were compiled by academic staff at the university 
with relevant subject expertise and responsibility for the study modules on which the 
tests were based. However, this did not guarantee tests of equal difficulty and it was 
therefore necessary to investigate differences between them in this respect statistically, 
when analysing the data collected. This would permit consideration of steps to control 
for a possible task difficulty confounding effect when considering individual differences 
in overconfidence. 
 
3.4.2.5 Number of Distracters 
While the use of two-choice questions, in which respondents choose from one of two 
possible answers, has been the most common approach in confidence studies (Klayman 
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et al, 1999), Keren (1991) suggests increasing this number, to represent more fully 
different knowledge states of the respondents. However, he cautions against too many 
alternatives on the grounds that limited cognitive processing capacity would prevent 
respondents from making meaningful comparisons between them. Consequently, in this 
study, a compromise was reached by using four-choice questions, which would increase 
the scope for respondents to transmit information (Shuford and Brown, 1975) as 
compared with two alternative items.   
   
3.4.2.6 Eliciting Confidence Levels 
As explained above, confidence judgements were elicited using numerical expressions 
rather than verbal responses. As forced choice judgements using multiple-choice 
questions require the use of confidence estimates between 1/n and 1 and in this case 
four alternatives were provided, participants were instructed to assign confidence levels 
in the range 25% to 100%. A response of 100% represented certainty in cases where 
they felt sure they knew the correct answer and 25% was to be used where their lack of 
knowledge meant they could only guess and the likelihood of doing so accurately was 
therefore down to chance. While previous studies have often restricted confidence 
responses to 5% intervals (100%, 95%, 90% etc), Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1977) advocate the use of a more graduated scale and therefore in this study, 
respondents were instructed to use any number between 25% and 100%.  
It has been suggested that overconfidence reported in previous studies may result from 
respondents not understanding the task and in particular, the use of the probability scale 
through which confidence levels are communicated (Keren, 1991). Consequently, 
studies such as this may be compromised to some extent by respondents‘ difficulty in 
translating subjective probabilities into numerical representations. Response contraction 
bias, which was discussed earlier, is an example of this, as is Ronis and Yates‘ (1987) 
finding that some respondents provided probability estimates at below chance level. In 
the latter example, the researchers addressed the issue by manipulating responses in a 
manner which they believed better reflected the judgements of participants. However, 
Keren (1991) suggested that such respondents may not understand the probability scale, 
in which case they should be removed from the sample. Consequently, in this study, 
119 
 
respondents who, through their use of confidence levels of less than 25%, appeared not 
to understand the use of the probability scale, were excluded from the sample. 
 
3.4.2.7 Number of Questions 
Where the intention is to study each respondent separately, a large number of 
observations are required in order to enhance the reliability of the results. Increasing the 
number of questions used also reduces the potential for the test to be biased towards 
contrary questions, which is more likely to result in overconfidence. Where respondents 
do not all complete the same test, as is the case in this study, increasing the number of 
questions also permits using a smaller sub-sample of questions from each test to derive 
tests of approximately equal difficulty. This procedure will be considered further later in 
this chapter, when discussing approaches to data analysis. However, increasing the 
number of questions also has its problems, such as the time required to complete them 
and the potential for respondents to become bored while doing so (Keren, 1991) and 
therefore not engage appropriately with the process. Since in this study, the test was 
conducted during the participants‘ scheduled study programme, it was designed to be 
completed within a single one hour session. Approximately 25 minutes were allowed 
for clarifying the nature of the task with respondents at the start of the session, allowing 
35 minutes for recording demographic data and completion of the test questions. 
Consequently, on the basis of the demographic section of the questionnaire requiring no 
more than five minutes and each test question requiring approximately one minute to 
complete, 30 questions were used in each test to provide sufficient time for completion 
within one hour. 
 
3.4.2.8 Piloting the Research Instrument 
When using fixed designs, it is important to carefully design the methods to be 
employed to answer the research questions before commencing data collection. In this 
study, a questionnaire was used and these have the advantage that they can permit the 
collection of data relatively quickly and consistently, particularly where closed 
questions are used. However, they can be difficult to design well (Wisker, 2001) and 
piloting them prior to their distribution can help to identify any problems respondents 
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may have in completing them (Jankowicz, 1995). Consequently, the research instrument 
to be used in the study was piloted with a group of 40 postgraduate students. These 
mainly comprised non-UK students, whose first language was not English, as it was 
anticipated that despite the necessity to satisfy the university as to the standard of their 
English language skills, such participants may have the greatest difficulty in interpreting 
the task requirements. The piloting activity was conducted in a one hour session and 
was followed by another session the following week, in which completion of the 
questionnaire was discussed with participants. This confirmed that one hour was 
sufficient time for an introductory explanation of the task and for respondents to 
complete it, since they all submitted their questionnaire within that time period. 
Analysis of the data also indicated that none had used a confidence rating below 25% 
and thus, all appeared to appreciate the use of the scale in this respect. However, 
discussion of the task with the group did highlight the potential for some confusion 
when providing confidence levels. For illustrative purposes, a hypothetical situation was 
discussed in which, for a particular question, one of the four alternative answers 
available is judged to be incorrect and the remaining three are deemed to have an equal 
chance of being correct. While the majority of the group appreciated that this 
corresponded with a 33% (one chance in three) confidence level, one person believed 
they had a 75% chance of being correct in this situation. Consequently, this was taken 
into account in the explanation of the task at subsequent data collection events, where 
more emphasis was placed on the use of the confidence scale and the implications of 
this hypothetical situation, along with others was discussed. These were illustrated using 
practical demonstrations which entailed retrieving one of four different coloured pens 
from a container, in which the participants were asked to make confidence judgements 
in respect of different scenarios. Given the feedback from the piloting activity, these 
included one for example, in which, in full view of the participants, one pen was 
removed from the container. They were then asked to indicate their confidence level in 
choosing a given colour from the remaining three.  These demonstrations were 
interactive and supported by inter-participant discussion as well as group discussion 
involving the researcher. 
Another initiative was introduced at this stage in respect of the confidence judgements, 
which was designed to address the potential problem of response contraction bias. As 
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What was the average number of people employed by British 
Airways in the year 2005-06? 
 
 a) 49,954    □ 
 
 b) 49,955    □ 
 
 c) 49,956    □ 
 
 d) 49,957    □ 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
discussed earlier, it has been argued that this can arise where respondents who are 
particularly uncertain about the answer to a test item provide a response around the mid-
point of the scale available to them (around 60-65% in the case of this study), rather 
than indicating a confidence judgement nearer chance level. To address this, an 
additional diagnostic question was incorporated in the test as a means of identifying 
those who appeared not to be using the confidence scale appropriately. As shown in 
Figure 19, this question was one for which it was highly unlikely that respondents 
would know the correct answer and to reinforce this, they were provided with four 
options with values which were very closely grouped. Thus, it was designed in such a 
manner as to prompt a guess, which should therefore have been accompanied by a 
confidence level of 25%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Diagnostic Test Item to Indicate Inappropriate Use of the Confidence Scale 
 
When discussing the introduction of this question with the pilot group, while the 
majority indicated that a confidence level of 25% was appropriate, one indicated 50% 
confidence. When questioned about this, they explained that they thought they could 
make a more informed judgement than merely relying on chance, due to their (incorrect) 
belief that the average number of employees in the year must be an even number. 
Consequently, this question was amended, as shown in Figure 20, to one which 
respondents were less likely to interpret as being answerable using informed judgement. 
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What was the total turnover of British Airways in the year 2004-05? 
 
 a) £7,811m.   □ 
 
 b) £7,812m.   □ 
 
 c) £7,813m.   □ 
 
 d) £7,814m.   □ 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Adapted Diagnostic Test Item to Indicate Inappropriate  
       Use of the Confidence Scale 
 
Any respondent providing a response other than 25% for this question was eliminated 
from the study, on the grounds that it appeared that they were using the response scale 
inappropriately (due to response contraction bias or any other explanation). This 
question was employed solely for this diagnostic purpose and was excluded from the 
data used to determine bias scores. While these initiatives may not necessarily have 
completely eliminated problems associated with the use of the confidence scale, they 
were designed to assist in doing so and therefore, in enhancing the reliability of the data 
collected. 
 
3.4.3 Data Collection Procedure  
3.4.3.1 Primary Data 
Primary data is ‗collected for a specific purpose from original sources‘ (Davis, 2005 
p.270). A potential problem in collecting it using questionnaires is a low response rate. 
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A lack of participants in calibration studies may mean subjects being evaluated as a 
group, rather than on an individual basis (Tomassini et al, 1982) and as this study aims 
to study individual differences, a good response rate was desirable. To improve 
response rates from questionnaires, it is preferable to distribute them personally (Bell, 
1993). Loftus and Wagenaar (1988) reported the effectiveness of this approach, as well 
as the benefits of accessing potential respondents at a time when it is easier to hold their 
attention, when discussing a study investigating overconfidence among lawyers 
attending a series of educational seminars. Initially they left questionnaires at the 
registration desk, where a facilitator invited the target group to participate, but this 
approach produced a response rate of only 5%. However, a modified strategy, in which 
the target group was supplied with the questionnaire and asked to participate once they 
had sat down in the seminar room, produced a response rate in excess of 80%. 
Therefore, in this study, data was collected at a session which respondents attended 
during the course of their study programme. At each session the questionnaires were 
personally distributed by the researcher and, given the relatively short time required for 
their completion, collected personally shortly after they had done so. Each session was 
also personally supervised by the researcher, to ensure that participants did not collude. 
Since it has been suggested that overconfidence detected in previous studies may have 
resulted from respondents failing to fully understanding the nature of the task and in 
particular, the use of the confidence scale, the questionnaire provided specific guidance 
in respect of the confidence judgements requested (See Appendix 8). However, the 
complexity of information required from respondents in questionnaires may also require 
the presence of the researcher to explain the requirements (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
Consequently, before each test the researcher clarified the task requirements, placing 
particular emphasis on the requirement for confidence judgements. As explained earlier, 
this included an interactive discussion regarding the use of confidence levels to reflect 
uncertain outcomes. It was also emphasised that students were under no obligation to 
consent to their data being used in the study and their decision as to whether they 
permitted this would have no bearing on the summative assessment of their 
performance on their study programme or any other adverse consequences.  
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3.4.3.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data is ‗data that has been collected by others for another purpose‘ (Davis, 
2005 p.70). As this study aimed to investigate the association between academic 
performance and overconfidence bias, it was necessary to obtain secondary data 
indicating the academic performance of participants from the university‘s marks 
recording system. This would permit comparison of overconfidence with an 
independently derived indicator of competence. As discussed earlier, it has been 
suggested that the tendency for the less competent to also demonstrate poorer self-
monitoring accuracy in previous studies has been attributed, at least partly, to the use of 
the same instrument to assess both metaknowledge and competence. This arises when 
competence is determined by using the correct response rate to the questions in the test. 
In these conditions it is more difficult for those demonstrating poor knowledge, as 
indicated by a low test accuracy score, to underestimate this knowledge and they are 
therefore more likely to display overconfidence than those displaying better knowledge. 
Consequently, in this study, this was addressed by using independently derived 
indicators of competence based on participants‘ academic performance. These were 
determined using marks achieved during the stage of their study programme in which 
the test was conducted and for each student participating in the study, a percentage mark 
was obtained which reflected their overall academic performance in that stage. Koku 
and Qureshi (2004) argued against the use of an overall score, on the grounds that it is a 
composite performance measure and evaluation of students occurs on different bases, 
depending on the nature of their own specific study programme. While this is also the 
case for this study, its impact is mitigated by the fact that the institution uses general 
assessment criteria, which promote consistency in the assessment process at each level 
of study, regardless of the mode of assessment. As well as the indicator of overall 
performance for each student, further data was collected which reflected component 
marks obtained for each of three different modes of assessment; examinations, oral 
presentations and coursework in which students are given assignments to work on over 
a specified period of time. In the case of final year undergraduates and postgraduate 
students, a further sub-component of the coursework category, which related to their 
mark on a research dissertation, was also obtained. This indicator was not relevant for 
lower level undergraduate students who are not required to produce a dissertation. 
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Obtaining this additional data permitted investigation of the association between 
overconfidence bias and performance in each of these types of assessment, as well as 
overall academic performance.  
 
3.4.4 Replicability 
Bryman (2008) argues that three of the most important criteria for evaluating social 
research are replicability, reliability and validity. Replicability relates to the extent to 
which other researchers can replicate the study, perhaps in a different time period, or in 
a different setting. It requires that studies are conducted in a manner which permits 
other researchers to repeat them in an objective manner, without being subjectively 
influenced by the researcher, in order that comparisons can be made between studies in 
order to generate legitimate generalisations (Sarantakos, 2005). For example, this study 
is informed by methods adopted in previous research discussed in Chapter 2, and 
operationalises overconfidence using the most commonly used indicator, the bias score 
(Ehrlinger et al, 2008; Hacker et al, 2000). The explanation of the conduct of the study 
in this chapter and the inclusion of the research instrument employed assist in its 
replicability in that other researchers who may wish to adopt this approach in other 
settings, can be guided by this information.  
 
3.4.5 Reliability 
While it is important to address them, threats to reliability and validity cannot be 
entirely overcome and therefore, researchers should rather focus on how they can be 
reduced (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000) and acknowledge them when reporting 
on the research. Reliability is concerned with how consistently a concept is measured 
and thus whether a measure of a concept is stable (Bryman, 2008). Reliable research is 
such that, if conducted in a similar context with similar participants, it should produce 
similar results (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). However, it is not easily 
established and it is difficult to solve potential problems associated with attempts to do 
so (Bryman, 2008). One approach to testing reliability in this study would be to collect 
data from the same participants more than once and investigate whether the correlation 
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between the results is high, thus indicating stability. However, Bryman (2008) explains 
that a problem in this approach is that the experience of undertaking the test the first 
time may influence the responses provided in the second test. Another problem relates 
to the influence of the time elapsing between the two tests. Inconsistent results between 
each test may be due to the influence of experiences occurring in the time period 
between them and not the research design and because of these difficulties, most 
research studies do not incorporate tests of stability (Bryman 2008). However, 
initiatives can be implemented which attempt to prevent causes of unreliability when 
designing the research and these are considered below for this study in respect of three 
important factors, participant bias, observer bias and situational factors.  
 
3.4.5.1 Participant Bias 
Since participants‘ declarations of their confidence for each test item were used in 
determining the indicator of overconfidence in this study, its reliability could be 
compromised by factors influencing their ability to translate subjective judgements into 
numerical representations and motivation to do so honestly. Initiatives to assist them in 
the former were discussed earlier. In terms of motivational influences, Robson (2002) 
argues that subjects may feel that certain responses show them in a more favourable 
light, citing the example in educational research of a student aiming to please his/her 
tutor.  This relates to the possible explanation for overconfidence discussed earlier in 
which, if they perceive social utility from doing so, respondents may feel motivated to 
express greater confidence than is warranted (Wright and Wishuda, 1982). 
Consequently, in this study, some may have been motivated to provide unjustifiably 
high confidence levels for self-presentation purposes (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) in 
order to give the impression that they understood the issues on which they were being 
questioned. Alternatively, since the term overconfidence may be seen as implying 
arrogance or vanity (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996), others may have tried to bias 
their responses in the direction of underconfidence, by providing ratings indicating 
inappropriately low levels of confidence. To help prevent these problems and reduce the 
potential for students providing responses intended to produce a desired outcome, while 
participants were made aware in advance that they would be participating in an activity 
designed to help them determine the extent of their learning on their study programme, 
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they were not informed that the specific focus was on self-monitoring or overconfidence 
in knowledge. During data collection, the researcher also verbally assured them that the 
results of the activity would have no direct bearing on summative assessment of their 
performance on their study programme. While student registration codes were collected 
to permit subsequent investigation of the association between metaknowledge and 
academic performance, it was also emphasised, both in writing on the questionnaire 
instructions (see Appendix 8) and verbally, that results would be anonymised and 
aggregated for research purposes.  
 
3.4.5.2 Observer Bias 
Observer bias occurs when the researcher does not make objective judgements in the 
data collection process. In this study, this potential problem was mitigated in that 
primary data was collected using a series of test questions, to which there was only one 
correct response, as verified by an academic member of staff with expertise in the 
knowledge domain in question. Expressions of confidence were also elicited using an 
objective indicator, using a continuous scale ranging between 25% and 100%. 
Consequently, the primary data collection procedure facilitated objective interpretation 
of participant responses. The secondary data, in respect of participants‘ academic 
performance on their study programme, was based on subjective judgements made by 
university tutors during the assessment process and was therefore subject to potential 
observer bias. However, to mitigate this, as well as using the assessment criteria 
discussed earlier to guide assessors, the university also has institutional procedures in 
place to moderate their judgements in the assessment process and thus reduce the 
potential for observer bias and promote consistency. These include moderation of marks 
by other internal members of staff and in the case of all work above first year 
undergraduate level, external moderation by suitably qualified assessors from outside 
the university.  
 
3.4.5.3 Situational Factors 
When using a test instrument in research, as is the case for this study, reliability may be 
affected by the conditions in which it is employed (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
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2000). Consequently, data collection events were all conducted in a consistent manner 
as described earlier. Each took place in the teaching room which participants regularly 
used for the study module on which the test was based. As this accommodation was of a 
similar design for all groups, physical conditions and contexts were consistent. Another 
situational factor in the case of a test is its perceived importance (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2000) and consequently, participants were given consistent information, 
which indicated that completion of the research instrument would have no impact on 
their summatively assessed performance on their study programme and that results 
would be anonymised and aggregated. Another potential issue is that in some cases 
respondents were completing a test which was not in their first language. However, 
while this had the potential to affect the reliability of the study, this was tempered by the 
requirement for such students to demonstrate their competence in English as part of the 
university application and admissions process. While this would not have been 
sufficient to ensure equal English language proficiency among participants, the impact 
of this would have been confined to their understanding of the task requirements, which 
were clarified as explained earlier to attempt to mitigate this, rather than the test 
questions themselves. This is because in cases where they were uncertain about their 
understanding of a question, then provided they understood the nature of the task, this 
uncertainty could be taken into account when making the associated confidence 
judgement. 
 
3.4.6 Validity 
Validity relates to the ‗integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of 
research‘ (Bryman, 2008 p.32) and different types of validity are typically 
distinguished. These relate to measurement, ecological, internal and external validity 
and each of these is discussed below in the context of this study. 
 
3.4.6.1 Measurement Validity 
Measurement validity, which is often called construct validity, is concerned with 
whether the measure or indicator actually reflects the concept for which it has been 
devised (Bryman, 2008). It is important to consider this as well as the reliability of a 
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measure, since it is of limited use if it provides results which are stable, but do not relate 
to the concept in question. In this study, overconfidence in knowledge was measured 
using the bias score and academic competence, using participants‘ assessment 
performance scores on their study programme. Therefore, the question is whether these 
adequately reflect the concepts in question. Robson (2002) argues that, because of the 
complexities surrounding them, most ways of collecting data are likely to be limited to 
some extent and contends that in many investigations, the reasonableness of the validity 
of a particular measure can, to some extent, be assessed intuitively, a process which 
establishes its face validity. The main determinant of validity is the extent to which the 
measure corresponds with the theoretical definition of the concept in question (Muijs, 
2004). In this case, overconfidence in knowledge has been defined as the unjustifiable 
belief that one‘s judgements are accurate (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982). 
Since the bias score is determined by comparing respondents‘ expressions of their belief 
in the accuracy of their judgements (i.e. their confidence estimates) with their actual 
accuracy (i.e. the knowledge score), it reflects this definition and enables the 
classification of individuals as overconfident, underconfident or neither. It also provides 
a means of indicating the extent of judgemental bias since, for example, it classifies 
those providing high confidence levels, but achieving low knowledge scores, as highly 
overconfident.  
The other concept addressed in the study is academic performance and this is 
determined using indicators based on tutor assessments during participants‘ study 
programme. While these are subjective to some extent, their validity is supported by the 
fact that they were produced by an established and credible institution of higher 
education, which has procedures to promote valid assessment of academic performance.  
 
3.4.6.2 Ecological Validity 
A discussed earlier, ecological validity relates to the extent to which individuals‘ natural 
behaviour is reflected in experimental scenarios (Bem and Lord, 1979) and whether 
findings from social research are applicable in natural settings (Bryman, 2008). It has 
been argued that subjects in real life settings do not display the same cognitive 
limitations as those in laboratory settings (Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981) 
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and suggested that overconfidence detected in some of the previous studies reported 
may not be ecologically valid. Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani (2008) are critical of the fact 
that very few calibration studies have been undertaken in a classroom environment. 
Additionally, since many previous studies have focused on general knowledge, Stone 
(2000) suggests that further research on more specific subject matter is needed and 
Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar (1994) have encouraged more investigation of 
individual differences in overconfidence in natural settings, such as when answering 
tests or sitting examinations. This study addresses these issues by conducting the 
research in a classroom environment, based on knowledge related to the study 
programme of participants. Ehrlinger et al (2008 p.101) argued that using ‗naturally 
occurring agents‘, such as a course instructor rather than an experimenter, in devising 
tasks for student participants in confidence judgements, would enhance the ecological 
validity of the design. In this study, this was taken into account in that tests were 
compiled by tutors with expertise in the subject matter in question. 
 
3.4.6.3 Internal Validity 
Internal validity is concerned with whether conclusions regarding causal links between 
variables can be supported.  When addressing causality, a distinction is made between 
independent variables, which have the causal impact, and dependent variables, which 
they influence (Bryman, 2008) and internal validity relates the extent to which changes 
in dependent variables can be attributed to independent variables (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Robson (2002) explains that an experimental approach is required to investigate this, 
but argues that since there are many factors which threaten internal validity, a belief that 
these can be eliminated in social research by adopting appropriate methods is consistent 
with a discredited positivist approach. Acknowledging the potential implications of such 
threats on the other hand complies with a post-positivist approach, in which all methods 
are deemed fallible. True experiments may also be impractical in social research as 
manipulation of variables or assigning subjects to control groups may be either 
unfeasible or unethical (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Consequently, while correlational 
relationships in quantitative studies such as this are important, they do not necessarily 
demonstrate causality (Sternberg, 1998), nor in their own right, help to understand what 
lies behind the relationship Robson (2002). Nash (1999 p.109) emphasises this by 
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distinguishing between ‗causal correlations and contingent correlations‘, explaining that 
in some cases, it is necessary to highlight that associations between data may not 
necessarily represent causal relationships. This study is a case in point, as the 
association between confidence bias and academic performance is explored using a non-
experimental method. It does not entail manipulating variables or the use of control 
groups and while this approach does not permit claims of causality, Hacker, Bol and 
Bahbahani (2008) argue that it may be the best method of investigating calibration in a 
natural setting. Kemp and Holmwood (2003) highlight the value of such studies, 
arguing that while statistical analysis may not in itself establish causality, looking for 
patterns and associations can play an important role in the identification of causes of 
events in social science. Consequently, it is important to emphasise that this study does 
not seek, or claim to establish, causal links between overconfidence bias and academic 
performance but rather, aims to determine whether associations exists, which may be 
indicative of potential causes.  
 
3.4.6.4 External Validity 
External validity is concerned with the extent to which findings from research are 
potentially applicable to the wider population in question (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2000). Sarantakos (2005) explains that a problem which may threaten 
external validity arises where some subjects, as a result of being chosen to participate in 
the study, are motivated to find out more about the issue under investigation and 
therefore become more knowledgeable about it than an average member of the 
population. To help overcome this problem in this study, subjects were not made aware 
of the explicit focus of the research before completing the test.  Additionally, any 
student who participated in more than one data collection event, due to the specific 
nature of their study programme, was included only on the basis of their first 
submission, to ensure that data was collected from participants who were unaware of the 
specific issue under investigation in the study. 
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Sampling 
Another issue of concern in external validity is sampling, which is the choice of a 
number of subjects, from whom data is collected in order to draw conclusions about the 
population represented (Jankowicz, 1995). In some cases, it is possible to conduct a 
census in which data is collected relating to the entire population under investigation. 
While this may provide a more complete picture than sampling, it can be very costly 
and time consuming and using samples can therefore provide reliable results more 
efficiently (Davis, 2005). However, inadequate or biased sampling of the population can 
result in an unrepresentative sample, though it is very difficult to obtain an entirely 
representative sample (Bryman, 2008) and interpretation of results should therefore take 
into account the sampling procedures employed. Cohen et al (2000) suggest that there 
are four key factors in sampling: 
 
1) Sample size 
2) Representativeness and parameters of the sample 
3) The sampling strategy to be employed 
4) Access to the sample 
 
Sample Size 
Pring (2000) suggests that conclusions drawn from quantitative research can only be 
tentative, but that the larger the sample, the more confidence one can have in those 
conclusions. However, due to the limited resources typically available for research, 
determining the sample size requires a balance between the cost of obtaining data and 
statistical efficiency (Davis, 2005). Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) suggest that 
for random probability sampling, sample size can be determined by either exercising 
prudence and ensuring that the sample represents the wider feature of the population by 
including a minimum number of cases in each sub-group, or by referring to 
mathematical tables to determine the minimum number required in the sample to 
represent the population. Table 4 provides an example which indicates the sample size 
required for different population sizes at confidence levels of 95% and 99%. It is the 
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absolute sample size which is most important rather than the size relative to the 
population (Davis, 2005), as can be seen in the table, where the required sample size 
relative to the population falls as the population size increases. 
 
         Table 4 - Sample Size, Sampling Errors and Confidence Levels 
 Sampling Error / 
(Confidence Level) 
 Sampling Error / 
(Confidence Level) 
5% / (95%) 1% / (99%) 
 
Sample 
 
Sample 
Total 
Population 
Size 
(N) 
Size 
(S) 
Sample as 
% of 
Population 
Sample 
Size 
(S) 
Sample as 
% of 
Population 
50 44 88.0% 50 100.0% 
100 79 79.0% 99 99.0% 
200 132 66.0% 196 98.0% 
500 217 43.4% 476 95.2% 
1,000 278 28.8% 907 90.7% 
2,000 322 16.1% 1,661 83.1% 
5,000 357 7.1% 3.311 66.2% 
10,000 370 3.7% 4,950 49.5% 
20,000 377 1.9% 6,578 32.9% 
50,000 381 0.8% 8,195 16.4% 
100,000 383 0.4%  8,926 8.9% 
1,000,000 384 0.1%  9,706 1.0% 
      Source: Adapted from Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000 p.95) 
 
In this study, the population was all full time students studying business at the 
university in question and since the data was collected in a period which straddled two 
academic years, the mean of these two periods was used to determine this. This 
indicated a total of 2,492 students and, in accordance with the table this requires a 
sample of between 322 and 357 students at a 95% confidence level. Consequently, a 
sample of at least 357 participants was sought. 
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Representativeness and Parameters of the Sample 
Bryman (2008) explains that it is usually accepted that representativeness will result 
from the use of a probability sample, where selection is made in a random manner, in 
which each unit of the population has a known chance of being chosen. However, he 
argues that in many, if not most, cases it may not be possible to use random sampling 
and that, in those circumstances, it is important to explain clearly the approach that has 
been taken and the reasons for that. Limited resources may necessitate the use of a 
sampling approach that is less than ideal (Baker, 1999) and since this was the case for 
this study, the manner in which the sample was chosen is discussed below. 
 
Sampling Strategy 
To address the concerns about ecological validity discussed earlier, the knowledge 
domain addressed in this research study related to students‘ study programmes and as 
the population was enrolled on various programmes, the nature of this knowledge 
differed accordingly. Since random sampling would have resulted in participants being 
drawn from a wide variety of study programmes, this would have required the design of 
a large number of different tests, to ensure that every participant was tested on 
knowledge related to their study programme. Consequently, as this would have been 
prohibitively time consuming and expensive, random sampling was rejected and a 
cluster sampling approach employed. 
Cluster sampling is mainly used where a sampling frame of all participants is either 
unavailable or unsuitable (Sarantakos, 2005).  It entails dividing the population into a 
number of clusters and drawing respondents from a limited number of these. This 
approach is commonly used in small-scale research (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
2000) and the main reason for its popularity is its efficiency (Davis, 2005). It is 
therefore particularly useful in circumstances where it is difficult, or expensive, to 
obtain data by sampling from the whole population (Robson, 2002), as is the case in this 
study. The sample can be drawn from the chosen clusters either randomly or, as is often 
the case in educational research, by targeting all within the cluster (Muijs, 2004). The 
clusters used in the study were eight study modules, which operate across four levels of 
135 
 
study, levels 4-6 relating to undergraduates and level 7 to postgraduates. As discussed 
earlier, each related to financial and quantitative aspects of participants‘ study 
programmes. To ensure a wider representation of participants, the modules chosen for 
each study level included one studied only by students specialising in accounting or 
finance and another by those who were not. Sampling in this manner permitted the 
investigation of overconfidence bias in the context of participants‘ subject-related 
knowledge, by tailoring the research instrument to reflect the relevant knowledge 
domain for each cluster. This approach also gave the opportunity to integrate the data 
collection activity into the study programme of the modules in question, which allowed 
all students attending these sessions to be targeted, rather than randomly selecting a sub-
sample from each. As well as enhancing its ecological validity, conducting the research 
in a natural setting in this way was therefore also designed to assist in increasing the 
sample size, by accessing potential participants at a time when it was easier to hold their 
attention as advocated by Loftus and Wagenaar (1988) in the study of overconfidence in 
lawyers discussed earlier. While this approach to increasing the sample size is likely to 
enhance the representativeness of the study in one respect, it must be acknowledged that 
it may be limited by the fact that sampling was not random. However Schwab (1985), in 
highlighting the sampling problems in social research, explains that random sampling in 
organisational studies is rare. He argues that almost all empirical studies in this field use 
convenience samples and that insistence on random sampling, to facilitate 
generalisation of results, would result in the rejection of most research submitted to 
academic journals for publication. Nevertheless, when using cluster sampling it is 
necessary to acknowledge the implications for generalisability (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2000) and in comparison with random sampling, this method will tend to 
produce larger errors for comparable sample sizes (Davis, 2005). 
The extent to which the sample is to be divided into sub-groups also influences the size 
and nature of the sample (Ticehurst and Veal, 1999).  However, the more factors 
included, the more complicated the sampling process becomes and therefore Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison (2000) suggest aiming for simplicity when deciding on sub-
groups for analysis. Robson (2002) cites Mertens‘ (1998) suggested rule of thumb, for 
non-experimental relational designs, of approximately 15 participants per variable and 
Borg and Gall‘s (1979) suggestion for surveys of approximately 100 observations for 
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major sub-groups investigated and 20-50 for minor sub-groups. Consequently, in this 
study, since the main sub-groups of interest related to age, gender and country of origin 
(UK and Chinese), a target of approximately 100 cases for each of these was sought by 
sampling a sufficiently high number of participants. However, it was acknowledged that 
in the case of age, due to the relative homogeneity of students studying at the university 
in this respect, it may be necessary to re-classify respondents into a smaller number of 
sub-groupings to achieve this. 
While the procedure described above was used to select a sample of students, the 
number providing usable data was reduced by two factors. Firstly, in accordance with 
ethical research procedures, each was asked to provide written consent to using their 
responses for research purposes and those who did not were excluded. Secondly, 
respondents were also excluded from the sample on the grounds of inappropriate use of 
the confidence scale, where they provided confidence levels below 25% or responded 
inappropriately to the diagnostic ‗British Airways‘ test question designed for this 
purpose. 
 
Access to the Sample 
It is also important to ensure that access to the research subjects is both permitted and 
practicable (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). Regarding permission, ethical 
approval was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at the university. To gain 
access, the researcher also discussed the nature of the study with tutors responsible for 
the learning of the students in question, explaining the potential benefits of their 
participation, through feedback they would be provided with after completing the task. 
This resulted in agreement to integrate the data collection activity into the study 
programmes in question as explained earlier and thus ensured access to the sample.  
 
3.5 Data Entry and Analysis 
When designing research, it is important to consider how data collected may be 
analysed and the techniques employed will depend on the research method adopted 
(Denscombe, 2003). In this study, two types of software were used for data analysis. 
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Initially, data from completed questionnaires was transferred to Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, which were used to determine mean confidence, the mean knowledge 
score, and the bias score for each respondent. They were also designed to identify which 
respondents had provided usable data, by indicating whether they had agreed to 
participate in the study and had used the confidence scale appropriately. The latter was 
determined by ascertaining whether confidence ratings below 25% had been used and 
whether a 25% rating had been provided for the diagnostic ‗British Airways‘ question 
used to detect inappropriate use of the scale. Secondary data, in respect of the academic 
performance of participants on their study programme, which was obtained from the 
university‘s marks recording system, was also recorded on the spreadsheet. This 
spreadsheet data was subsequently imported into an SPSS statistical software package 
for subsequent data analysis and to facilitate this analysis, a coding plan was devised. 
Codes allow subsequent processing on a computer (Bryman, 2008) and permit the 
identification of patterns among the variables addressed in the questionnaire (Czaja and 
Blair, 1996) and those used in this study are shown in Appendix 9. 
Statistical tests were undertaken to investigate associations and differences between 
sub-groups as appropriate and these tested for statistical significance at the 5% level. 
This is commonly used in social research and indicates that there is a less than 5% 
chance of the relationship found in the sample arising by chance only and not occurring 
in the population (Bryman, 2008). Where appropriate, results indicating a 1% 
significance level were also highlighted. The specific statistical tests undertaken are 
discussed below. 
 
3.5.1 Task Difficulty Effect 
Since previous studies have reported that task difficulty may influence overconfidence, 
it was necessary to ensure that the eight knowledge based tests used in the study did not 
significantly differ in terms of their difficulty. To facilitate this, each test was approved 
by the relevant study module tutor as being a reasonable test of the respondents‘ 
knowledge, in the context of their level of study and the knowledge domain being 
tested. However, having attempted to design tests of equal difficulty, this should 
subsequently be verified statistically (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996) and the 
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knowledge score was used for this purpose, since it represents the proportion of 
questions answered correctly by each respondent. Hacker et al (2000) compared the 
median knowledge score across each of three confidence tests they employed and 
concluded that since these were equal, the potential confounding effects of using 
different tests were minimised. Grimes (2002) and Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani (2008) 
meanwhile tested for differences in mean knowledge scores for each test and this 
approach was also adopted in this study. When investigating differences in means 
between more than two groups, as in this case where there are eight, ANOVA, which 
tests differences in three or more means (Tabachnick and Fidel 2001), can be used. 
Different types of ANOVA test can be employed, depending on the whether the 
independent variables are independent measures, in which respondents fall into only 
one condition, or repeated measures, in which each respondent has a score in each 
condition of the variable (Hinton et al 2004). In this case, each of the independent 
variables is an independent measure (i.e. each participant had a knowledge score for 
only one test) and therefore, independent measures ANOVA was appropriate. 
An indication of significantly different levels of difficulty across the eight tests would 
require an intervention to control for this. One approach for doing so, which was used 
by Klayman et al (1999), would be to use relative overconfidence. This indicator 
removes differences in difficulty caused by the use of different tests, by determining the 
bias score for each participant relative to that of others taking the same test, as follows: 
 
Relative overconfidence =   Bias score – Mean bias score for all participants  
                                                                              taking that test   
 
Since the bias score for each participant is compared with the mean for others taking the 
same test, employing this method would result in mean relative overconfidence scores 
of zero for each of the eight groups of participants completing the different tests used. 
This would facilitate investigation of individual differences where participants in each 
condition were drawn from across all eight tests, such as gender for example, where 
each test included both male and female participants. However, it would hamper any 
investigation of students by level of study, since at each study level only two different 
tests were used.   
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Consequently, an alternative and less restrictive approach, which reflects that employed 
by Yates et al (1989), was adopted. This entails deriving, for each of the eight tests used 
in the study, a sub-set of questions which did not significantly differ in difficulty across 
the eight tests. This could be achieved for each test by initially determining the mean 
correct response rate for each of the 30 original questions used. These can be 
subsequently randomly sampled, using SPSS software, to produce subsets of 25 
questions for each test, each with a mean knowledge score approximately equal to that 
for the entire sample of participants across all eight tests. This procedure therefore 
permits the design of eight tests of approximately equivalent difficulty in order to 
control for the task difficulty effect. 
 
3.5.2 Investigating Overconfidence  
The hypotheses established in Chapter 2 are shown in Table 5. The first of these was 
tested using a one sample t-test on bias scores, using a test value of zero, since a 
positive bias score indicates overconfidence. 
 
Table 5 – Hypotheses Tested in the Study 
 
Hypothesis 
 
H1:   Students are overconfident  in their knowledge 
H2:  Overconfidence differs between older and younger students 
H3:  Overconfidence is greater for male students 
H4:  Overconfidence is greater for  Chinese than UK students 
H5:  There is a negative association between overconfidence and 
        academic performance 
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3.5.3 Individual Differences 
The study also aims to explore individual differences in overconfidence in respect of 
gender, age, nationality and level of study. To investigate differences in the mean bias 
score between two groups, as in the case of gender for example, independent samples t-
tests were used. In the case of a directional hypothesis (e.g. overconfidence is greater 
for male students) a one tailed test was used. When analysing differences between 
groups, the problem of differential selection, in which members of the group differ in 
respects other than the explanatory variable in question, may occur. Robson (2002) 
suggests that, if random allocation to groups is not possible, this can be addressed 
through analysis of subgroups. This was achieved by investigating differences in two 
dimensions, using two-factor ANOVA, to investigate the potential moderating effect of 
a second variable, such as whether there are gender differences in overconfidence bias 
between students from China and the UK.  
The use of t-tests and ANOVA to explore differences in means assumes that the 
analysis is conducted on interval data, which is representative of the population and is 
normally distributed. However, should the data not be normally distributed, results can 
still be meaningfully interpreted, provided that samples of over 30 are used (Hinton et 
al, 2004). In this case, interval data was used, as well as samples in excess of 30 for 
respondents as a whole and for each of the sub-groups analysed in respect of age, 
gender and country of origin. In terms of the extent to which the sample was 
representative of the population, Muijs (2004) explains that, as is the case in this study, 
it is often difficult to conduct random sampling in educational studies and that research 
has indicated that t-tests are robust to violation of this assumption, provided large 
samples are used. As well as using a large sample for the study, representativeness was 
also addressed by investigating the extent to which it represented the population in 
respect of the individual characteristics investigated; age, gender and country of origin. 
T-tests and ANOVA also assume that samples are drawn from populations with equal 
variances (the homogeneity of variance assumption). Violation of this when performing 
t-tests to compare two groups required using the result generated by the test in which 
equal variances are not assumed (Hinton, 2004) and when investigating differences 
between more than two groups, necessitated the use of the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test, as the analogous test to the ANOVA explained above.  
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3.5.4 Overconfidence and Academic Performance 
The association between overconfidence and academic performance was analysed using 
Pearson‘s correlation between the participants‘ bias scores and overall marks for the 
level of study in which the confidence data was collected, since each indicator 
comprised interval data (Hinton et al, 2004).  Since the hypothesis being tested was 
directional, a one tailed test was appropriate. This approach was also used to investigate 
the association between overconfidence and academic performance in each of the 
various different mode of assessment used in the participants‘ study programmes 
(examinations, coursework etc.). 
 
3.6 Ethical Issues 
Research should be conducted in an ethical manner and in order to protect those 
involved in the study, social researchers should behave honestly and with integrity and 
respect the rights and dignity of the participants, ensuring that they are not harmed as a 
result of their participation (Denscombe, 2003). These principles are incorporated in the 
university ethics policy (University of Northumbria, 2009a), which embraces the 
principles of beneficence, implying that the research should have a conceivable benefit 
and nonmaleficence, which indicates that it should not be harmful (Rosenthal and 
Rosnow, 2008).  The policy therefore requires that the anticipated consequences of the 
work, and well being of others, should be taken into account when conducting research. 
Researchers should also obtain the consent of those who may be willing to participate in 
studies (Reeves and Harper, 1981) and this is particularly important in cases where they 
may be in a position of relative power, as is the case in this study, where the researcher 
is an academic member of staff in the institution in which the research was conducted. 
This requirement is also made clear in the university ethics policy, which explains that 
the participation of human participants in research should be on the basis of informed 
consent. This can be implicit, through respondents returning a questionnaire (Fisher, 
2004) and the university policy for informed consent in research (University of 
Northumbria, 2009b p.3) accepts this unless ‗sensitive personal data as defined by the 
Data Protection Act‘ is collected. This definition includes information regarding ‗the 
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racial or ethnic origin of the data subject‘ (Great Britain, Data Protection Act, 1998 p.2). 
While these were not specifically requested in this study, respondents were asked to 
record their country of origin, and therefore they were asked to indicate in writing on 
the questionnaire whether they consented to their data being used in the study. It was 
emphasised that they were under no obligation, and should not feel pressured, to do so. 
Data in respect of those who did not consent to participation was not used in the 
research. However, along with those who did consent, they were provided with 
feedback on the results of the activity. This included their knowledge and bias scores 
and therefore, they were provided with both performance and cognitive feedback, which 
provided a more complete assessment of their knowledge, in that they were made aware 
of not only what they knew, but also what they thought they knew (Renner and Renner, 
2001). They were also provided with information to assist in the interpretation of their 
results, to allow them to reflect on their potential implications for their future learning. 
As well as addressing ethical issues, this was designed to assist in increasing the sample 
size and enhance the reliability of the data collected, as providing information to 
respondents in this way can motivate them to participate and provide considered 
responses (Davis, 2005). Boud (1995) advises that public presentations of self-
assessments should be avoided, unless initiatives are in place to protect respondents‘ 
self-esteem. Consequently, each student was provided with a unique reference number, 
which was shown on their questionnaire and known only to them. They were then able 
to use this number to access their results, from information made available via the e-
learning platform used in the university.  
The university policy for informed consent in research (University of Northumbria, 
2009b p.4) also requires that ‗all data must be encoded or anonymised if possible‘ and 
this was achieved through the use of individual student codes and the aggregation of 
data for analysis. Consequently, in compliance with the principles of nonmaleficence, 
those taking part were protected from harm as a result of their participation in the study. 
Additionally, in terms of beneficence, there were potential benefits from the research 
both for participants in the study, through personal feedback they received after 
completing the research instrument, as well as for future learners who may benefit from 
the manner in which the findings emerging from the study may inform the development 
of future learning activities.   
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While an open approach is usually considered more ethical (Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994), disclosing the specific research objective may bias the responses provided (Gill 
and Johnson, 1991). In these circumstances, it may be appropriate to disclose the nature, 
though not the precise aim, of the work, if those being studied are not harmed as a result 
of their participation. Consequently, while they were informed that the intention was to 
use the data for research purposes, to assist in understanding influences on student 
learning, participants were not made aware that the study specifically addressed 
overconfidence in knowledge, in order to prevent this information biasing their 
responses. However, as discussed above, after completing the questionnaire they were 
provided with feedback, which included their bias score and highlighted the 
consequences of poor knowledge monitoring.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the philosophical foundations underpinning the research 
and the design used to answer the research questions developed in Chapter 2. It is 
informed by realist ontology, empiricist epistemology and quantitative methodology 
and entails a deductive process, in which overconfidence is operationalised and theory 
tested empirically, in a large business school based in a UK university. However, while 
adopting the stance that an objective reality exists which may be investigated 
empirically, it is acknowledged that it may not be possible to discover it with certainty, 
due to limitations in the manner in which the research was conducted. The difficulties in 
operationalising social concepts such as overconfidence in knowledge are recognised, as 
well as the potential impact of bias on the part of both the participants and the 
researcher. Consequently, in order that readers may take limitations of the study into 
account when interpreting its findings, the research design has been fully explained.  
The study employs a non-experimental, fixed design using a research instrument 
comprising a closed response, two part questionnaire, to collect demographic details of 
participants as well as gathering data which can be used to generate an indicator 
reflecting knowledge monitoring accuracy. In terms of its ecological validity, the 
research design responds to calls for more studies using tests in a classroom 
environment (Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar, 1994; Hacker, Bol and Bahbahani, 2008) 
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and suggestions that research should focus on rich, specific subject matter gained over a 
period of time (Stone, 2000; Hacker et al, 2000), by investigating knowledge 
monitoring in the context of the study programmes of participants. Integrating data 
collection events into the participants‘ study programmes, was intended not only to 
conduct the study in a natural setting, but also assist in increasing the sample size. 
Basing the study on participants‘ knowledge related to their study programme requires 
the use of cluster sampling, due to the difficulties and resource implications of random 
sampling in a large institution with students following a wide variety of study 
programmes. Consequently, the approach adopted represents a trade off between two 
types of validity in that the strategy employed to enhance ecological validity means that, 
in common with many other organisational studies, random sampling was not used. 
While this has potential consequences for the representativeness of the sample, the 
clusters used ensured that participants were drawn from all three levels of undergraduate 
study, as well as postgraduate programmes.  
The research instrument incorporates a test comprising 30 multiple-choice questions, 
which was used to collect data which can be used to generate indicators of knowledge 
monitoring accuracy. Each question required respondents to indicate their choice of the 
correct answer, as well as a confidence judgement, using a graduated scale in the range 
25%-100%. In terms of its relationship with the conceptual framework and dimensions 
of calibration discussed in Chapter 2, the study is therefore an investigation of 
metacognitive monitoring using retrospective, local meta-level judgements, in which 
respondents provide postdictions of accuracy in respect of individual test items. The 
bias score used in many previous studies was employed as an indicator of 
overconfidence and in order to enhance its reliability, a mechanism to identify 
inappropriate use of the confidence scale was incorporated in the research instrument. 
While it is acknowledged that this may not necessarily eliminate all difficulties 
respondents may have in translating subjective judgements into quantitative measures, it 
should enhance the reliability of data used in the study, by excluding those who provide 
evidence suggesting they have done so inappropriately. Similarly, while it is 
acknowledged that responses from participants could be biased by the social utility 
some may attach to confidence judgements, the research design includes initiatives to 
mitigate these. These include discussions with students regarding the manner in which 
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data collected is processed and feedback provided. To permit investigation of the 
association between overconfidence and academic performance, the latter was 
operationalised using assessment results from the participants‘ study programme. This 
approach addresses problems highlighted in the literature associated with using the 
same research instrument to operationalise both overconfidence (the bias score) and 
competence (the knowledge score). This secondary data, related to the participants‘ 
assessment results on their study programme, was gathered from the institution‘s marks 
recording system and as well as their overall performance, included sub-component 
marks related to various modes of assessment used at the institution. While these 
indicators arise from subjective judgements made by academic staff, the institution has 
procedures in place to moderate these assessments to promote consistency in the 
manner in which they are made.  
Since the study entailed collecting data from individuals, the ethical issues associated 
with doing so were addressed. In order to ensure that respondents were not harmed 
through their participation, their anonymity was protected and data aggregated for 
analysis. The questionnaire asked them to indicate in writing whether they consented to 
their responses being used in the research and where they declined, their data was 
excluded. While being informed that the purpose of the research was to investigate 
issues associated with student learning, they were not informed of the specific emphasis 
on overconfidence in knowledge, in order to prevent this information influencing their 
responses. However, shortly after completing the test, they were provided with 
individual feedback of their results, as well as information to assist them in interpreting 
this.  
Having addressed the philosophical foundations of the research and methodology 
adopted and discussed the research design in detail, in this chapter, the results arising 
from deploying this design to answer the research questions developed in Chapter 2 are 
considered in the next chapter. 
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4. Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings arising from the application of the research design 
explained in Chapter 3 to the research questions developed in Chapter 2. Their 
relationship with those reported in previous studies discussed in Chapter 2 is also 
addressed as well as their potential implications. Initially, the participants in the sample 
are analysed, indicating the extent to which they are representative of the population 
from which they were drawn. The procedure designed to control for task difficulty is 
then discussed to clarify how this was implemented before reporting findings in respect 
of knowledge monitoring accuracy. This initially addresses the extent to which 
overconfidence in knowledge was detected in participants generally and its association 
with both knowledge and confidence. Individual differences are subsequently analysed, 
before considering the association between overconfidence and various aspects of 
academic performance. 
 
4.2 Participants 
While questionnaires were completed by 606 participants, as shown in Table 6, these 
were not all used in the study. 
 
Table 6 - Determination of the Final Sample 
  
Students 
Students completing the test 
Less: those completing twice 
 
Less: not consenting to use of data 
Consenting respondents 
Less: using confidence scale inappropriately 
Final sample 
606 
(15) 
591 
(26)  
565 
(57) 
508 
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Despite efforts to prevent this, by choosing non-overlapping cluster samples, 15 of 
those completing the test attended two data collection sessions and therefore submitted 
two questionnaires, each based on a different knowledge domain. However, only the 
first of these was included in each case, since having completed it once and received 
feedback, this may have influenced responses provided in their second attempt. Of the 
remaining 591 participants, 26 (4%) indicated that they did not wish to their results to 
be used in the study and were therefore excluded. This high consent rate suggests that 
initiatives designed to enhance it, including reassuring students about how the data 
would be used and explaining that individual feedback would be provided, were 
effective.  This left 565 respondents, of which three were excluded from the study on 
the grounds of using confidence levels below 25%, and a further 54 (10%) for not 
providing a confidence level of 25% for the diagnostic ‗British Airways‘ question 
designed to test for inappropriate use of the confidence scale. As shown in Table 7, 
analysis of these indicated that while two did not disclose their country of origin, 13 
were UK students (comprising 5% of total UK students) and 42 were non-UK (15% of 
total non-UK). Thus proportionately fewer UK students were excluded on the basis of 
their inappropriate use of the confidence scale. The remaining 508 participants 
comprised the final sample analysed for the study. 
 
 
     Table 7 – Analysis of Respondents Excluded for Inappropriate  
Use of the Confidence Scale 
 
Country of 
Origin 
Consenting 
Respondents 
Inappropriately Using 
Confidence Scale 
 
n 
 
n 
% of Consenting 
Respondents 
UK 282 13 5% 
Non-UK 278 42 15% 
 560 55  
Not disclosed     5   2  
Total 565 57 10% 
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4.2.1 Individual Characteristics 
4.2.1.1 Gender 
Three participants did not disclose their gender and the remainder are detailed in Table 
8, along with the gender split in the population of full time business students studying at 
the university. This was determined using the mean proportions for 2006/07 and 
2007/08, the period during which the data was collected for the study. The table shows 
the proportion of males in the sample exceeding that in the population by 2%, with 
females showing a corresponding deficit. It therefore indicates that the sample closely 
represented the population in respect of gender. 
 
Table 8 – Analysis of Participants by Gender 
 
  
Participant 
Sample (S) 
 Population 
(P) 
(S-P) 
N % N % % 
Male 281 56% 1,339 54% +2% 
Female 224 44% 1,153 46% -2% 
Total 505 100% 2,492 100% 
Did not disclose     3 
Total sample 508 
 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Age 
All except four respondents disclosed their age group and, as shown in Table 9, the 
majority (92%) were aged between 18 and 25 years. Consequently, for the purposes of 
analysis, the older age bands were collapsed as shown in Table 10. This indicates that 
the proportions in each age group in the sample were within 1% of that in the 
population and consequently, that it was representative in this respect. However, the 
relatively narrow age distribution does constrain the investigation of age differences to 
some extent. 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
 
      Table 9 – Analysis of Participants by Age Group 
 
  
Participant 
Sample (S) 
 
N % Cum. 
% 
18-21 years 297 59% 59% 
22-25 years 166 33% 92% 
26-29 years  26 5% 97% 
30-33 years   8 2% 99% 
34+ years   7 1% 100% 
Total 504 100% 
Did not disclose     4 
Total sample 508 
       
 
 
 
     Table 10 – Regrouping of Participants by Age 
 
  
Participant 
Sample (S) 
 Population 
(P) 
(S-P) 
N % N % % 
18-21 years 297 59% 1,490 60% -1% 
22+ years 207 41% 1,002 40% +1% 
Total 504 100% 2,492 100% 
Did not disclose     4 
Total sample 508 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Country of Origin 
Participants in the sample originated from 43 different countries and to permit 
comparison of the overconfidence levels of Chinese and UK students, the sample was 
sub-divided into these two groups and other students as shown in Table 11. This shows 
that while Chinese students are a little over, and UK under-represented, the sample does 
broadly reflect the population in this respect. 
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Table 11 – Analysis of Participants by Country of Origin 
 
  
Participant 
Sample (S) 
 Population 
(P) 
(S-P) 
N % N % % 
UK 269 53% 1,403 56% -3% 
China 102 20%   410 16% 4% 
Other 134 27%   680 27% 0% 
Total 505 100% 2,492 100% 
Did not disclose    3 
Total sample 508 
 
 
The participants analysed for the study therefore comprise a large sample of over 500 
business students, which is broadly representative of the population of those studying at 
the institution in respect of gender, age group and country of origin. The sample also 
included at least 100 participants in each condition investigated in these major sub-
groups, as recommended by Borg and Gall (1989).  
 
4.3 Controlling for Task Difficulty 
Given the potential confounding effect of task difficult in the investigation of 
overconfidence, this was tested for in the eight tests used in the study by analysing the 
differences in mean knowledge scores attained by participants in each, as these indicate 
the proportion of questions correctly answered. Since the data for knowledge scores 
violated the homogeneity of variances assumption implicit in an ANOVA test, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test (see Appendix 10) was used for this purpose and this indicated that 
there were significant differences in difficulty between the tests (p=0.001<0.01). 
Consequently, to control for this, eight tests of approximately equal difficulty were 
derived by using a sub-sample in each test of 25 questions from the original 30 used. 
This entailed a random sampling process to generate the 25 item tests, each with a mean 
knowledge score around the overall mean across all eight original 30 item tests 
(49.25%) and which did not differ significantly across each of the eight tests. As shown 
in Appendix 11, this was confirmed by a Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.980>0.05). Data from 
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these refined tests were used in the study and from a potential maximum total of 12,700 
confidence judgements (i.e. 508 respondents x 25 items), 12,564 responses were 
provided by participants, representing a completion rate of 99%.  
 
4.4 Investigating Overconfidence 
Table 12 shows measures of central tendency for mean confidence, knowledge score 
and bias score for all participants. The positive mean bias score of 8.9% indicates that, 
as a group, they displayed overconfidence and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (See 
Appendix 12) confirmed that it was normally distributed (p=0.606>0.05) and therefore 
satisfied this assumption associated with the use of parametric tests (Hinton et al, 2004). 
 
Table 12 – Measures of Central Tendency for  
   Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias 
Score 
% 
Mean 59.1 50.2 8.9 
Median 58.5 48.0 9.0 
Mode 56.0 48.0 9.0 
Std. Deviation 14.1 13.5 14.8 
       
 
 
The following hypothesis was tested in respect of overconfidence: 
 
H0   = Students are not overconfident in their knowledge 
 
H1   = Students are overconfident in their knowledge 
 
 
As shown in Appendix 13, a one sample t-test indicated that the difference between the 
mean bias score of 8.9% and a perfectly calibrated zero score was statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level (p=0.001<0.01). Consequently, the null 
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hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that students are overconfident in their 
knowledge. Participants were also investigated using the standard used by Pallier 
(2003), in which scores between -5% and +5% are deemed indicative of good self-
assessment. The results shown in Figure 21 indicate that 23% displayed good self-
monitoring accuracy, with the majority (63%) demonstrating overconfidence and 
relatively few (14%), underconfidence.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Self-Monitoring Accuracy of Participants 
 
Figure 22 shows a calibration chart for all participants, plotting confidence against 
accuracy, and indicates that participants were particularly overconfident when 
expressing high levels of confidence. Further investigation of extreme levels of 
confidence indicated that respondents expressed 100% confidence in 23% of the total 
judgements made. However, as illustrated by the calibration curve, the accuracy rate for 
such responses fell well short of this at only 73%. Consequently, the inaccuracy rate of 
27% (100%-73%) in respect of these ‗false certainties‘, exceeds the 20% reported by 
Dunning et al (1990) and lies within the range of 17-30% in studies reported by 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977). 
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Figure 22: Calibration Curve – All Participants 
 
4.4.1 Overconfidence and Knowledge 
Investigation of the association between the bias score and knowledge score, as shown 
in Appendix 14, revealed moderately strong negative correlation, which was significant 
at the 1% level (r=-0.504, p=0.001<0.01). This indicates that those demonstrating 
greater overconfidence displayed less knowledge in the test. However, as discussed 
earlier, this result typically arises due to the method of investigation used. Using the 
same instrument to test for both knowledge and overconfidence tends to result in 
overconfidence for those displaying poor knowledge, due to the fact that it is more 
difficult to be underconfident when the proportion of questions answered correctly is 
low. 
 
4.4.2 Overconfidence and Confidence 
Previous studies have shown that confidence and overconfidence are positively related 
and in this case, the calibration chart in Figure 22 indicated greater overconfidence for 
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judgements in which participants expressed greater confidence. This was tested 
statistically and as shown in Appendix 15, indicated  moderately strong positive 
correlation between confidence and overconfidence, which is significant at the 1% level 
(r=+0.561, p=0.001<0.01). Therefore it can be concluded that those who displayed more 
confidence also tended to demonstrate greater overconfidence, a finding which supports 
similar results reported by Klayman et al (1999) and Loftus and Wagenaar (1988). 
Again, it can be argued that the use of the same instrument to determine indicators for 
both confidence and overconfidence contributes to this finding, since it is more difficult 
for those providing relatively low confidence judgements to demonstrate 
overconfidence.  
 
4.4.3 Individual Differences 
Having determined that participants displayed a general tendency for overconfidence, 
individual differences were investigated to determine its association with age, gender 
and country of origin. 
 
4.4.3.1 Age 
The following hypothesis was tested with respect to age:  
 
H0      = No age differences in overconfidence exist 
 
H2      = Overconfidence differs between older and younger  
students 
 
 
Since the age group classifications were compressed to two groups, this was achieved 
by investigating whether overconfidence differed between the younger group, aged 18-
21 years, and those aged 22 years and above. Table 13 shows that the older group 
displayed more confidence in their responses, but this was not justified by their 
performance, since their mean knowledge score was very close to that for the younger 
group. Consequently, while both groups displayed overconfidence, it was evident to a 
greater extent in the older group, with a bias score of 11.3% as compared with 7.3% for 
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younger students. An independent samples t-test (see Appendix 16) indicated that this 
difference was statistically significant at the 1% level (p=0.003<0.01).  The null 
hypothesis is therefore rejected and the results indicate greater overconfidence for older 
students. 
 
Table 13 – Mean Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score by Age Group 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
18-21 years 57.6 50.3 7.3 
22+ years 61.3 50.0 11.3 
Total 59.1 50.2 8.9 
 
This finding does not support earlier studies which reported the tendency for 
overconfidence to reduce with age (Grimes, 2002; Fischhoff, 1992), nor Fitzgerald, 
White and Gruppen‘s (2003) suggestion that self-assessment ability is mainly learned in 
childhood and once in adulthood tends to be fixed. However, it is acknowledged that the 
extent to which the study was able to investigate the influence of age was limited to 
some extent, due to the narrow age range of the population.  
The calibration curves shown in Figure 23 indicate a similar pattern for each age group 
in respect of accuracy at different levels of confidence. In terms of questions which 
produced extremely high levels of confidence, accuracy for those in which 100% 
confidence was expressed was similar for each group, with 18-21 year olds answering 
74% of such questions correctly and the older group 72%. However, the younger group 
expressed this degree of confidence more frequently, doing so for 26% of questions, as 
compared with 21% for the older group. This outcome is interesting in view of 
Fischhoff and McGregor‘s (1982) finding of more accurate self-assessment of 
knowledge for those who tended not to provide 100% confidence judgements. This 
study provides evidence to the contrary, since the younger group, which made more 
100% confidence judgements, displayed less overconfidence than the older participants. 
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Figure 23: Calibration Curves by Age Group 
 
4.4.3.2 Gender 
The following hypothesis was tested in respect of gender: 
 
 
H0      = There is no gender difference in overconfidence 
 
 
H3      = Overconfidence is greater for male students 
 
The results shown in Table 14 indicate that, while the positive mean bias score for each 
group indicated overconfidence, it was evident to a greater extent for males, with a 
mean bias score of 9.9%, as compared with 7.6% for females.  
 
                   Table 14 – Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score by Gender 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
Male 61.2 51.3 9.9 
Female 56.3 48.7 7.6 
Total 59.0 50.1 8.9 
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A t-test (see Appendix 17), indicated that this difference was statistically significant at 
the 5% level (p=0.045<0.05). Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
results indicate greater overconfidence for males.  
The calibration curves in Figure 24 show that results are similar by gender for 
judgements made with relatively high degrees of confidence. However at lower levels, 
females were more accurate and tended to display underconfidence for judgements 
made with confidence levels below 50%. For high confidence judgements, accuracy for 
questions in which 100% confidence was expressed was the same for each group at 
73%. However, males were more inclined to express this degree of confidence, doing so 
for 24% of questions, as compared with 21% for females. 
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Figure 24: Calibration Curves by Gender 
 
These findings support others reporting a greater tendency for overconfidence in males 
(Acker and Duck, 2008; Pallier, 2003; Barber and Odean, 2001; Lundeberg, Fox, and 
Punccohar, 1994). However, since as a group, females also displayed overconfidence, 
albeit to a lesser extent than males, they do not support Beyer‘s (1990 p.960) argument, 
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that ‗self-derogatory‘ bias tends to result in females underestimating their ability. 
Rather, it supports the view that gender differences result, not from a lack of confidence 
in females, but rather a tendency for its excess in males (Lundeberg, Fox, and 
Punccohar, 1994).  
 
Gender and Age 
The potential moderating effect of age on gender was also explored and as shown in 
Table 15, bias score was higher for males regardless of their age group. A two factor 
ANOVA test (see Appendix 18) showed that there was no significant interaction 
between gender and age (p=0.213>0.05) and therefore, that gender differences are not 
moderated by age group. 
 
Table 15 – Bias Score by Gender and Age 
 
 18-21 Years 
% 
22+ Years 
% 
Total 
% 
Male 7.8 13.3 10.0 
Female 6.7 8.9 7.6 
Total 7.3 11.3 8.9 
 
 
4.4.3.3 Country of Origin 
The following hypothesis was tested in respect of participants‘ country of origin: 
 
 
H0     = There is no difference in overconfidence between Chinese and  
UK students 
 
 
H4     = Overconfidence is greater for Chinese than UK students 
 
 
Table 16 shows that, while both Chinese and UK students demonstrated 
overconfidence, with a positive mean bias score in each case, it was higher for Chinese 
students. The t-test shown in Appendix 19 indicates that this difference is statistically 
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significant at the 1% level (p=0.001<0.01). Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected 
and the results indicate greater overconfidence for Chinese than UK students.  
 
 
Table 16 – Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score for  
UK and Chinese Students 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
UK 57.2 52.1 5.1 
China 62.5 46.3 16.2 
 
 
 
The calibration curve in Figure 25 shows different patterns of overconfidence, with 
Chinese students particularly overconfident for judgements made with high levels of 
confidence. They also showed a much greater tendency to express extremely high levels 
of confidence, with 30% of questions being answered with 100% confidence as 
compared with 20% for UK students. As indicated on the calibration chart, these 
judgements also resulted in a lower accuracy rate for Chinese participants, with 67% of 
such questions being answered correctly, as compared with 75% for UK students.  
The higher levels of overconfidence detected for Chinese participants, as compared with 
UK students, supports previously reported higher levels in Asians as compared with 
Westerners (Acker and Duck, 2008; Yates, Lee and Bush, 1997) and more specifically, 
higher levels for Chinese (Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery, 2002; Yates, Lee and 
Shinotsuka, 1996). Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery (2002) also suggest that this is 
particularly likely to be the case in respect of knowledge about specific facts, in respect 
of which a tendency for less debate between opposing views in Chinese culture may 
result in a tendency to use extreme responses. The findings here provide supportive 
evidence for this, since Chinese participants displayed a greater tendency to express a 
confidence level of 100%. The greater overconfidence shown by Chinese students was 
explored further to test for possible moderating effects of age and gender.  
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      Figure 25: Calibration Curves by Country of Origin 
 
 
Country of Origin and Age 
Table 17 shows that the bias score is greater for Chinese students regardless of their age 
and also that, when analysed by country, the younger age group for both UK and 
Chinese participants, was more overconfident. A two factor ANOVA test (See 
Appendix 20) indicated no significant interaction between age and country of origin 
(p=0.307>0.05) and it can therefore be concluded that there is no evidence to support 
differences by country being moderated by age. 
 
    Table 17 – Bias Score by Country and Age Group 
 
 18-21 Years 
% 
22+ Years 
% 
Total 
% 
UK 5.2 4.3 5.1 
China 20.0 14.9 16.2 
Total 6.7 11.6 8.1 
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Country of Origin and Gender 
Table 18 indicates that Chinese students were more overconfident, regardless of their 
gender. However, while in the case of UK students, males were more overconfident, for 
Chinese students this tendency was reversed. A two factor ANOVA (see Appendix 21) 
indicated a significant interaction between country of origin and gender at the 5% level 
(p=0.040<0.05) and therefore, that differences in overconfidence by gender were 
moderated by country of origin. It can therefore be concluded that, while there was a 
statistically significant finding that males were more overconfident than females, this 
was not so for Chinese students. While, as discussed earlier, investigation of all 
participants demonstrated statistically significant greater overconfidence for males, a t-
test (See Appendix 22) indicated that for Chinese students there was no significant 
difference by gender (p=0.535>0.05). This supports Acker and Duck‘s (2008) finding of 
no significant difference between Asian males and females in terms overconfidence. 
 
 
        Table 18 – Bias  Score by Country and Gender 
 Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Total 
% 
UK  7.0 2.3 5.1 
China 15.1 17.0 16.2 
Total 8.7 7.5 8.2 
 
 
4.4.4 Overconfidence by Level of Study 
Since participants comprised students studying at different levels at the university, 
differences by level were also investigated, including the potential moderating effects of 
age group, gender and country of origin. Table 19 shows that the mean bias score for 
each level was positive, indicating overconfidence in each case. However, the score for 
postgraduate students was higher than for each of the undergraduate groups, indicating 
greater overconfidence at that level. An ANOVA test (see Appendix 23) indicated that 
differences in the means were significant at the 1% level (p=0.001<0.01) and post hoc 
tests showed that these related to differences between level 7 and each of the other three 
levels.  
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 Table 19 – Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score by Level of Study 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
Undergraduates Level 4 59.7 50.3 9.3 
Level 5 55.3 49.4 5.8 
Level 6 58.2 52.0 6.2 
Postgraduates Level 7 64.4 50.3 14.1 
 Total 59.1 50.2 8.9 
 
Consequently, in respect of undergraduate students, these results provide no evidence to 
challenge Russo and Schoemaker‘s (1992) view that metaknowledge tends not to be 
developed during formal education, since there is no statistically significant reduction in 
the bias score across these levels. Nor does it support the view that epistemological 
beliefs are an important influence on cognitive monitoring (Tynjala, Helle and 
Murtonen, 2001), when taking into account Jehng, Johnson and Anderson‘s (1993) 
findings that those studying at postgraduate level are more likely than undergraduates to 
recognise that knowledge is uncertain. In this case, postgraduates displayed greater 
overconfidence than undergraduates. To explore these findings further, overconfidence 
by level of study was tested for potential moderating effects of individual differences in 
respect of age, gender or country of origin.   
 
4.4.4.1 Level of Study and Age 
Table 20 shows age differences in the bias score by level of study and indicates that 
postgraduates were more overconfident than each undergraduate group, regardless of 
their age group. A two factor ANOVA test (See Appendix 24) confirmed that there was 
no significant interaction between level of study and age group (p=0.856>0.05) and 
consequently, that study level differences are not moderated by age group.  
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     Table 20 – Bias Score by Level of Study and Age 
 18-21 years 
% 
22+ years 
% 
Total 
% 
Undergraduates Level 4 9.2 10.4 9.3 
Level 5 5.5 8.3 5.8 
Level 6 7.7 6.2 6.6 
Postgraduates Level 7 14.4 14.4 14.2 
 Total 7.3 11.3 8.9 
 
 
4.4.4.2 Level of Study and Gender 
Table 21 shows that postgraduate students were more overconfident than any of the 
undergraduate groups, regardless of their gender and a two way ANOVA test (see 
Appendix 25) confirmed that there was no significant interaction between these 
variables (p=0.218>0.05). Consequently, there is no evidence that study level 
differences are moderated by gender.  
 
 
Table 21 – Bias Score by Level of Study and Gender 
 Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Total 
% 
Undergraduates Level 4 10.8 7.5 9.4 
Level 5 5.5 6.3 5.8 
Level 6 6.7 5.8 6.2 
Postgraduates Level 7 16.8 10.9 14.2 
 Total 9.9 7.6 8.9 
 
 
 
4.4.4.3 Level of Study and Country of Origin 
The majority of full time postgraduate business students at the institution in which the 
study was conducted are non-UK students and during the period during which the data 
was collected, 42% of the population were Chinese and 9% UK students. This was 
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reflected in the sample, in which a significant proportion (39%) of level 7 students was 
Chinese, and only a small minority (8%), UK students. Consequently, given the higher 
levels of overconfidence displayed by Chinese participants, the potential moderating 
effect of this on differences between study levels was explored. Figure 26 shows a 
comparison of bias scores for UK and Chinese students by level of study and country of 
origin. A two factor ANOVA test (See Appendix 26) indicated that interactions between 
study level and country were significant at the 1% level (p=0.009<0.01). However, as 
shown in Figure 26, while greater for other study levels, differences in overconfidence 
by country for postgraduates (level 7), were relatively small, with a mean bias score for 
UK students of 15% as compared with 16.4% for Chinese (See Appendix 26). 
Consequently, there is no evidence that high levels of overconfidence for postgraduate 
students are moderated by country of origin. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 26: Mean Bias Scores by Level of Study and Country of Origin 
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4.4.4.4 Entry Status 
Students may enter the university either as new students (direct entrants) or as 
continuing students, progressing in their studies from a previous level of study. For 
example, the university admits students with appropriate qualifications directly to the 
final year of undergraduate programmes. Consequently, those studying at level 6 can be 
grouped according to whether they entered directly at that stage or progressed from 
level 5. Similarly, postgraduate students may enter the university directly onto a 
postgraduate programme (level 7), or progress internally from a previous undergraduate 
programme at level 6. Therefore, differences in overconfidence bias between direct 
entrants and continuing students at each of these levels were investigated. Table 22 
shows that at level 6, the mean bias score for direct entrants exceeds that of continuing 
students and a t-test (See Appendix 27) indicated that this difference was significant at 
the 5% level (p=0.042<0.05). Consequently, it can be concluded that those entering the 
university directly onto the final stage of undergraduate programmes were more 
overconfident than continuing undergraduate students, who had previous experience of 
studying at the institution. For postgraduate students, while both groups were 
overconfident, this was evident to a greater extent for continuing students. However, a t-
test (See Appendix 28) indicated that this difference was not statistically significant 
(p=0.065>0.05), although it should be noted that the p-value is close to the 5% level.    
 
 
Table 22 – Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score by Entry Status 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
Undergraduate 
Level 6 
Direct entrants 60.9 52.0 8.9 
Continuing students 54.3 52.9 2.4 
Postgraduate 
Level 7 
Direct entrants 63.5 51.3 12.2 
Continuing students 65.9 48.4 17.5 
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4.4.5 Overconfidence and Academic Performance 
The association between overconfidence and academic achievement on the participants‘ 
study programmes was investigated by testing the following hypothesis: 
 
H0     = There is a no association between overconfidence  
and academic performance 
 
H5     = There is a negative association between overconfidence  
and academic performance 
 
Data in respect of academic performance was unavailable for 39 participants (8%), due 
to them not supplying their student registration number, supplying an incorrect number 
or terminating their studies before submitting work for assessment. For the remainder, 
Appendix 29 shows correlations between bias scores and marks obtained by participants 
for the stage of their study programme during which the confidence data was collected. 
These include the overall mark for that stage and, since these were achieved through a 
variety of assessment tasks, marks attained for different modes of assessment. The 
results show very strong positive correlation, significant at the 1% level 
(p=0.001<0.01), between overall assessment marks and those for examinations 
(r=+0.867), coursework (r=+0.855) and dissertations (r=+0.739). This indicates that 
higher achieving students tended to perform consistently better across these different 
modes of assessment and poorer performers, worse.  
 
4.4.5.1 Overall Academic Performance 
Investigation of the association between overconfidence and overall academic 
achievement revealed weak and negative, but, due to the large sample size, statistically 
significant at the 1% level, correlation between bias score and students‘ overall marks 
(r=-0.113, p=0.007<0.01). This indicates that the more overconfident in their knowledge 
participants were, the lower their overall level of academic achievement was. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected and the results indicate that greater 
overconfidence is associated with poorer academic performance. This finding is in 
accordance with the view that less competent individuals tend to experience greater 
difficulty when making metacognitive judgements than the more competent (Dunning et 
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al, 2003) and more specifically, literature highlighting an inverse relationship between 
overconfidence and academic competence (Pieschl, 2009; Ehrlinger et al, 2008; Paris 
and Paris, 2001; Everson and Tobias, 1998). It also supports Koku and Qureshi‘s (2004) 
findings in a smaller scale investigation of business students. However, while in that 
research, the same instrument was used to assess both overconfidence and academic 
performance, in this study the latter was determined independently, using student marks 
achieved during their study programme. While the finding here indicates association 
rather than causality, it does provides supportive evidence for Grimes‘ (2002) argument 
that the abilities required for academic achievement are associated with those necessary 
for accurate self-assessment. It also lends weight to the argument that for some, poor 
self-assessment accuracy can result in a dual burden, in which they possess not only 
poor knowledge, but also insufficiently developed metaknowledge with which to 
appreciate this (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). However, as noted above, negative 
correlation between academic performance and overconfidence, while statistically 
significant, is weak. Therefore to investigate this issue further, participants were divided 
into three groups of equal size according to their academic ability, as indicated by their 
overall assessment mark on their study programme. High performers were those 
achieving at least 63.1%, the low performing group achieved below 54.3% and the 
remainder were assigned to the middle group. As shown in Table 23, those in the lower 
performing group were most overconfident in their knowledge, with a mean bias score 
of 10.5%, followed by the middle performing group (9.6%). The higher performers 
were least overconfident, with a mean bias score of 7%. However, an ANOVA test (See 
Appendix 30) indicated that these differences were not significant at the 5% level 
(p=0.099>0.05). 
 
    Table 23 – Mean Bias Score by Academic Performance Group 
 Mean Bias Score 
% 
High performing 7.0 
Middle performing 9.6 
Low performing 10.5 
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Differences between performance groups in this case are less than those detected in 
Koku and Qureshi‘s (2004) study of business students. In their case, they reported bias 
scores for three similarly compiled academic performance groups, of 3% for high 
performers, 10% for the middle group and 22% for low performers. However academic 
performance was more narrowly defined in their study, in that it was determined using 
only scores achieved in a multiple choice examination while, in this study, a broader 
indicator of performance was used, incorporating all marks achieved across each 
participant‘s study programme. As noted earlier, this also entailed using an indicator of 
academic performance which did not rely on the same data used to determine 
overconfidence. The findings here therefore provide evidence that when using this 
approach, differences in overconfidence between achievement groups, are less than 
those detected by Koku and Qureshi (2004). 
 
4.4.5.2 Performance in Different Modes of Assessment 
As well as overall academic performance, Appendix 29 also shows correlations between 
the bias score and academic performance in different modes of assessment. These 
indicate weak, but statistically significant, negative correlation in respect of 
examinations (r=-0.096, p=0.019<0.05) and coursework (r=-0.138, p=0.001<0.01). 
These correlations are similar to that between the bias score and overall academic 
performance (r=-0.113) due to the high positive correlation between the latter and 
achievement in examinations and coursework and indicate that overconfidence is only 
weakly associated with poorer performance in these types of assessment. Performance 
in the other two modes of assessment, dissertations (r=-0.004, p=0.479>0.05) and oral 
presentations (r=0.045, p=0.348>0.05) show statistically insignificant and very weak, 
correlation with the bias score. For dissertations, a possible reason for this stems from 
the fact that, unlike other study modules, students receive individual supervision from 
an academic member of staff when undertaking this work. Individual and focused 
formative feedback received during this process may therefore help to reduce the impact 
of overconfidence in knowledge on work which is subsequently submitted for 
assessment. In the case of presentations, while, as discussed earlier, much emphasis is 
placed on the potential negative consequences of overconfidence, possible advantages 
have also been highlighted. Since confidence can be associated with competence, 
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especially in circumstances where it is difficult to assess (Klayman et al, 1999), 
unwarranted displays of confidence may attract favourable attention and rewards 
(Fischhoff 1994). Consequently, it may be that overconfident students attract this 
attention and are rewarded for their confidence, despite the fact that it may be 
misplaced, when delivering presentations. Another issue which may impact on the 
association between overconfidence in knowledge and academic achievement is the 
extent to which knowledge is rewarded in the assessment process. Pieschl (2009) argues 
that students‘ ability to accurately assess their own knowledge is important for more 
complex learning tasks, as well as lower level activities. However, in higher education 
knowledge acquisition tends to be rewarded more highly at lower levels of study, while 
at higher levels there is more emphasis on more advanced learning outcomes. Since 
more demanding skills are required as students progress through different levels of 
study, Isaacson and Fujita (2006) highlight the potential value in exploring whether 
effective knowledge monitoring becomes increasingly important for academic tasks that 
require higher level learning skills. Consequently, the association between 
overconfidence and academic performance at different levels of study was investigated. 
 
4.4.5.3 Overconfidence and Academic Performance by Level of Study 
Correlations between bias score and academic performance for each study level are 
shown in Appendices 31-34. Table 24 summarises these findings in respect of overall 
academic performance and indicates that while negative correlation is weak in each 
case, it is statistically significant at the 5% level, for both undergraduates studying at 
level 4 and postgraduate students and each of these are discussed below.   
 
Table 24 – Correlation between Bias Score and Overall Marks by Level of Study  
 R 
 
p 
(one tailed) 
Undergraduates Level 4 -0.188* 0.021 
Level 5     -0.055 0.247 
Level 6     -0.071 0.276 
Postgraduates Level 7 -0.175* 0.026 
*Significant at 5% level (one tailed) 
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Undergraduate Level 4 Students 
The stronger negative association between overconfidence and academic performance 
for undergraduates studying at level 4, as compared with levels 5 and 6, may be 
attributable to knowledge being more highly rewarded at level 4 than at higher levels of 
study, where there is greater emphasis on more advanced learning outcomes. While it 
may usefully inform learning in other situations, effective self-monitoring of knowledge 
may be more influential in situations in which the ability to demonstrate knowledge is 
critical.  
Alternatively, since these students are new to both the institution, and higher education, 
they may not yet have developed other metacognitive knowledge which may usefully 
inform metacognitive regulatory activity in that learning environment to an extent that it 
compensates for their poor self-monitoring ability. For example, while undergraduates 
who have more experience of studying in higher education may also be overconfident 
about how much they know, they may have developed greater declarative task 
knowledge of learning strategies, procedural knowledge of how to use them and 
conditional knowledge of when they are most appropriate in a higher education learning 
environment. This enhanced metacognitive knowledge may positively impact on their 
learning and academic performance to an extent that offsets the adverse consequences 
of poor self-monitoring.  
In terms of the association between the bias score and each mode of assessment for 
level 4 students, the results shown in Appendix 31 indicate weak, but statistically 
significant at the 5% level, negative correlation for examinations (r=-0.156, 
p=0.047<0.05) and coursework (r=-0.212, p=0.011<0.05). This indicates that while 
overconfidence is associated with poor academic performance in each of these to some 
extent, like overall academic performance, this association is not strong. For assessment 
based on oral presentations, correlation is positive but not significant (r=0.092, 
p=0.280>0.05) and as discussed above, the lack of association between overconfidence 
and performance in this form of assessment may be attributable to being rewarded for 
confidence when delivering presentations. 
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Postgraduate Students 
Given the higher level learning outcomes associated with postgraduate study, the 
implications of greater emphasis on knowledge in assessment advanced for level 4 
students above is clearly inappropriate in the case of postgraduate students. 
Investigation of the association between the bias score and performance in each mode of 
assessment for this group also indicates weakly negative correlation in respect of all 
modes of assessment except presentations (see Appendix 34). However, for 
postgraduates, this correlation is not statistically significant at the 5% level for any of 
these.  
Differences according to entry status were also investigated, by separately analysing 
direct entrants and continuing students (See Appendices 35 and 36). The results show 
that for direct entrants, there is a weak, but statistically significant, negative association 
between the bias score and both overall performance (r=-0.226, p=0.022<0.05), 
examinations (r=-0.192, p=0.049<0.05) and coursework marks (r=-0.241, 
p=0.016<0.05). However, for continuing students, there was no significant association 
between overconfidence and any aspect of academic performance. Whilst these 
associations do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship, they suggest that the 
overconfidence of students new to the institution for their postgraduate studies may 
have more influence on their academic performance than those who have progressed 
from undergraduate studies and have been with the university for some time and are 
therefore familiar with the specific demands of the learning environment. To investigate 
this issue further and in a broader context, direct entrants were compared with 
continuing students for all levels of study. While as indicated in Table 25, direct 
entrants were more overconfident, with a higher mean bias score than continuing 
students, a t-test (see Appendix 37) indicated the difference between the two groups was 
not statistically significantly at the 5% level (p=0.092>0.05) 
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Table 25 
Mean Confidence, Knowledge and Bias Score for All Students by Entry Status 
 Mean 
Confidence 
% 
Knowledge 
Score 
% 
Bias  
Score 
% 
Direct entrants 60.8 50.8 10.0 
Continuing students 57.4 49.6 7.8 
        
 
However, while the results did not reveal a statistically significant difference in levels of 
overconfidence between each group, there were differences between each group in 
terms of its association with academic performance. For direct entrants, Appendix 38 
shows weak and negative, but statistically significant at the 1% level, correlation 
between bias score and overall academic performance (r=-0.190, p=0.002<0.01) as well 
as examination (r=-0.171, p=0.004<0.01) and coursework marks (r=-0.199, 
p=0.001<0.01). However, for continuing students there was no statistically significant 
correlation between bias score and any aspect of academic performance (see Appendix 
39). Consequently, these findings indicate that, while differences in bias scores between 
those new to the university and continuing students are not statistically significant, 
overconfidence may have a greater impact on academic performance for new students. 
As suggested earlier, a possible explanation for this is that continuing students, who 
have experience of the demands of higher education generally, and their study 
programme specifically, have developed better declarative task, procedural and 
conditional metacognitive knowledge. Since this would equip them better to meet the 
assessment demands of their study programmes, it may compensate for poor 
metaknowledge.   
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4.4.5.4 Overconfidence and Academic Performance – Individual Differences 
Since the association between overconfidence in knowledge and academic performance 
may be subject to individual differences, this was investigated in respect of age, gender 
and country of origin.  
  
Age 
Appendices 40 and 41 show results for the investigation of the association between the 
bias score and academic performance for each age group. These show that for the 18-21 
years group, correlation is not significant in respect of the overall assessment mark, or 
any individual mode of assessment (p>0.05). However, for older students, there is weak, 
negative correlation between bias score and coursework, which is significant at the 5% 
level (r=-0.153, p= 0.016<0.05). This indicates that for this group, greater 
overconfidence is associated with poorer performance in coursework, indicating that not 
only are they more overconfident about their knowledge than the younger participants, 
but that this is also linked more closely with academic performance in this mode of 
assessment, albeit not strongly.  
 
Gender 
Investigation of the association between bias score and academic performance for males 
and females separately, indicate only small gender differences (See Appendices 42 and 
43). For males, the results reveal weak, but statistically significant, negative correlation 
between bias score and each of the overall mark (r=-0.117, p=0.030<0.05) and 
coursework marks (r=-0.120, p=0.026<0.05). Correlation with performance in 
examinations is also close to significant at the 5% level (r=-.099, p=0.055). For females, 
the findings are similar. Weak correlation between bias score and overall marks is close 
to significant at the 5% level (r=-0.113, p=0.054>0.05) and for coursework, weak 
negative correlation is significant at the 1% level (r=-0.171, p=0.007<0.01).  
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Country of Origin 
Appendices 44 and 45 show results for the investigation of associations between bias 
score and academic performance for UK and Chinese students. For UK participants, 
they indicate no statistically significant association between bias score and overall 
academic performance, or achievement in any of the different modes of assessment 
(p>0.05). However, for Chinese students, there is moderately strong negative 
correlation between bias score and marks for oral presentations, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (r=-0.595, p=0.035<0.05). This finding is interesting given 
that this association has, unlike that between bias score and other modes of assessment, 
tended to be positive when investigated earlier in other dimensions. It indicates that for 
Chinese students, unlike other groups, greater overconfidence is associated with worse 
performance in assessed presentations. This suggests that if for other students, 
overconfidence in knowledge may translate into confident presentations, which are 
rewarded in the assessment process; this is not the case for Chinese students who are 
also confident about their knowledge. While an explanation for this is beyond the scope 
of this study, it may relate to the theory discussed earlier suggesting that the behaviour 
of this group may tend to differ according to the nature of the task. It has been argued 
that nomothetic enquiries based on specific facts, such as that used to collect data for 
this study, may increase the potential for overconfidence in Chinese respondents, due to 
their tendency to consider less contrary evidence (Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery, 2002). 
However, it has also been suggested that there is a greater tendency for modesty and 
self-effacement in more idiographic tasks in Chinese culture (Yates, Lee and 
Shinotsuka, 1996). Consequently, it may be that when comparing those who are 
overconfident in their knowledge, Chinese students are less likely to display the type of 
confident behaviour that other students are rewarded for when delivering assessed 
presentations. 
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4.5 Discussion and Implications for Professional Practice 
Table 26 summarises the findings of the study in respect of the research hypotheses 
established in Chapter 2 and these are discussed below. 
 
   Table 26 - Summary of Results from Hypothesis Testing 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Outcome 
 
 
Significance  
Level 
H1:   Students are overconfident  in their    
        knowledge Accepted 
 
1% 
 
H2:  Overconfidence differs between   
        older and younger students 
 
Accepted 
(Older students are 
more overconfident) 
1% 
H3:  Overconfidence is greater for male   
        students 
Accepted 
 
5% 
H4:  Overconfidence is greater for  Chinese   
        than UK students 
 
Accepted 
1% 
H5:  There is a negative association between   
        overconfidence and academic    
        performance 
Accepted 
(Weak association) 
1% 
 
 
4.5.1 Overconfidence 
The mean bias score across all participants was 8.9%, indicating a general tendency for 
overconfidence in knowledge, which was confirmed as being statistically significant. 
Positive correlation between confidence and overconfidence also indicated that those 
who displayed more confidence also tended to demonstrate greater overconfidence. The 
results also indicated a statistically significant negative correlation between knowledge 
and bias scores, indicating that those who were most overconfident tended to know less 
about the subject matter on which they were tested. 
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4.5.2 Individual Differences 
Table 27 summarises findings from the investigation of individual differences in respect 
of age, gender and country of origin, as well as other sub-groupings investigated. 
 
        Table 27 – Summary of Individual Differences in Bias Score 
 Bias 
Score 
(%) 
 
Sig. 
All Participants 8.9 √√ 
Age Group 18-21 yrs 7.3 √√ 
22+ yrs 11.3 
Gender Male 9.9 √ 
Female 7.6 
Country of 
Origin 
UK 5.1 √√ 
China 16.2 
Level of Study Undergrad Level 4 9.3 √√ 
Undergrad Level 5 5.8 
Undergrad Level 6 6.2 
Postgraduate 14.1 
Entry Status Direct entrants 10.0 X 
Continuing students 7.8 
Significance levels in group differences:    
√√  1%       √ 5%      X  not significant 
 
      
Due to the nature of the population, analysis of the association between age and 
overconfidence was restricted to some extent, since the age distribution was relatively 
narrow. However, the results indicated that those aged 22 years and above displayed 
higher levels of overconfidence than those aged 18-21 years. This finding suggests that 
interventions to assist in moderating overconfidence may be of greater value in learning 
environments and study programmes with a higher proportion of older students.   
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In respect of gender, while both groups displayed overconfidence, males displayed 
statistically significant higher levels than females. This suggests that initiatives to 
enhance metaknowledge may be more important for programmes with a higher 
proportion of male participants. However, in many business programmes both gender 
groups tend to be relatively well represented and therefore, this finding may be most 
usefully employed in highlighting the gender bias to learners in order that males in 
particular, who are more likely to display overconfidence, may consider the potential 
implications of this and how it may be moderated.   
With regard to country of origin, Chinese were more overconfident than UK students. 
There are business study programmes offered by the institution in question which have 
a relatively high proportion of Chinese students and this finding suggests that 
interventions to enhance metaknowledge may be particularly appropriate in these. 
Alternatively, induction programmes which are designed by the institution specifically 
for overseas students could include initiatives to highlight this issue and assist in the 
development of metaknowledge. Further analysis also revealed a statistically significant 
interaction between country of origin and gender, with females displaying greater 
overconfidence in the case of Chinese and males for UK students and this is another 
issue which could be brought to the attention of Chinese students. 
 
4.5.2.1 Level of Study 
Investigation of differences by level of study indicated overconfidence for 
undergraduates at all three levels, but that differences between them were not 
statistically significant. This is not in accordance with findings in Kennedy, Lawton and 
Plumlee‘s (2002) study of sociology and business students, in which overconfidence 
declined with the length of time participants had spent on their courses and it was 
suggested that the educational experience had helped to indicate limitations in their 
knowledge. Instead, it supports the view that metaknowledge tends not to be developed 
during formal education (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992) and suggests the need for 
greater emphasis on its development, to enable students to better appreciate gaps in their 
knowledge. This would enable them to adapt their learning strategies accordingly since, 
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if an overconfident individual believes their knowledge is good, they will not prompted 
to improve it (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996)  
Interestingly, in view of Jehng, Johnson and Anderson‘s (1993) findings, indicating that 
postgraduate students have a lower tendency to see knowledge as certain, in this study 
they displayed statistically significant greater overconfidence than those studying at all 
three levels of undergraduate study. Investigation of the potential moderating effect of 
demographic differences on this finding indicated no statistically significant interactions 
in respect of age or gender. In the case of country of origin, while there was a 
significant interaction, this did not relate to postgraduates, for whom levels of 
overconfidence were similar between UK and Chinese students. Consequently, 
initiatives to assist in the development of metaknowledge may be particularly beneficial 
for those studying at postgraduate level. However, while this may assist in developing 
their self-monitoring ability, the potential for this greater capability to impact positively 
on their academic performance in higher education will be influenced by the association 
between overconfidence in knowledge and academic achievement.     
 
4.5.3 Overconfidence and Academic Performance 
If learners are overconfident in their knowledge, this may adversely affect self regulated 
learning, as it could influence the development of learning strategies in response to self-
monitoring activity (Stone, 2000). Ehrlinger et al (2008) argue that we should be 
concerned about poorly performing students whose overconfidence may prevent them 
from improving through additional study. These arguments raise the question of 
whether there is an association between overconfidence and poor academic 
performance. Findings in respect of this study are summarised in Table 28.  
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Table 28 – Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
 Correlation Between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Overall 
Performance 
Exams Presentations Coursework Dissertations 
r Sig r Sig. r Sig. r Sig. r Sig. 
All Participants -.113 √√ -.096 √ .045 X -.138 √√ -.004 X 
Level of 
Study 
Undergrad.  
Level 4 
-.188 √ -.156 √ .092 X -.212 √ N/A N/A 
Undergrad. 
Level 5 
-.055 X -.051 X -.147 X -.111 X N/A N/A 
Undergrad. 
Level 6 
-.071 X -.043 X -.425 X -.129 X -.008 X 
Postgrad. 
 
-.175 √ -.122 X .009 X -.126 X -.029 X 
Entry Status Direct 
entrants 
-.190 √√ -.171 √√ .022 X -.199 √√ -.077 X 
Continuing 
students 
-.023 X -.021 X -.206 X -.067 X .077 X 
Age Group 18-21 yrs 
 
-.074 X -.061 X .061 X -.070 X -.219 X 
22+ yrs 
 
-.110 X -.078 X .059 X -.153 √ .001 X 
Gender Male 
 
-.117 √ -.099 X .068 X -.120 √ .036 X 
Female 
 
-.113 X -.101 X .042 X -.171 √√ -.058 X 
Country of 
Origin 
UK 
 
.013 X .030 X .126 X .048 X .119 X 
China 
 
-.008 X -.082 X -.595 √ -.010 X .167 X 
Significance levels:    
√√  1%       √ 5%      X  not significant 
 
The study revealed weak, but statistically significant, negative correlation between bias 
score and overall academic achievement for the sample as a whole, which indicates that 
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greater overconfidence was to some extent associated with poorer levels of 
achievement. While causality has not been established, this finding suggests that 
developing better metaknowledge may be influential in enhancing learning and 
academic performance. However, since the association is weak it provides only limited 
supportive evidence that learning can be improved through better appreciation of gaps 
in understanding (Schraw, 1998), and that this is particularly the case in an 
environment, such as higher education, which requires large amounts of information to 
be learned (Clarebout, Elen and Onghena, 2006). This issue was explored further by 
investigating the association between overconfidence and academic performance in 
different methods used to assess student learning, to determine whether the association 
differed across methods. This indicated weak, but statistically significant, negative 
association between overconfidence and achievement in both examinations and 
coursework, which suggests that, while it may be possible to improve performance in 
each of these through the development of metaknowledge, the improvement may not be 
striking.  
The association between overconfidence and academic performance was also 
investigated by level of study, to determine whether it differed accordingly. This 
indicated statistically significant, negative association for two groups, those at the first 
level of study on undergraduate programmes and postgraduates. The closer association 
between overconfidence and academic performance for first level, as compared with 
other undergraduates, may be due to the greater emphasis placed on demonstrating 
knowledge at this level of study. In such circumstances, those who overestimate their 
own knowledge may perform worse when their learning is assessed. However, this does 
not explain the finding for postgraduate students, for whom there is greater emphasis on 
higher level learning outcomes, such as analysis and critical evaluation. Consequently, 
to investigate this group in greater detail, they were analysed according to whether they 
had joined the institution directly for postgraduate study, or had progressed to that level 
from previous undergraduate studies at the university. This revealed statistically 
significant negative correlation between overconfidence and overall academic 
performance for direct entrants but not continuing students. Extending this analysis to 
all students participating in the study revealed similar results, indicating that, while the 
difference in overconfidence between each group was not statistically significant, its 
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association with academic performance was. This suggests that for students new to the 
university, overconfidence in knowledge may be more likely to adversely impact on 
their academic performance than those who have progressed from a previous level of 
study and are more familiar with the institution and its academic demands. 
Consequently, while the study suggests that initiatives to assist in the development of 
metaknowledge may have some, albeit limited, implications for academic performance, 
they may be better targeted at new entrants, perhaps during induction activities designed 
to help prepare them for their studies at the university, or during the early part of their 
study programme. 
Individual differences in the association between overconfidence and academic 
performance were also investigated in respect of age, gender and country of origin. In 
the case of age, differences were not striking, with a statistically significant association 
indicated only for the older (22 years +) group in respect of weak negative correlation 
between overconfidence and coursework marks. Analysis by gender also revealed 
similar findings for each sub-group, with statistically significant negative associations 
between overconfidence and overall performance for males and close to significance at 
the 5% level for females (p=.054), as well as for coursework for each group. These 
findings suggest that overconfidence is more closely associated with academic 
performance when students are assessed by coursework than the other modes of 
assessment investigated; examinations and oral presentations. Table 28 shows that for 
the participants as a whole, as well as for each sub-group (with the exception of Chinese 
students) where negative correlation is statistically significant, it is stronger for 
coursework than any other type of assessment. This suggests that initiatives aimed at 
improving metaknowledge and reducing overconfidence may have greater impact on 
academic performance in study programmes placing a greater emphasis on coursework. 
In respect of country of origin, separate analysis of UK and Chinese students revealed 
no statistically significant evidence of an association between overconfidence and 
overall academic performance for either group. In the case of Chinese students, this is 
particularly interesting, since as a group they displayed relatively high levels of 
overconfidence, which do not appear to be linked to how they perform during their 
study programmes.  
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In conclusion, while the study has produced findings which support the argument that 
accurate self-monitoring is essential for effective learning (Pieschl, 2009) to some 
extent, the evidence is not strong. Although it revealed a statistically significant 
negative association between overconfidence and overall academic performance for the 
sample as a whole, as well as various sub-groups, correlations are typically weak. 
Classifying students according to overall academic performance, the results also show 
that while overconfidence tended to be greater for lower achievement groups, 
differences were not statistically significant. 
Investigation of individual differences also indicated statistically significant association 
between academic performance and overconfidence for some groups but not others. 
Consequently, the extent to which accurate self-monitoring of knowledge influences 
learning may depend on who is doing the learning and in what context. For example, 
while an association is evident for those new to the university, it is not for continuing 
students, nor, despite their relatively high levels of overconfidence, for Chinese 
students. This suggests that for some, overconfidence may not be an obstacle to 
learning, or that the extent to which it is, is not largely influential in their capacity to 
perform well in summative assessment activities. Alternatively, it may be that any 
disadvantages associated with overconfidence which do impact on assessment outcomes 
are moderated, to some extent, by other compensating influences. A potential example 
of this was highlighted when discussing findings related to the association between 
overconfidence and marks achieved for assessed presentations. In this case, 
overconfidence in knowledge may adversely impact on the learning of some students, 
due to their inability to recognise, and therefore respond appropriately to, gaps in their 
knowledge. However, if for example, overconfidence in knowledge is positively 
associated with confidence in other contexts, including self-assured delivery of oral 
presentations, this could compensate for any disadvantages in knowledge acquisition. A 
lack of strong evidence of better academic performance for those who are less 
overconfident may also relate to the extent to which such self-monitoring skills inform 
their learning, since to be effective, the outcomes from self-evaluation should inform 
decisions students‘ make in respect of their learning strategies (Klenowski, 1995). In 
this case it may be that potentially misleading outcomes from poor self-monitoring are 
not particularly influential because students do not rely on them greatly when devising 
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learning strategies anyway.  In terms of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 
2, as illustrated in Figure 27, this would suggest that while poorly developed 
metacognitive self-knowledge reduces monitoring accuracy, its impact on academic 
achievement may be relatively low due to the limited influence knowledge monitoring 
has on planning learning activities.  
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Figure 27: Limited Influence of Knowledge Monitoring on Planning 
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In terms of the implications of these findings for professional educators working in 
higher education, the absence of evidence of a strong association between accurate self-
monitoring of knowledge and academic performance does not necessarily imply that 
there is no value in addressing metaknowledge in business programmes. Flavell (1979) 
argues that as well as learning more effectively, those with better metacognitive 
monitoring skills may be better equipped when taking lifestyle decisions. Additionally, 
Crittenden and Woodside (2007) argue that students and business managers should 
appreciate the importance of metathinking skills and that business schools should do 
better in developing students‘ appreciation of how these skills may improve their 
chances of success in business. Business management entails taking decisions in 
conditions of uncertainty and overconfidence in knowledge is therefore a potential 
impediment. Ramnarayan, Strohschneider and Schaub (1997), for example, in a study of 
advanced students in a school of management, analysed factors that contributed to poor 
performance in a business simulation and found that participants typically displayed 
proficiency in terms of basic knowledge, but lacked metaknowledge. Consequently, 
interventions to address the consequences of poor metaknowledge may usefully inform 
students in these respects and help to equip them for a career in business management, 
as well as highlighting its potential consequences for learning.  
Having discussed the findings from the research in detail, the following chapter will 
draw conclusions in respect of the study and these findings and their contribution to the 
understanding of how effective learners are in monitoring their own knowledge and the 
implications of this.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws conclusions from the research and discusses its contribution towards 
answering central questions of how effectively individuals are able to self-assess their 
capabilities and what the implications of this are. Before doing so, it is important to 
acknowledge that attempts to explain the world are fallible, cannot be justified 
absolutely and are subject to critique and replacement by alternative explanations (Scott, 
2005). Consequently, when reporting on research studies it is important not to be 
overconfident about conclusions, nor to over-generalise (Wallace and Wray, 2006). This 
principle is, of course, particularly apt in a study investigating the theory of 
overconfidence in knowledge since, if this tendency is widespread, those researching it 
could also be affected and may, in view of the nature of the evidence, overstate their 
case, displaying overconfidence in their findings (Plous, 1993). Consequently, as well 
as initiatives to enhance the reliability of the study, limitations, and their potential 
implications for the research findings, are also discussed. Educational research has been 
criticised because it is too inaccessible and does not assist professional practice (Pring, 
2000) and therefore the chapter also addresses the implications of the findings from the 
study for professional practice, by considering their relevance for professional 
practitioners responsible for enhancing student learning. As well as discussing what was 
discovered in the research, the discussion also considers what was not, by clarifying the 
boundaries of the study and suggesting issues which may merit investigation in future 
research.  
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5.2 Aims 
In the context of the broader questions regarding self-assessment ability and its 
implications, the purpose of the research was to investigate self-monitoring, an aspect of 
metacognitive regulation concerned with the ability to assess one‘s own learning. It has 
been argued that improving metacognitive skills can enhance student learning 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006) and consequently, the specific 
aims of the study were to assess the ability of business students in higher education to 
monitor their own knowledge accurately, investigate individual differences in this 
capacity and determine the extent to which it is associated with academic performance. 
It therefore contributes to knowledge in this field by investigating theory related to the 
general tendency for overconfidence in knowledge in a specific context: a large UK 
institution of business higher education.  
 
5.3 Method 
The study is also a response to calls for more research in natural settings by focusing on 
knowledge related to the participants‘ business study programmes and collecting data in 
classroom based tests. A number of initiatives were implemented to address suggestions 
that the reliability of findings in previous studies may have been compromised by 
respondents‘ inability to understand the scale used to communicate confidence 
judgements. These included providing written instructions supported by interactive 
discussions at data collection sessions, as well eliminating from the sample those who 
responded inappropriately to a diagnostic device designed to identify misuse of the 
scale. Additionally, while being informed that the purpose of the research was to assist 
in understanding influences on student learning, participants were not made aware of its 
specific focus, to prevent this information biasing their responses. Another problem, in 
previous studies investigating the association between accurate self-monitoring and 
academic performance, has been the tendency to operationalise the latter on the basis of 
knowledge displayed in the test being simultaneously used to determine monitoring 
accuracy. This approach has been criticised on the grounds that it systematically biases 
findings in the direction of poor self-monitoring for the less knowledgeable. This study 
addresses this problem by using independently derived indicators of competence, based 
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on participants‘ performance on their study programme. It also explores the association 
between metaknowledge and academic achievement in greater depth than previous 
studies, by separately addressing performance in various modes of summative 
assessment. 
 
5.4 How the Findings Contribute to the Central Theme 
In terms of self-monitoring accuracy, the study detected a general tendency for 
overconfidence in knowledge, which supports the view that overconfidence is a 
powerful human tendency (Gilfoyle, 2000) and reflects the most commonly reported 
finding in studies investigating metacognitive self-monitoring, that people tend to 
overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge (Renner and Renner, 2001). The findings 
also revealed individual differences, indicating that, as reported in previous studies, 
overconfidence was greater for males (Acker and Duck, 2008; Pallier, 2003; Barber and 
Odean, 2001; Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar, 1994) and particularly for Chinese 
students (Culpepper, Zhao and Lowery, 2002; Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996). They 
also indicated that overconfidence was greater for older students, a finding contrary to 
those in previous studies reporting that overconfidence reduces with age (Grimes, 2002; 
Fischhoff, 1992) 
In terms of the potential implications of these findings, Tobias and Everson (2002) 
suggest that students‘ ability to distinguish between what they know and what they do 
not, is an important influence on academic success in all settings. This claim was 
investigated by exploring the association between overconfidence bias and participants‘ 
academic performance on their study programmes. This indicated only a weak, negative 
association in respect of overall academic performance, a finding reinforced by a lack of 
evidence that self-monitoring accuracy differed significantly between student groups of 
differing academic performance. Investigation of differences according to type of 
assessment task produced similar findings, with weak association detected between 
overconfidence and each of the two main types of summative assessment used in the 
institution, examinations and coursework. Similarly, investigation of individual 
differences in the association between overconfidence and academic performance 
indicated that while stronger for some groups (e.g. those in their first year at the 
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university), associations were typically weak. Thus, when considering students‘ 
academic performance and using separate instruments to determine overconfidence and 
academic competence, these findings do not confirm those reported by Koku and 
Qureshi (2004) in a previous study of business students‘ examination performance, 
which detected significantly greater overconfidence for poorer performers.  
 
5.5 Implications for Professional Practice 
As discussed in Chapter 1, educational practice tends to be poorly supported by 
academic research (Hemsley-Brown and Sharp, 2004) and a key factor influencing the 
adoption of new initiatives is the potential benefits for students (Sparks, 1988). 
Consequently, this suggests that in terms of student learning, research findings which 
indicate that an intervention may be associated with higher levels of academic 
achievement are more likely to impact on professional practice. In respect of 
metaknowledge, Kennedy, Lawton and Plumlee (2002) argue that professional 
educators have a responsibility to assist learners in knowing how much they do not 
know. The positive association between self-monitoring accuracy and academic 
achievement detected in this study suggests that initiatives to enhance metaknowledge 
may also improve academic performance. Since business schools aim to equip learners 
for a career in business it is also important that students appreciate the importance of 
metathinking skills in improving their chances of success in business (Crittenden and 
Woodside, 2007). For example, Larres, Ballantine and Whittington (2003) argue that, 
through stimulating reflection, self-assessment contributes to life-long learning and 
while they specifically highlight its importance for accountants, who must continually 
assess their competence during their career, this argument can be extended to include 
others pursuing a career in business. Therefore, as well as its impact on academic 
performance, well developed metaknowledge is also important for business education, 
since it has other potential benefits for business professionals. However, metathinking 
skills are typically poorly addressed in business schools and while its inclusion in the 
business curriculum may be advisable, thinking about thinking is a difficult topic to 
study and students, from undergraduate level up to executives, find studying it 
challenging (Crittenden and Woodside, 2007). Consequently, Pintrich (2002) argues 
that, rather than addressing it separately, it should be incorporated in content based 
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learning activities. However, this is likely to require staff development initiatives since 
many professional educators have insufficient knowledge of metacognition and, 
therefore, need the tools to assist them in integrating it into learning activities 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach, 2006). However, in the case of 
metaknowledge however, since their appreciation of the concept may be limited, then 
prior to providing them with tools to assist in its development in students‘, it will firstly 
be necessary to take steps designed to develop their own understanding of the concept.  
 
5.5.1 Engaging Professional Practitioners 
Raising higher education professionals‘ awareness of metaknowledge and the potential 
implications of its poor development can be accomplished through the dissemination of 
the findings of this study, accompanied by a review of literature addressing other 
empirical evidence on metaknowledge. This will occur at the academic institution in 
which the research was conducted, and at which the researcher is employed, through 
staff seminars and newsletters and to a wider audience through presentation of the 
research at academic conferences and publication in academic journals which target 
professionals working in higher education. The researcher‘s role as a professional 
practitioner in higher education should assist in the dissemination of the research in a 
manner which such practitioners are able to interpret, as recommended by Aram and 
Salipante (2003).  
This will facilitate interventions designed to raise students‘ awareness of the importance 
of being able to accurately self-assess the extent of one‘s own knowledge. However, 
while awareness alone may help learners to manage overconfidence bias (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1992), this alone may be insufficient to do so. Consequently, encouraging 
education professionals to personalise the issue for students, by providing them with 
individual feedback in respect of the extent of their own bias, may be beneficial 
(Fischhoff, 1982) and since it was conducted in a natural setting, the approach adopted 
in this study is one which can be adapted to do so relatively easily. This therefore 
addresses Gersten et al‘s (1997) concern that initiatives implemented in studies 
conducted in unnatural settings, tend not be adopted in practice unless they can be 
adapted to reflect naturally occurring environments.   
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Consequently, having firstly raised the awareness of professional educators working in 
higher education of the concept of metaknowledge and the potential consequences of its 
poor development, dissemination of this research will also provide specific guidance on 
how the tool used in the study can be employed to assess metaknowledge. This will 
include the manner in which individual questions may be designed as well as 
instructions which may be provided to students when administering it. Clarification will 
also be provided on how the bias score may be determined and interpreted. The value of 
such guidance was highlighted by Gersten et al (1997) when discussing problems 
encountered in the implementation of self-assessment research into comprehension of 
written text, which indicated the value of asking students to make predictions and 
subsequently assess their accuracy. They explain that the impact of this intervention in 
practice was compromised by poor implementation, with many teachers asking students 
to provide predictions, but not following this up by subsequently investigating their 
accuracy. They suggest that this arose due to teachers not fully understanding the 
importance of different components of this intervention.  
Gersten et al (1997) argue that ‗top down‘ approaches to the implementation of new 
initiatives often fail and highlight the value of dissemination of good practice by 
educational practitioners communicating details of successful strategies to peers 
working in the same setting. The members of staff that supported this study are a good 
target group in this case as Huberman (1990) advocates greater involvement of 
practitioners in conducting research as a means of enhancing its impact on professional 
practice. In this research numerous academic staff were involved in the research by 
initially granting permission to collect data from students studying modules for which 
they are responsible and subsequently assisting in the compilation of the research 
instrument used to do so. Involving practitioners in the design of the research in this 
way can assist in enhancing its practical impact on professional practice (Hemsley-
Brown and Sharp, 2004) and therefore implementation of self-assessment procedures by 
this group initially may be an effective means of later achieving wider dissemination 
through their communication of the approach to peers. Indeed shortly after completion 
of the data collection procedure for the study, one member of this group requested 
support in integrating the activity into the learning programme for the module in 
question on a more permanent basis for the benefit of future students. Since instruments 
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have already been designed for the other modules included in this research, the cost of 
integrating this approach into those modules will also be relatively small and the author 
intends to pursue this with the staff in question. 
 
5.5.2 Engaging Students 
Sternberg (1998) expresses concern that students, who may in the past have been 
rewarded for more passive learning, may resist the more thoughtful approach that 
metacognition entails. However, personalising the issue by providing students with 
individual diagnostic feedback may assist in overcoming this. Multiple-choice tests, 
based on knowledge related to students‘ study programmes, could be used to provide 
formative feedback on the extent of both their knowledge and metaknowledge. The 
frequent use of these during a study programme would permit repeated feedback which, 
as discussed earlier, may increase self-assessment accuracy. However, the capacity to 
administer a series of these tests would be constrained by the time available to design 
suitable questions and it may be more feasible to introduce them on a more modest scale 
and develop more gradually over a period of time.  
Learners can be more easily engaged in such initiatives by using an approach which is 
not cognitively over-demanding and adopts a relatively simple scoring system (Farrell 
and Leung, 2004) and in this case, the bias score used to indicate metaknowledge is not 
a particularly complex indicator. In terms of the demands of this approach on learners, 
Swartz (2006) investigated student preferences and found no significant difference 
between confidence-response multiple-choice questions and the traditional multiple-
choice approach, in terms of how difficult they found them to use. He therefore argues 
that, whether or not practitioners adopt them depends on the trade off between their 
pedagogic advantages, through better quality, richer feedback and the cost associated 
with modifying procedures. However, their implementation need not be excessively 
resource intensive when compared with the use of traditional multiple-choice tests, with 
the main cost being the time required to generate the bias score from data collected. 
However this could be facilitated by either training students to do this themselves, or 
using a computer programme to automate this task. Farrell and Leung (2004) adopted 
the automated approach, devising a system operated via the internet which could be 
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used flexibly by students, at a time of their choosing, and provided instant and private 
feedback. Consequently, using this approach would give practitioners the opportunity to 
integrate initiatives designed to test for metaknowledge into directed learning activities, 
rather than conducting them as classroom-based tests. 
Personalised diagnostic information provided to business students can be accompanied 
by information designed to simultaneously develop their appreciation of relevant theory 
and awareness of the findings from this and other research studies. This can be used to 
develop their understanding of the potential implications of poor metaknowledge, not 
only for their future learning, but also for personal and professional decision making. 
Consequently, the integration of such a learning initiative into business study 
programmes addresses concerns expressed regarding the inaccessibility of educational 
research (Hemsley-Brown and Sharp, 2004; Pring, 2000), by engaging both professional 
practitioners and the learners with whom they engage.  
Another initiative which may be effective in promoting the potential value of good 
metaknowledge to students would be to recognise it through reward. Pintrich (2002) 
suggests setting learning goals related to metacognitive knowledge and assessing the 
extent to which these are achieved. In respect of metaknowledge, this could entail 
rewarding self-monitoring accuracy, as well as more traditionally assessed learning 
outcomes such as knowledge, application and critical analysis. For example, marks 
available for a multiple choice examination could be weighted such that students were 
rewarded for metaknowledge, as indicated by the bias score, as well as knowledge. 
 
5.5.3 Implications for the Author’s Own Professional Practice 
The author is an academic member of staff at the institution in which the research was 
conducted, with responsibility for designing, managing and delivering learning 
activities at undergraduate and post-graduate level to full-time and part-time business 
students. The theory addressed here, as well as empirical findings derived in this study 
and previous research, will be incorporated in learning programmes as a means of 
developing students‘ understanding of the importance of metaknowledge and its 
potential implications for learning. This will be achieved by making them aware of the 
general tendency for overconfidence in knowledge, along with the findings here 
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indicating its association with academic performance. To further engage learners in 
addressing this issue, personal diagnostic feedback will also be employed, through the 
use of the type of multiple choice instruments used in this study to assess both 
knowledge of issues addressed in their study programme and metaknowledge, as 
discussed above. 
The author also intends to implement initiatives designed to improve knowledge 
monitoring accuracy. While making individuals aware of their own limitations in this 
respect can facilitate this, in some cases this may be insufficient (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1992) and consequently, other additional interventions will also be 
implemented. These include explicitly prompting students to consider why their 
judgements may be incorrect (Koku and Qureshi, 2004; Arkes et al, 1987; Koriat, 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980) and encouraging them to take account of evidence 
which may challenge their initial beliefs (Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa, 1998; Zakay 
and Glicksohn, 1992). These will be conducted either as part of directed learning 
activities using the e-learning platform employed by the university to facilitate student 
learning or as a classroom-based activity. In the case of the latter, an experimental 
approach will be adopted in which one sub-group adopts one of these potential remedial 
strategies while a second control group does not and differences between the two groups 
in terms of self-assessment accuracy are discussed in the context of literature suggesting 
the potential value of such remedial initiatives.  
At the institution at which he is employed, the author is based in a corporate and 
management development centre, which designs and delivers interventions to meet the 
needs of specific business clients. Consequently much of his work is spent designing 
and delivering learning programmes to facilitate the personal development of aspiring 
and practicing managers working in a variety of business organisations. This provides 
the opportunity to address metaknowledge with such individuals and encourage them to 
reflect on its potential implications for their own practice. The author‘s own specific 
contribution to such learning programmes is often in the context of  judgement and 
decision making and therefore, as well as exploring the potential consequences of poor 
self-monitoring for learning generally, as discussed above, its implications for 
judgements informing business decisions will also be addressed. The aim of this will be 
to encourage learners to consider not only implications for their own behaviour, but also 
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for that of others they may deal with in a professional role as a business manager. For 
example, as well as appreciating that their decisions may be misinformed, due to over-
estimating their own knowledge, it is important that managers are also aware that the 
same problem may afflict colleagues, on whose judgements they also rely. As discussed 
earlier, while such individuals should appreciate the importance of metathinking, few 
business academic programmes incorporate it and business schools have typically not 
done a good job in integrating it into classroom activities in a manner which will 
enhance students‘ appreciation of how metathinking may enhance success in business 
(Crittenden and Woodside, 2007). The author intends to address this in the context of 
his own work by building on initiatives he has recently introduced into learning 
programmes which address behavioural influences on judgement and decision making, 
by addressing the potential implications of poor metaknowledge for judgement and 
business decisions.  
As well as being able to integrate the specific subject matter addressed in this study into 
learning activities as discussed above, the author also intends to use his own experience 
in conducting it to provide more effective guidance in respect of research he himself 
supervises in his professional role. Participating in both the taught element and thesis 
stage of the DBA programme has resulted in developing a better personal appreciation 
of the research process and enhanced the author‘s understanding of different approaches 
to research and the merits and potential problems associated with these. Specifically it 
has also highlighted, or in some cases reinforced, issues such as the importance of being 
appropriately focused in terms of the aims of research and of seeking feedback from 
others, as well as the need to ensure that research is theoretically underpinned by a 
sufficiently critical review of relevant literature. The need to be clear and critically 
reflective about how methodology and research design impact on research findings is 
another issue which has been reinforced by the experience of conducting this study. The 
greater appreciation of the research process which has resulted will enable the author to 
provide more informed guidance in his role as supervisor to students undertaking their 
own research, in the form of undergraduate and postgraduate dissertations and research 
projects as well as doctoral supervision, in which the author will participate in the 
future.  
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5.6 Limitations of the Study 
This study was informed by realist ontology, empiricist epistemology and quantitative 
methodology. However, while adopting the view that an objective reality exists that 
may be empirically investigated, it was acknowledged earlier that it may not have been 
possible to discover it with certainty, due to limitations associated with the manner in 
which the research was conducted. These include the difficulty of operationalising a 
social concept such as overconfidence as well as potential biases on the part of 
participants as well as the researcher. Research findings may be affected by the role 
researchers play in generating them and the process in which they reflect on their own 
actions and values during the research process and their potential impact on the study is 
known as reflexivity (Robson, 2002). It has been argued that in some cases this has not 
necessarily been evident and that researchers have been guilty of being uncritical in 
terms of their position in research (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). Reflexivity may be 
perceived as being more important in qualitative than quantitative research, since the 
former values the reflexive ‗self awareness of the researcher‘ (Sarantakos, 2005 p.45). 
However, while the use of fixed designs in studies such as this usually suggests that 
researchers act in a detached capacity, their position may nevertheless be influential. 
Biases may exist not only in methods adopted by researchers, but also as a consequence 
of their presence in the situation under investigation (Bryman, 2008). For instance, the 
researcher in this study is a member of academic staff in the institution in which the 
research took place and therefore, his presence at data collection events may have 
impacted on the research. Consequently, in order that readers may take them into 
account when interpreting the findings discussed above, it is important that these, and 
other limitations, are addressed.  
To collect the data necessary to operationalise overconfidence, using the bias score, 
respondents were required to indicate their confidence in answers to knowledge-based 
questions. They were given both written and verbal guidance on how to do so and 
initiatives were implemented to detect inappropriate use of the confidence scale, with 
respondents excluded from the study accordingly. However, it is possible that, while all 
included in the study complied with these requirements, some had a clearer 
understanding of the requirements than others and may have consequently responded 
differently to equivalent states of uncertainty. An issue worthy of note in this respect is 
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that English was not the first language of a large proportion of respondents. While the 
institution‘s admissions requirements include minimum proficiency levels, to help 
ensure that students are appropriately equipped for their study programme, language 
skills in these circumstances will inevitably differ. This was not necessarily 
problematical in terms of understanding the wording of each individual question, since 
there was an in-built corrective mechanism to deal with this, in that respondents could 
have adjusted confidence levels accordingly. For example, faced with a question which 
they felt they did not clearly understand, they could have provided a correspondingly 
low confidence level in their chosen answer. However it may have been a more 
significant issue in terms of understanding the task requirements. To some extent this 
may have been addressed by the initiatives included in the research design to exclude 
respondents on the grounds of their inappropriate use of the confidence scale, since 
these resulted in the exclusion of a greater proportion of non-UK (15%) than UK 
students (5%). However, it is possible that some respondents with limited understanding 
of the instructions provided for expressing confidence levels may have evaded detection 
in this manner. 
To enhance the ecological validity of the study, respondents were tested on knowledge 
related to their study programme. Since they were drawn from across different levels of 
study, eight variations of the research instrument were used, each focusing on 
knowledge relevant to that particular group of students. Each was distilled to produce 
eight sub-sets of questions of approximately equal difficulty, to control for a potential 
task difficulty confounding effect. However, there may have been other potentially 
confounding issues arising from the use of different variations of the instrument, which 
were not addressed. For example, one may have contained more difficult questions 
earlier in the test than others and if so, this may have been significant. While it would 
have been possible to control for this using a single test for all participants, it would 
have not been possible to do so using study programme-based knowledge and 
consequently this would have compromised the ecological validity of the study. Thus, 
any limitations associated with the use of different variations of the research instrument 
may be regarded as a price paid for the ecological validity which many other studies in 
the field have lacked.       
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Another potential limitation arises from the extent to which students were motivated to 
engage sufficiently with the task used for data collection. Some studies, such as Koku 
and Qureshi‘s (2004) investigation of business students‘ performance in a multiple 
choice examination, have focused on a summative assessment procedure to study 
confidence in knowledge, whereas in this case, a formative assessment activity was 
used. Respondents in these circumstances may be less motivated to focus fully on the 
task in hand and may therefore provide ill-considered responses. The impact of this may 
have been curtailed to some extent in that those behaving in this way, may have also 
been more likely to indicate that they did not consent to their data being used in the 
study and therefore not influenced the findings. However, this may not be the case for 
all such respondents. While basing the study on a summative assessment activity may 
have helped to limit this effect, it would have limited it to the investigation of first year 
undergraduate students since, in the research setting; only these are assessed using 
multiple-choice based examinations. Another factor which may have assisted in 
reducing the potential for poorly considered responses by participants is the fact that 
prior to completing the test, they were informed that they would be provided with 
information to assist in the interpretation of their results, to allow them to reflect on the 
potential implications for their future learning. This initiative was designed to 
encourage them to engage with the task, since providing information in this way can 
motivate participants to provide considered responses (Davis, 2005).  
It has also been suggested that in some circumstances, overconfidence may arise due to 
the social utility associated with expressions of high confidence levels. In this study, the 
fact that their responses were provided in an environment which explicitly rewards 
knowledge may have motivated students to exaggerate their confidence ratings, in order 
to suggest an air of competence. Submission of their responses to an academic member 
of staff may have contributed to this, since such staff are responsible for making 
judgements about their academic performance. While they were assured anonymity and 
that data would be aggregated for analysis, the request to supply their student 
registration number may have caused some to mistrust the process and thus contributed 
to this motivational effect. The more reticent on these grounds may have been excluded 
from the study due to them not giving consent for their data to be used in the study. 
However, it is acknowledged that the presence and identity of the researcher may have 
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influenced participants to some extent and therefore impacted on the data collected and 
resulting findings. Consequently, if the study was repeated, a more appropriate 
approach may be to train a research assistant, who is not a member of academic staff at 
the institution in question, and ask them to brief participants and conduct the data 
collection procedure. 
   
5.7 Boundaries of the Study and Directions for Future Research 
It is important to re-emphasise here that this study did not seek, and makes no claims of 
evidence for, causal links between overconfidence in knowledge and academic 
performance. Positive associations between knowledge monitoring accuracy and 
academic performance do not necessarily indicate that accurate monitoring will result in 
improved academic achievement. As explained earlier, experimental approaches are 
more appropriate when aiming to establish causality, but these can be impractical in 
social research, since manipulating variables, or assigning participants to control 
groups, may be either unfeasible or unethical (Gill and Johnson, 1991). This study 
investigated metaknowledge in a natural setting, using a non-experimental approach, 
which did not entail manipulating variables or using control groups. Its aim was to 
determine whether associations between overconfidence in knowledge and academic 
performance exist, which may be indicative of a possible causal relationship. The 
associations reported therefore represent contingent, rather than causal, correlations and 
while these may not in themselves establish causality, they can play an important role in 
the identification of causes of events in social science (Kemp and Holmwood, 2003). In 
this case, associations between overconfidence and academic performance investigated 
in the study were weak and evident for some sub-groups but not others. Consequently, 
while by its nature it was unable to detect a causal effect, the study‘s contribution is the 
generation of findings which support the view that while students‘ ability to distinguish 
between what they know and what they do not may be an influence on academic 
success in for some, this is not necessarily the case in all settings. 
Another important issue to consider is the extent to which the findings from this study 
can be generalised. Due to manner in which the research was designed, random 
sampling was not feasible, which compromises its generalisability to some extent. 
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However, because the sample was representative in respect of the main individual 
differences investigated, the findings can be reasonably generalised to the population in 
question (i.e. students studying business at the university in question). While they may 
also usefully inform those responsible for managing learning in other higher education 
learning environments, they are not necessarily generalisable to those settings. For 
example, the study focused on business students and since other subject areas may 
attract different personality types, who may display differences in behaviour (Koku and 
Qureshi, 2004), these findings may not be applicable to those studying in other 
disciplines. Consequently, they may be more generalisable to other business students, 
studying at different institutions of higher education. However, while learning 
environments in other institutions may be similar in some respects to that in which this 
study was conducted, they will inevitably differ to some extent, thus limiting the 
generalisability of these findings accordingly. Consequently, as Kennedy, Lawton and 
Plumlee (2002) suggest, understanding of this issue can be enhanced by further research 
in a variety of institutions and disciplines.  
Future studies focusing on business students could address differences by subject area 
specialism by investigating, for instance, whether findings for those specialising in 
human resource management differed from those on specialist marketing programmes. 
This study did not address such differences and it may be, for example, that some 
groups are more prone to overconfidence in knowledge than others, or that 
overconfidence is more closely associated with academic performance in some 
specialist areas of business studies than others. Another question, which could be 
addressed to develop better understanding of self-monitoring accuracy in business 
education, is whether the knowledge domain used to determine it is influential. In this 
study, it was determined in the context of knowledge related to financial and 
quantitative aspects of study programmes and future research could investigate the 
extent to which findings may differ if instead, it was assessed based on their marketing 
knowledge, for example.           
Another issue worthy of investigation is the extent to which knowledge monitoring 
impacts on learning strategies adopted by students and how this relates to academic 
performance. Hacker et al (2000) suggest that accurate monitoring enables students to 
use their time more effectively, by focusing on issues in which their knowledge is 
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lacking and helping them to judge when to finish studying a particular topic. Thus, it 
can potentially contribute to effective learning and improve academic performance, 
through better informing the planning aspect of metacognitive regulatory activity.  
However, while poor appreciation of their own knowledge may constrain students‘ 
learning (Pintrich, 2002), metaknowledge may be insufficient in itself to enhance it, 
since this will also depend on the extent to which it is actually used to inform planning. 
Investigating the extent to which students‘ planning decisions are influenced by how 
well they believe they already know that topic, may therefore help to explain the 
relatively weak association between self-monitoring accuracy and academic 
performance detected in this study. This could be achieved by questioning learners 
about the relative importance of metaknowledge and various other factors which may be 
influential in planning learning and this is an issue which the author proposes to 
investigate in future research, in order to further contribute towards better understanding 
of the implications of individuals‘ capacity for self-assessment.  
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Appendix 1 
Improving Metacognitive Knowledge 
A Strategy Evaluation Matrix 
 
Declarative 
Knowledge 
Procedural 
Knowledge 
Conditional 
Knowledge 
 
Strategy 
 
How to Use 
 
 
When to Use 
 
Why Use 
Skim Search for headings, 
highlighted words, 
previews, summaries 
Prior to reading an 
extended text.  
Provides conceptual 
overview,  helps to 
focus one‘s attention. 
 
 
Slow down Stop, read, and 
think. 
When information 
seems especially 
important. 
Enhances focus of 
one‘s attention. 
 
Activate prior 
knowledge 
Pause and think 
about what you 
already know. Ask 
what you don‘t 
know.  
 
Prior to reading or 
an unfamiliar task. 
Makes new 
information easier to 
learn and remember. 
 
 
 
Mental 
integration 
Relate main ideas. 
Use these to 
construct a theme or 
conclusion. 
 
When learning 
complex 
information or a 
deeper 
understanding is 
needed. 
Reduces memory 
load. Promotes 
deeper level of 
understanding. 
 
Diagrams Identify main ideas, 
connect them, list 
supporting details 
under main ideas, 
connect supporting 
details. 
When there is a lot 
of interrelated 
factual info. 
Helps identify main 
ideas and organize 
them into categories. 
Reduces memory 
load. 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Schraw (1998 p.120) 
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Appendix 2 
Improving Regulation of Cognition 
A Regulatory Checklist 
 
Planning 
1. What is the nature of the task? 
2. What is my goal? 
3. What kind of information and strategies do I need? 
4. How much time and resources will I need? 
 
Monitoring 
1. Do I have a clear understanding of what I am doing? 
2. Does the task make sense? 
3. Am I reaching my goals? 
4. Do I need to make changes? 
 
Evaluating 
1. Have I reached my goal? 
2. What worked? 
3. What didn‘t work? 
4. Would I do things differently next time? 
 
Source: Schraw (1998 p.121) 
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Appendix 3 
Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning Objectives 
Cognitive Domain 
 
Knowledge 
 
1.0 Knowledge 
 
1.10 Knowledge of specifics 
1.11 Knowledge of terminology 
1.12 Knowledge of specific facts 
 
1.20 Knowledge of ways and means of dealing with specifics 
1.21 Knowledge of conventions 
1.22 Knowledge of trends and sequences 
1.23 Knowledge of classifications and categories 
1.24 Knowledge of criteria 
1.25 Knowledge of methodology 
 
1.30 Knowledge of universals and abstractions in a field 
1.31 Knowledge of principles and generalizations 
1.32 Knowledge of theories and structures 
 
 
Intellectual Abilities and Skills 
 
2.0 Comprehension 
 
2.1 Translation 
2.2 Interpretation 
2.3 Extrapolation 
 
3.0 Application 
 
4.0 Analysis 
 
4.1 Analysis of elements 
4.2 Analysis of relationships 
4.3 Analysis of organizational principles 
 
5.0 Synthesis 
 
5.1 Production of a unique communication 
5.2 Production of a plan, or proposed set of operations 
5.3 Derivation of a set of abstract relations 
 
6.0 Evaluation 
 
6.1 Evaluation in terms of internal evidence 
6.2 Judgements in terms of external criteria 
 
Source: Bloom (1956) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Revised Taxonomy of Learning Objectives 
 
 
 
The Knowledge 
Dimension 
The Cognitive Process Dimension 
1 
Remember 
2 
Understand 
3 
Apply 
4 
Analyse 
5 
Evaluate 
6 
Create 
A. Factual  
knowledge 
      
B. Conceptual 
knowledge 
      
C. Procedural 
knowledge 
      
D. Meta-cognitive 
knowledge 
      
 
Source: Anderson et al (2001 p.28) 
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Appendix 5 
Revised Taxonomy of Learning Objectives 
The Six Categories of the Cognitive Process Dimension 
 
1    Remember 
1.1 Recognizing 
1.2 Recalling 
 
2 Understand 
2.1 Interpreting 
2.2 Exemplifying 
2.3 Classifying 
2.4 Summarizing 
2.5 Inferring 
2.6 Comparing 
2.7 Explaining 
 
3 Apply 
3.1 Executing 
3.2 Implementing 
 
4 Analyze 
4.1 Differentiating 
4.2 Organizing 
4.3 Attributing 
 
5     Evaluate 
5.1 Checking 
5.2 Critiquing 
 
6     Create 
6.1 Generating 
6.2 Planning 
6.3 Producing 
 
Source: Anderson et al (2001 p.31) 
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Appendix 6 
Revised Taxonomy of Learning Objectives 
The Knowledge Dimension 
 
A. Factual Knowledge  
(The basic elements that students must know to be acquainted with a discipline 
or solve problems in it.) 
 
AA. Knowledge of terminology 
AB. Knowledge of specific details and elements 
 
B. Conceptual Knowledge  
(The interrelationships among the basic elements within a larger structure 
that enable them to function together.) 
 
BA. Knowledge of classifications and categories 
BB. Knowledge of principles and generalizations 
BC. Knowledge of theories, models, and structures 
 
C. Procedural Knowledge 
(How to do something; methods of inquiry, and criteria for using skills, 
algorithms, techniques, and methods.) 
 
CA. Knowledge of subject-specific skills and algorithms 
CB. Knowledge of subject-specific techniques and methods 
CC. Knowledge of criteria for determining when to use appropriate                       
             procedures 
 
D. Metacognitive Knowledge 
(Knowledge of cognition in general as well as awareness and knowledge of 
one’s own cognition.) 
 
DA. Strategic knowledge 
DB. Knowledge about cognitive tasks, including appropriate contextual    
       and conditional knowledge 
DC. Self-knowledge 
 
Source: Anderson et al (2001 p.29)
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Appendix 7 
 
Test for Overconfidence Using  
Continuous Variables (Range Questions) 
 
 
For each of the following questions, make a low and a high estimate for which you 
believe there is a 90% chance that the correct answer lies between your two estimated 
figures.  
 
Your challenge is to try to ensure that the difference between your two estimates for 
each question is neither too high nor too low. 
 
 
 90% Confidence Range 
Low 
Number 
High 
Number 
1 What is the length of the River Amazon in 
kilometres? 
  
2 How many weeks did Beatles recordings spend at 
number one in the 1960s? 
  
3 How many bones are there in the human body? 
 
  
4 How old was Albert Einstein when he died? 
 
  
5 What is the total population of Australia? 
 
  
6 What is the height of Mount Everest in metres? 
 
  
7 What is the east to west width of the Pacific 
Ocean in kilometres? 
  
8 What is the average life span of a giraffe in 
months? 
  
9 What is the distance between Edinburgh and 
London in kilometres? 
  
10 How many weeks did Bill Clinton spend as 
president of the USA? 
  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Russo and Schoemaker (1989)
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Appendix 8 
 
The Research Instrument 
 
 
TESTING YOUR UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 You are required to answer multiple-choice questions in which you indicate your 
response by ticking one of the four alternatives provided. 
 
 
 
Confidence Levels 
 
 After each question you are also required to record your confidence level, 
indicating the % chance that you believe you have answered correctly.  
 
 
 Your confidence level for each question should fall between 25% and 100%.  
 
 
If you are certain that your answer is correct, 
 
You should record a 100% response.  
 
 
If your answer is a complete guess 
 
As there are four possible answers to choose from, you have a 1 in 4 chance 
of being correct and you should therefore record 25%.  
 
 
In other cases 
 
You should provide a response somewhere between 25% and 100% to 
indicate your confidence in the choice you have made.  
(If for example you believe that you are certain that two of the possible 
answers are definitely incorrect but you believe that the other two have an 
equal chance of being correct, you should choose one and indicate a 50% 
confidence rating) 
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Example 
 
 Which of the following countries is biggest in terms of area? 
 
a)  Peru   □ 
b) Mexico  □ 
c) Denmark  □ 
d) Italy   √ 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)   …60……..% 
 
This would indicate that you believe there is a 60% chance that your judgement 
that Italy is the biggest country is correct (ie. if you were answering 10 
questions with this level of confidence you would expect to be correct 6 times) 
 
 
 
 You should work through the questions as quickly and accurately as you can. 
 
 
 Data collected in this exercise will be used to assist you in appreciating issues 
addressed to date in the module and you will be provided with individual 
feedback on your responses. It will also be used for research purposes to assist in 
understanding influences on student learning. In this respect results generated, 
which will be analysed in conjunction with student academic performance on the 
programme, will be anonymous and aggregated for research purposes. 
Your name will not be used in any part of the research and your responses 
in this activity will not affect your mark for the module.  
 
Please tick here to indicate whether you agree to this data being used in this way 
for research purposes.    
 
I agree   □ 
 
I disagree  □ 
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Submission of Questionnaire 
 
Should you be willing for this data to be incorporated into the research findings, please 
complete the following details by ticking the relevant box. 
 
 
General Details             
          Office use 
 
 
1) Age     18-21 22-25  26-29   30-33   34+ 1…… 
       □     □  □   □  □ 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Gender         2…… 
Male    □    
Female   □            
 
 
 
3) Country of origin……………………………………………  3…… 
 
 
 
 
4) Student number…………………………..    4…… 
 
 
 
5) On which course are you currently studying? 
 
……………………………..     5…… 
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QUESTIONS 
 
 
1) The Bretton Woods System was: 
 a) A floating exchange rate system   □ 
 
 b) A fixed exchange rate system    □ 
 
 c) A managed floating exchange rate system  □ 
 
 d) A sinking exchange rate system   □ 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) According to the Anglo American model the objective of a company is to: 
 
 a) Maximise corporate wealth    □ 
 
 b) Maximise sales income    □ 
 
 c) Maximise profit     □ 
 
 d) Maximise shareholder wealth    □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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3) Fixed exchange rates promote international trade by: 
 
 a) Increasing exchange rate risk    □ 
 
 b) Increasing the possibility of currency speculation □ 
 
 c) Increasing the productivity of companies  □ 
 
 d) Removing exchange rate risk    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4) The Asian currency crisis occurred in: 
 
 a) 1997       □ 
 
 b) 1967       □ 
 
 c) 1977       □ 
 
 d) 1987       □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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5) NAFTA stands for 
 
 a) North Atlantic Full Trading Area    □ 
 
 b) New Approach to Funding Trading Associations   □ 
 
 c) North American Free Trade Agreement   □ 
 
 d) New Association for Funding Trade Alliances  □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) Exchange rate risk for a Multi-National Company arises because: 
 
a) Overseas cash flows may depreciate against the home currency □ 
 
 b) Costs in the home country may rise     □ 
 
 c) Income earned in the home country may fall    □ 
 
d) Overseas cash flows may appreciate against the home currency □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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7) The Bretton Woods System collapsed in: 
 a) 1951    □ 
 
 b) 1961    □ 
 
 c) 1971    □ 
 
 d) 1981    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8) The Maastricht convergence criteria in respect of the European single currency 
included which of the following 
: 
 a) Inflation rates   □ 
 
 b) Growth rates   □ 
 
 c) Unemployment rates  □ 
 
 d) Wage rates   □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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9) Which of the following represents the greatest economic and political 
integration for trading blocs? 
 
 a) Common market    □ 
 
 b) Economic union    □ 
 
 c) Free-trade area    □ 
 
 d) Customs union    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10)  
A rational bubble 
 a) Exchange rates adjust to their correct level   □ 
 
 b) Exchange rates stay at an incorrect level   □ 
 
 c) Speculators hold an undervalued currency   □ 
 
 d) Speculators will be unaware that a problem is developing □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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11) After the financial liberalizations in the 1980‘s: 
 a) Currency crises have not occurred     □ 
 
 b) Currency crises have been accompanied by banking crises  □ 
 
 c) Banking crises have not occurred     □ 
 
 d) Currency crises have not been accompanied by banking crises □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12) Ethnocentrism is the belief that: 
 
 a) Businesses should seek ways to minimise risk    □ 
 
 b) Strategies for change should be initiated by government   □ 
 
 c) Financial systems should be closely regulated   □ 
 
 d) One‘s own culture is superior to others    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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13) A chaebol is: 
 
 a) A financial instrument     □ 
 
 b) A state owned conglomerate     □ 
 
 c) A type of business takeover     □ 
 
 d) A family owned conglomerate    □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
14) The term ‗contagion‘ is used to describe: 
 
 a) The financial objectives of companies   □ 
 
 b) Ethical concerns over business managers   □ 
 
 c) A type of financial panic     □ 
  
 d) Growth rates in business income     □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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15) What was the total turnover of British Airways in the year 2004-05? 
 
 a) £7,811m.  □ 
 
 b) £7,812m.  □ 
 
 c) £7,813m.  □ 
 
 d) £7,814m.  □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
16) Which of the following countries did not adopt the single European Currency in 
1999? 
 a) Ireland   □ 
 
 b) Austria  □ 
 
 c) Belgium  □ 
 
 d) Switzerland  □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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17) Which of the following is not a learning outcome for this module? 
 
 
 a) Identify the issues that influence overseas investment  
decisions        □ 
 
 b) Critically discuss ways of raising international funds  □ 
 
 c) Identify characteristics of exchange rate systems   □ 
 
 
d) Critically discuss overseas investment decisions made  
by multinational businesses      □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
18) Protectionism is defined by Eitman, Stonehill and Moffet as: 
 
 a) An attempt by a company to reduce its tax liability □ 
 
 
 b) An attempt by a company to reduce the risks to  
which it is exposed      □ 
 
 c) An attempt by government to reduce corruption □ 
 
 
d) An attempt by a government to protect particular 
 industries from foreign competition   □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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19) Interest Rate Parity (IRP) provides the linkage between: 
 
 a) Interest rates and inflation rates     □ 
 
 b) Foreign exchange markets and inflation rates   □ 
 
 c) Inflation rates and international money markets    □ 
 
 d) Foreign exchange markets and international money markets □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
20) Which of the following type of risks faced by Multi National Enterprises is 
classed as firm-specific? 
 
 a) Foreign exchange risks   □ 
 
 b) Transfer risks     □ 
 
 c) Cultural risk     □ 
 
 d) International risk    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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21) University regulations on plagiarism mean that students should 
 
 a) Only use their own opinions when writing assignments □ 
 
 b) Never use direct quotes from other people   □ 
 
 c) Never discuss assignments with other students  □ 
 
d)       Provide references when using other people‘s ideas   □ 
or words 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
22) The balance of payments is a summary of: 
 
a) All international transactions between a country and all  
other countries       □ 
 
 
 b) All international transactions between two companies   □ 
 
 
c) All costs incurred by a company when trading with  
foreign-owned businesses      □ 
 
 
d) All costs incurred by all companies in a country when 
trading with foreign companies     □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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23) In the late 1990s Daewoo had a debt to equity ratio which: 
 
 a) Was significantly less than the average of U.S. companies  □ 
 
 b) Was significantly higher than the average of U.S. companies □ 
 
 c) Was significantly lower than that of similar Korean    □ 
conglomerates   
 
 d) Was approximately equal to that of similar Korean conglomerates □ 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
24) When forecasting using Purchasing Power Parity, the UK forward rate equals:  
 
 a) Spot rate  x    1  +  overseas inflation rate   □ 
      1  +  UK inflation rate   
  
  
b) Spot rate  x    1  -  overseas inflation rate   □ 
      1  -  UK inflation rate   
 
 
 
 c) Spot rate  x           1  +  UK inflation rate   □ 
      1  +  overseas inflation rate   
  
 
 d) Spot rate  x           1  -  UK inflation rate   □ 
      1  -  overseas inflation rate    
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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25) Which of the following countries had the highest score in Transparency 
International‘s Corruption Perception index for 2001? 
 
 a) France      □ 
 
 b) Canada     □ 
 
 c) Turkey      □ 
 
 d) Mexico     □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
26) According to Conklin (2002) which of the following is suggested as a method 
for dealing with exchange rate risks? 
 
a) Borrow in a different currency to the one in which the business is trading 
        □ 
 
 
 b) Invest in as many different countries as possible  □ 
 
 
c) Arrange for most of the investment cost to be incurred over  
as short a period as possible      □ 
 
 
 d) Borrow domestically to do business domestically  □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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27) ASEAN stands for: 
 
 a) Association of Southern European Allied Nations  □ 
 
 b) Association of Southeast Asian Nations  □ 
 
 c) Association of Southeast African Nations  □ 
 
 d) Association of South Eastern Atlantic Nations □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
28) According to the World Almanac and Book of Facts 2002, which of the 
following languages, has the highest number of native speakers: 
 
 a) Bengali  □ 
 
 b) Japanese  □ 
 
 c) French   □ 
 
 d) Spanish  □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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29) Which of the following type of risks faced by Multi National Enterprises is 
classed as country-specific? 
 
 a) Governance risks     □ 
 
 b) Business risks      □ 
 
 c) Cultural and international risk   □ 
 
 d) Foreign exchange risks    □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
30) Which of the following is acknowledged by Yoshino as typical of Japanese 
work customs: 
 
 a) High employee turnover     □ 
 
 b) Very little socialising after work    □ 
 
 c) Decisions taken primarily by senior managers  □ 
 
 d) Group based rewards      □ 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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31) Which of the following countries ranked highest in the United Nations 2002 
Human Development Index? 
 
 a) Japan        □ 
 
 b) France        □ 
 
 c) Brazil        □ 
 
 d) Germany       □ 
 
 
 
 
Confidence level (25-100%)  ……….% 
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Appendix 9 
 
Coding Plan 
 
Variable Description            Code 
Age   18-21 
  22-25 
  26-29 
  30-33 
  34+ 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
Gender   male 
  female 
  1 
  2 
Study Programme babs 
babm 
bwhrm 
bwm 
bwim 
bwe 
mwbm 
baac 
bwf 
baaf 
fim 
bacm 
mba 
magfm 
mabm 
maiba 
mabfm 
baibs 
baiba 
bwit 
bwlscm 
bamkt 
bw tour 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
Country of Origin uk  
china  
indonesia  
thailand  
vietnam  
sweden  
india  
ukraine  
nepal  
taiwan  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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cyprus  
nigeria  
russia  
france  
germany  
liberia  
rwanda  
spain  
iran  
tanzania  
kuwait  
hong kong  
malaysia  
bangladesh  
SouthAfrica  
angola  
sri lanka  
zimbabwe  
bahrain  
brunei  
uae  
slovakia  
egypt  
latvia  
ireland  
Saudi   
gibraltar  
congo  
estonia  
bahrain  
lithuania  
denmark  
gambia  
 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
 
Module BM0118 
FN0134 
FN0205 
MN0253 
MN0307 
MN0353 
MN0431 
MN0457 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 
Agreement to participate    yes 
   no 
  1 
  2 
Appropriate use of scale    yes 
   no 
  1 
  2 
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Appendix 10 
Analysis of Differences in Mean Knowledge Scores 
30 Item Test Instruments 
 
 
Knowledge Score  by Module Code 
Module 
Code Mean N 
BM0118 .4739 70 
FN0134 .4838 57 
FN0205 .4242 22 
MN0253 .4663 158 
MN0307 .5519 27 
MN0353 .5620 47 
MN0431 .5096 85 
MN0457 .5198 42 
Total .4925 508 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Knowledge Score   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
3.960 7 500 .000 
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Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 
Ranks 
 Module 
Code N Mean Rank 
Knowledge Score BM0118 70 233.42 
FN0134 57 251.74 
FN0205 22 178.39 
MN0253 158 226.79 
MN0307 27 335.65 
MN0353 47 315.01 
MN0431 85 271.50 
MN0457 42 283.20 
Total 508  
 
 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Knowledge 
Score 
Chi-Square 32.128 
df 7 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Module 
Code 
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Appendix 11 
 
Analysis of Differences in Mean Knowledge Scores 
Randomly Sampled 25 Test Items 
 
 
Means by Module Code 
Module 
Code Mean N 
BM0118 .5026 70 
FN0134 .5042 57 
FN0205 .4818 22 
MN0253 .4960 158 
MN0307 .5107 27 
MN0353 .5245 47 
MN0431 .5053 85 
MN0457 .4969 42 
Total .5023 508 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Ranks 
 Module 
Code N Mean Rank 
Knowledge Score BM0118 70 254.10 
FN0134 57 262.56 
FN0205 22 233.48 
MN0253 158 249.71 
MN0307 27 272.06 
MN0353 47 266.51 
MN0431 85 254.19 
MN0457 42 249.15 
Total 508  
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Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Knowledge 
Score 
Chi-Square 1.560 
Df 7 
Asymp. Sig. .980 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Module 
Code 
 
 
 
234 
 
Appendix 12 
Test for Normal Distribution of the Bias Score 
 
 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  Bias Score 
N 508 
Normal Parameters
a
 Mean .0885 
Std. Deviation .14765 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .034 
Positive .034 
Negative -.027 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .762 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .606 
a. Test distribution is Normal.  
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Appendix 13 
Bias Score – One Sample t-test 
 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score 508 .0885 .14765 .00655 
 
 
 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0                                        
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Bias Score 13.504 507 .000 .08846 .0756 .1013 
                                   Sig. (1-tailed) = .000/2=    0.000 
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Appendix 14 
Correlation between Bias Score and Knowledge Score 
 
 
Correlations 
  
Bias Score 
Knowledge 
Score 
Bias Score Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.504
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 508 508 
Knowledge Score Pearson Correlation -.504
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 508 508 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Appendix 15 
Correlation between Mean Confidence and Bias Score 
 
 
Correlations 
  Mean 
Confidence Bias Score 
Mean Confidence Pearson Correlation 1.000 .561
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 508 508 
Bias Score Pearson Correlation .561
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 508 508 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
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Appendix 16 
Test for Age Differences in Bias Score 
 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 Age Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score 18-21 years 297 .0725 .13849 .00804 
22+ years 207 .1125 .15728 .01093 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.245 .135 -3.020 502 .003 -.04005 .01326 -.06611 -.01399 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-2.952 406.222 .003 -.04005 .01357 -.06673 -.01338 
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Appendix 17 
Test for Gender Differences in Bias Score 
 
 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score Male 281 .0986 .14723 .00878 
Female 224 .0761 .14844 .00992 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.000 .992 1.700 503 .090 .02250 .01324 -.00351 .04850 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.698 476.509 .090 .02250 .01325 -.00354 .04853 
    Sig. (1-tailed) = .090/2=    0.045 
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Appendix 18 
Bias Score – Test for Interaction between Age and Gender 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score   
Gender Age Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
Male 18-21 years .0776 .13903 169 
22+ years .1332 .15169 111 
Total .0996 .14648 280 
Female 18-21 years .0661 .13851 127 
22+ years .0885 .16098 96 
Total .0757 .14867 223 
Total 18-21 years .0726 .13869 296 
22+ years .1125 .15728 207 
Total .0890 .14779 503 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.993 3 499 .396 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Gender + over21 + Gender 
* over21 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .306
a
 3 .102 4.778 .003 
Intercept 4.020 1 4.020 188.220 .000 
Gender .095 1 .095 4.454 .035 
Age .184 1 .184 8.608 .004 
Gender * Age .033 1 .033 1.553 .213 
Error 10.658 499 .021   
Total 14.952 503    
Corrected Total 10.964 502    
a. R Squared = .028 (Adjusted R Squared = .022)   
 
242 
 
Appendix 19 
 
Test for Differences in Bias Score between  
UK and Chinese Students 
 
 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 Country 
of Origin N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score UK 269 .0509 .13124 .00800 
China 102 .1617 .15159 .01501 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.487 .223 -6.950 369 .000 -.11081 .01594 -.14216 -.07946 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
-6.515 161.644 .000 -.11081 .01701 -.14440 -.07722 
                                 Sig. (1-tailed) = .000/2=    0.000 
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Appendix 20 
Bias Score - Test for Interaction between Country and Age 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score   
Country 
of Origin Age Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
UK 18-21 years .0520 .12898 235 
22+ years .0429 .14776 34 
Total .0509 .13124 269 
China 18-21 years .1996 .15894 25 
22+ years .1492 .14908 76 
Total .1617 .15235 101 
Total 18-21 years .0662 .13882 260 
22+ years .1164 .15600 110 
Total .0811 .14575 370 
 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.694 3 366 .556 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Origin + Age + Origin * 
Age 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .952
a
 3 .317 16.867 .000 
Intercept 2.268 1 2.268 120.533 .000 
Origin .742 1 .742 39.450 .000 
Age .041 1 .041 2.163 .142 
Origin * Age .020 1 .020 1.046 .307 
Error 6.887 366 .019   
Total 10.273 370    
Corrected Total 7.839 369    
a. R Squared = .121 (Adjusted R Squared = .114)   
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Appendix 21 
Bias Score - Test for Interaction between  
Country and Gender 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
Country 
of Origin Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
UK Male .0702 .13822 159 
Female .0229 .11595 109 
Total .0510 .13147 268 
China Male .1505 .16144 42 
Female .1695 .14518 60 
Total .1617 .15159 102 
Total Male .0870 .14665 201 
Female .0750 .14489 169 
Total .0815 .14577 370 
 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.814 3 366 .144 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Origin + Gender + Origin * 
Gender 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.059
a
 3 .353 19.042 .000 
Intercept 3.051 1 3.051 164.617 .000 
Origin .920 1 .920 49.642 .000 
Gender .014 1 .014 .769 .381 
Origin * Gender .079 1 .079 4.237 .040 
Error 6.783 366 .019   
Total 10.298 370    
Corrected Total 7.841 369    
a. R Squared = .135 (Adjusted R Squared = .128)   
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Appendix 22 
Test for Gender Differences in Bias Score – Chinese Students 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score Male 42 .1505 .16144 .02491 
Female 60 .1695 .14518 .01874 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.349 .556 -.622 100 .535 -.01902 .03059 -.07972 .04167 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.610 82.242 .543 -.01902 .03117 -.08104 .04299 
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Appendix 23 
Test for Differences in Bias Score by Level of Study 
 
 
Report 
Level of Study 
Mean 
Confidence 
Knowledge 
Score Bias Score 
4 Mean .5968 .5033 .0934 
N 127 127 127 
5 Mean .5529 .4943 .0584 
N 180 180 180 
6 Mean .5819 .5195 .0623 
N 74 74 74 
7 Mean .6439 .5025 .1413 
N 127 127 127 
Total Mean .5908 .5023 .0885 
N 508 508 508 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Bias Score    
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
.667 3 504 .573 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Bias Score      
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .571 3 .190 9.152 .000 
Within Groups 10.482 504 .021   
Total 11.053 507    
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Multiple Comparisons 
Bias Score 
Tukey HSD 
     
(I) Level 
of Study 
(J) 
Level of 
Study 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
4 5 .03494 .01671 .158 -.0081 .0780 
6 .03109 .02109 .454 -.0233 .0855 
7 -.04795
*
 .01810 .041 -.0946 -.0013 
5 4 -.03494 .01671 .158 -.0780 .0081 
6 -.00385 .01991 .997 -.0552 .0475 
7 -.08289
*
 .01671 .000 -.1260 -.0398 
6 4 -.03109 .02109 .454 -.0855 .0233 
5 .00385 .01991 .997 -.0475 .0552 
7 -.07904
*
 .02109 .001 -.1334 -.0247 
7 4 .04795
*
 .01810 .041 .0013 .0946 
5 .08289
*
 .01671 .000 .0398 .1260 
6 .07904
*
 .02109 .001 .0247 .1334 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Appendix 24 
Bias Score - Test for Interaction between  
Level of Study and Age 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score   
Level of 
Study Age Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
4 18-21 years .0922 .13652 114 
22+ years .1038 .19658 13 
Total .0934 .14285 127 
5 18-21 years .0545 .14271 158 
22+ years .0833 .12285 21 
Total .0579 .14052 179 
6 18-21 years .0772 .10742 18 
22+ years .0620 .14136 55 
Total .0658 .13325 73 
7 18-21 years .1443 .08696 7 
22+ years .1422 .15981 118 
Total .1423 .15641 125 
Total 18-21 years .0725 .13849 297 
22+ years .1125 .15728 207 
Total .0889 .14767 504 
 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.363 7 496 .219 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Level + Age + Level * Age 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .591
a
 7 .084 4.034 .000 
Intercept 1.582 1 1.582 75.608 .000 
Level .130 3 .043 2.064 .104 
Age .001 1 .001 .070 .791 
Level * Age .016 3 .005 .257 .856 
Error 10.378 496 .021   
Total 14.953 504    
Corrected Total 10.969 503    
a. R Squared = .054 (Adjusted R Squared = .041)   
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Appendix 25 
Bias Score - Test for Interaction between  
Level of Study and Gender 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
Level of 
Study Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
4 Male .1076 .14285 74 
Female .0746 .14301 52 
Total .0940 .14327 126 
5 Male .0547 .13975 98 
Female .0629 .14176 82 
Total .0584 .14033 180 
6 Male .0662 .12502 39 
Female .0580 .14830 35 
Total .0623 .13563 74 
7 Male .1687 .14802 70 
Female .1087 .16165 55 
Total .1423 .15641 125 
Total Male .0986 .14723 281 
Female .0761 .14844 224 
Total .0886 .14805 505 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.489 7 497 .843 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Level + Gender + Level * 
Gender 
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .727
a
 7 .104 5.005 .000 
Intercept 3.469 1 3.469 167.067 .000 
Level .519 3 .173 8.338 .000 
Gender .061 1 .061 2.928 .088 
Level * Gender .092 3 .031 1.483 .218 
Error 10.319 497 .021   
Total 15.014 505    
Corrected Total 11.047 504    
a. R Squared = .066 (Adjusted R Squared = .053)   
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Appendix 26 
 
Bias Score - Test for Interaction between  
Level of Study and Country 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
Level of 
Study 
Country 
of Origin Mean Std. Deviation N 
4 UK .0749 .12909 94 
China .1308 .16938 13 
Total .0817 .13492 107 
5 UK .0326 .12810 145 
China .2167 .12196 21 
Total .0559 .14103 166 
6 UK .0205 .13442 20 
China .1163 .13704 19 
Total .0672 .14242 39 
7 UK .1500 .12508 10 
China .1639 .15982 49 
Total .1615 .15360 59 
Total UK .0509 .13124 269 
China .1617 .15159 102 
Total .0813 .14561 371 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.532 7 363 .810 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Level + Origin + Level * 
Origin 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Bias Score     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.243
a
 7 .178 9.760 .000 
Intercept 2.246 1 2.246 123.506 .000 
Level .156 3 .052 2.863 .037 
Origin .335 1 .335 18.406 .000 
Level * Origin .212 3 .071 3.884 .009 
Error 6.602 363 .018   
Total 10.298 371    
Corrected Total 7.845 370    
a. R Squared = .158 (Adjusted R Squared = .142)   
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Appendix 27 
Test for Differences in Bias Score by Entry Status  
Level 6 Participants 
 
Report 
Entry Status 
Mean 
Confidence 
Knowledge 
Score Bias Score 
Direct Entrants Mean .6086 .5198 .0886 
N 44 44 44 
Continuing Students Mean .5427 .5190 .0237 
N 30 30 30 
Total Mean .5819 .5195 .0623 
N 74 74 74 
 
 
 
   
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.675 .414 2.068 72 .042 .06497 .03142 .00234 .12760 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
2.161 70.284 .034 .06497 .03007 .00500 .12494 
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Appendix 28 
Test for Differences in Bias Score by Entry Status  
Level 7 Participants 
 
Report 
Entry Status 
Mean 
Confidence 
Knowledge 
Score Bias Score 
Direct Entrants Mean .6350 .5132 .1219 
N 80 80 80 
Continuing Students Mean .6589 .4843 .1745 
N 47 47 47 
Total Mean .6439 .5025 .1413 
N 127 127 127 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.324 .130 -1.859 125 .065 -.05259 .02829 -.10858 .00339 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.957 111.744 .053 -.05259 .02688 -.10585 .00066 
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Appendix 29 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.113
**
 -.096
*
 .045 -.138
**
 -.004 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .007 .019 .348 .001 .479 
N 508 469 463 78 467 152 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.113
**
 1.000 .867
**
 .182 .855
**
 .739
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .007  .000 .056 .000 .000 
N 469 469 463 78 467 152 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.096
*
 .867
**
 1.000 .139 .683
**
 .402
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .019 .000  .112 .000 .000 
N 463 463 463 78 461 148 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.045 .182 .139 1.000 .236
*
 -.105 
Sig. (1-tailed) .348 .056 .112  .019 .372 
N 78 78 78 78 78 12 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.138
**
 .855
**
 .683
**
 .236
*
 1.000 .681
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .019  .000 
N 467 467 461 78 467 152 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.004 .739
**
 .402
**
 -.105 .681
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .479 .000 .000 .372 .000  
N 152 152 148 12 152 152 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 30 
Test for Differences in Bias Score by  
Academic Performance Group 
 
 
Descriptives 
Bias Score        
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 156 .1049 .14899 .01193 .0814 .1285 -.28 .42 
Middle 156 .0960 .15303 .01225 .0718 .1202 -.25 .54 
High 157 .0703 .14162 .01130 .0479 .0926 -.28 .59 
Total 469 .0904 .14836 .00685 .0769 .1038 -.28 .59 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Bias Score    
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.286 2 466 .277 
 
 
ANOVA 
Bias Score      
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .102 2 .051 2.321 .099 
Within Groups 10.200 466 .022   
Total 10.301 468    
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Appendix 31 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Undergraduate Students – Study Level 4 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.188
*
 -.156
*
 .092 -.212
*
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .021 .047 .280 .011 . 
N 127 117 117 42 117 0 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.188
*
 1 .946
**
 .242 .730
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .021  .000 .062 .000 . 
N 117 117 117 42 117 0 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.156
*
 .946
**
 1 .092 .563
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .047 .000  .281 .000 . 
N 117 117 117 42 117 0 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.092 .242 .092 1 .356
*
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .280 .062 .281  .010 . 
N 42 42 42 42 42 0 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.212
*
 .730
**
 .563
**
 .356
*
 1 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .011 .000 .000 .010  . 
N 117 117 117 42 117 0 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) . . . . .  
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.    
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 32 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Undergraduate Students – Study Level 5 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.055 -.051 -.147 -.111 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .247 .262 .334 .085 . 
N 180 156 156 11 154 0 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.055 1 .860
**
 .601
*
 .862
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .247  .000 .025 .000 . 
N 156 156 156 11 154 0 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.051 .860
**
 1 .610
*
 .652
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .262 .000  .023 .000 . 
N 156 156 156 11 154 0 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.147 .601
*
 .610
*
 1 .531
*
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .334 .025 .023  .046 . 
N 11 11 11 11 11 0 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.111 .862
**
 .652
**
 .531
*
 1 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .085 .000 .000 .046  . 
N 154 154 154 11 154 0 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) . . . . .  
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.    
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 33 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Undergraduate Students – Study Level 6 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.071 -.043 .425 -.129 -.008 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .276 .358 .097 .138 .479 
N 74 73 73 11 73 46 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.071 1.000 .899
**
 .062 .919
**
 .810
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .276  .000 .428 .000 .000 
N 73 73 73 11 73 46 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.043 .899
**
 1.000 .031 .742
**
 .582
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .358 .000  .464 .000 .000 
N 73 73 73 11 73 46 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.425 .062 .031 1.000 -.034 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .097 .428 .464  .461 . 
N 11 11 11 11 11 1 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.129 .919
**
 .742
**
 -.034 1.000 .826
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .138 .000 .000 .461  .000 
N 73 73 73 11 73 46 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.008 .810
**
 .582
**
 .
a
 .826
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .479 .000 .000 . .000  
N 46 46 46 1 46 46 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is 
constant. 
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Appendix 34 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Postgraduate Students 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.175
*
 -.122 .009 -.126 -.029 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .026 .095 .487 .083 .386 
N 127 123 117 14 123 106 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.175
*
 1.000 .661
**
 .034 .881
**
 .681
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .026  .000 .454 .000 .000 
N 123 123 117 14 123 106 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.122 .661
**
 1.000 .168 .529
**
 .262
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .095 .000  .283 .000 .004 
N 117 117 117 14 117 102 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.009 .034 .168 1.000 .058 -.095 
Sig. (1-tailed) .487 .454 .283  .423 .390 
N 14 14 14 14 14 11 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.126 .881
**
 .529
**
 .058 1.000 .570
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .083 .000 .000 .423  .000 
N 123 123 117 14 123 106 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.029 .681
**
 .262
**
 -.095 .570
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .386 .000 .004 .390 .000  
N 106 106 102 11 106 106 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 35 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Postgraduate Students – Direct Entrants 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.226
*
 -.192
*
 -.053 -.241
*
 -.075 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .022 .049 .438 .016 .277 
N 80 79 75 11 79 64 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.226
*
 1.000 .684
**
 .066 .917
**
 .692
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .022  .000 .424 .000 .000 
N 79 79 75 11 79 64 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.192
*
 .684
**
 1.000 .251 .510
**
 .180 
Sig. (1-tailed) .049 .000  .229 .000 .081 
N 75 75 75 11 75 62 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.053 .066 .251 1.000 .045 -.085 
Sig. (1-tailed) .438 .424 .229  .447 .414 
N 11 11 11 11 11 9 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.241
*
 .917
**
 .510
**
 .045 1.000 .554
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .016 .000 .000 .447  .000 
N 79 79 75 11 79 64 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.075 .692
**
 .180 -.085 .554
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .277 .000 .081 .414 .000  
N 64 64 62 9 64 64 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 36 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Postgraduate Continuing Students 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.099 .059 .921 .082 .029 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .261 .355 .128 .299 .427 
N 47 44 42 3 44 42 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.099 1.000 .645
**
 .740 .806
**
 .672
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .261  .000 .235 .000 .000 
N 44 44 42 3 44 42 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
.059 .645
**
 1.000 -.579 .623
**
 .388
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .355 .000  .303 .000 .007 
N 42 42 42 3 42 40 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.921 .740 -.579 1.000 .805 1.000
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .128 .235 .303  .202 . 
N 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.082 .806
**
 .623
**
 .805 1.000 .595
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .299 .000 .000 .202  .000 
N 44 44 42 3 44 42 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.029 .672
**
 .388
**
 1.000
**
 .595
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .427 .000 .007 . .000  
N 42 42 40 2 42 42 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 37 
Test for Differences in Bias Score by Entry Status  
All Students 
 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 Entry Status N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Bias Score Direct Entrants 250 .0997 .14526 .00919 
Continuing Students 258 .0776 .14941 .00930 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Bias 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.225 .635 1.688 506 .092 .02208 .01308 -.00361 .04778 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.689 505.994 .092 .02208 .01307 -.00360 .04777 
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Appendix 38 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
All Direct Entrants 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.190
**
 -.171
**
 .022 -.199
**
 -.077 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .002 .004 .433 .001 .239 
N 250 240 236 62 240 86 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.190
**
 1.000 .887
**
 .169 .864
**
 .711
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .002  .000 .095 .000 .000 
N 240 240 236 62 240 86 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.171
**
 .887
**
 1.000 .129 .722
**
 .335
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .004 .000  .159 .000 .001 
N 236 236 236 62 236 84 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.022 .169 .129 1.000 .246
*
 -.090 
Sig. (1-tailed) .433 .095 .159  .027 .402 
N 62 62 62 62 62 10 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.199
**
 .864
**
 .722
**
 .246
*
 1.000 .619
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .027  .000 
N 240 240 236 62 240 86 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.077 .711
**
 .335
**
 -.090 .619
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .239 .000 .001 .402 .000  
N 86 86 84 10 86 86 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 39 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
All Continuing Students 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.023 -.021 .206 -.067 .077 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .365 .378 .222 .157 .269 
N 258 229 227 16 227 66 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.023 1.000 .837
**
 .373 .843
**
 .773
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .365  .000 .077 .000 .000 
N 229 229 227 16 227 66 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.021 .837
**
 1.000 .373 .626
**
 .502
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .378 .000  .078 .000 .000 
N 227 227 227 16 225 64 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.206 .373 .373 1.000 .251 1.000
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .222 .077 .078  .174 . 
N 16 16 16 16 16 2 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.067 .843
**
 .626
**
 .251 1.000 .742
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .157 .000 .000 .174  .000 
N 227 227 225 16 227 66 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.077 .773
**
 .502
**
 1.000
**
 .742
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .269 .000 .000 . .000  
N 66 66 64 2 66 66 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 40 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Aged 18-21 Years 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.074 -.061 .061 -.070 -.219 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .115 .159 .328 .129 .237 
N 297 268 268 56 266 13 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.074 1.000 .906
**
 .249
*
 .821
**
 .697
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .115  .000 .032 .000 .004 
N 268 268 268 56 266 13 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.061 .906
**
 1.000 .114 .658
**
 .548
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .159 .000  .201 .000 .026 
N 268 268 268 56 266 13 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.061 .249
*
 .114 1.000 .347
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .328 .032 .201  .004 . 
N 56 56 56 56 56 0 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.070 .821
**
 .658
**
 .347
**
 1.000 .752
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .129 .000 .000 .004  .002 
N 266 266 266 56 266 13 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.219 .697
**
 .548
*
 .
a
 .752
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .237 .004 .026 . .002  
N 13 13 13 0 13 13 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is 
constant. 
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Appendix 41 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Aged 22+ Years 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.110 -.078 .059 -.153
*
 .001 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .062 .142 .396 .016 .496 
N 207 197 191 22 197 138 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.110 1.000 .782
**
 .033 .870
**
 .745
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .062  .000 .442 .000 .000 
N 197 197 191 22 197 138 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.078 .782
**
 1.000 .162 .626
**
 .381
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .142 .000  .236 .000 .000 
N 191 191 191 22 191 134 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.059 .033 .162 1.000 .014 -.105 
Sig. (1-tailed) .396 .442 .236  .475 .372 
N 22 22 22 22 22 12 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.153
*
 .870
**
 .626
**
 .014 1.000 .673
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .016 .000 .000 .475  .000 
N 197 197 191 22 197 138 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.001 .745
**
 .381
**
 -.105 .673
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .496 .000 .000 .372 .000  
N 138 138 134 12 138 138 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 42 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Males 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.117
*
 -.099 .068 -.120
*
 .036 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .030 .055 .353 .026 .379 
N 281 261 259 33 260 77 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.117
*
 1.000 .854
**
 .415
**
 .861
**
 .731
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .030  .000 .008 .000 .000 
N 261 261 259 33 260 77 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.099 .854
**
 1.000 .221 .672
**
 .356
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .055 .000  .108 .000 .001 
N 259 259 259 33 258 76 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.068 .415
**
 .221 1.000 .514
**
 1.000
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .353 .008 .108  .001 . 
N 33 33 33 33 33 2 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.120
*
 .861
**
 .672
**
 .514
**
 1.000 .656
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .026 .000 .000 .001  .000 
N 260 260 258 33 260 77 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.036 .731
**
 .356
**
 1.000
**
 .656
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .379 .000 .001 . .000  
N 77 77 76 2 77 77 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 43 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Females 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.113 -.101 .042 -.171
**
 -.058 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .054 .078 .394 .007 .312 
N 224 205 201 44 204 75 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.113 1.000 .885
**
 .052 .847
**
 .747
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .054  .000 .369 .000 .000 
N 205 205 201 44 204 75 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.101 .885
**
 1.000 .094 .699
**
 .458
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .078 .000  .272 .000 .000 
N 201 201 201 44 200 72 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.042 .052 .094 1.000 .064 -.158 
Sig. (1-tailed) .394 .369 .272  .340 .331 
N 44 44 44 44 44 10 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.171
**
 .847
**
 .699
**
 .064 1.000 .710
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .007 .000 .000 .340  .000 
N 204 204 200 44 204 75 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.058 .747
**
 .458
**
 -.158 .710
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .312 .000 .000 .331 .000  
N 75 75 72 10 75 75 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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Appendix 44 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
UK Students  
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 .013 .030 .126 .048 .119 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .422 .320 .216 .229 .281 
N 269 243 243 41 241 26 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
.013 1.000 .871
**
 .283
*
 .811
**
 .754
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .422  .000 .036 .000 .000 
N 243 243 243 41 241 26 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
.030 .871
**
 1.000 .126 .625
**
 .392
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .320 .000  .216 .000 .024 
N 243 243 243 41 241 26 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.126 .283
*
 .126 1.000 .414
**
 .
a
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .216 .036 .216  .004 . 
N 41 41 41 41 41 0 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.048 .811
**
 .625
**
 .414
**
 1.000 .794
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .229 .000 .000 .004  .000 
N 241 241 241 41 241 26 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.119 .754
**
 .392
*
 .
a
 .794
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .281 .000 .024 . .000  
N 26 26 26 0 26 26 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is 
constant. 
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Appendix 45 
Correlation between Bias Score and Academic Performance 
Chinese Students 
Correlations 
  Bias 
Score 
Overall 
Mark 
Exam 
Mark 
Presentation 
Mark 
Coursework 
Mark 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Bias Score Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.008 -.082 -.595
*
 -.010 .167 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .470 .217 .035 .461 .108 
N 102 98 94 10 98 57 
Overall Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.008 1.000 .754
**
 -.487 .799
**
 .753
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .470  .000 .077 .000 .000 
N 98 98 94 10 98 57 
Exam Mark Pearson 
Correlation 
-.082 .754
**
 1.000 -.438 .522
**
 .192 
Sig. (1-tailed) .217 .000  .103 .000 .084 
N 94 94 94 10 94 53 
Presentation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.595
*
 -.487 -.438 1.000 -.315 1.000
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .035 .077 .103  .187 . 
N 10 10 10 10 10 2 
Coursework 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.010 .799
**
 .522
**
 -.315 1.000 .666
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .461 .000 .000 .187  .000 
N 98 98 94 10 98 57 
Dissertation 
Mark 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.167 .753
**
 .192 1.000
**
 .666
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .108 .000 .084 . .000  
N 57 57 53 2 57 57 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).     
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